'Mossad' X account says hundreds of IRGC members fed up with regime have reached out for help
An account claiming to be the Mossad's official Farsi platform has reported that several IRGC soldiers are reaching out to the agency.
"We expected this, but not to this extent! Hundreds of Revolutionary Guards soldiers and officers, fed up with the regime, are reaching out to us. We promise to get in touch with you - please be patient," the account wrote in Farsi in a post on X/Twitter.
Israeli officials have not commented on the ownership of the @MossadSpokesman Farsi feed, and it is not listed among Israel's verified government or military social-media channels.
It seems that the account serves as a psychological operations platform that mixes genuine leaks with trolling to unsettle Tehran's leadership and engage ordinary Iranians.
On Sunday, the Mossad posted that it was aware that three senior Iranian military commanders were closely monitoring its account. The Mossad said that 'the respected gentlemen Pakpour, Mousavi, and Araghchi are among our most loyal viewers," and said that it was following them back.
The Israeli intelligence agency then warned Iranian citizens not to interact with the account. 'You may keep watching our content, but for your own safety, please avoid following the page or reacting to our posts.'
The anonymous X account, which has been posting satirical jabs and provocative claims since late June, also transformed Iran's attempt to conceal the identity of its new chief of staff into an interactive guessing game. "Know that we know exactly what his name is, and we know him well," they wrote. "Please send us your guesses about his name."
When an Iranian user guessed correctly, the account congratulated and urged him to privately message the account for a prize.
The account also created an "expert medical team" for Iranian citizens.
"Dear citizens of Iran, the ceasefire is in effect," they wrote. "At this moment, the regime is focusing on its senior ranks, not on taking care of its citizens. We are by your side." Mossad offered medical services, including specialists in cardiology, diabetes, lung diseases, and mental health, available through WhatsApp, Telegram, or Signal.
The tweet about hundreds of IRGC soldiers and officers reaching out to the Mossad comes after a series of significant Israeli actions inside Iran, including smuggling drones and explosives used to target Iranian defense systems.
In response, Iran arrested dozens of individuals on suspicion of espionage—28 in Tehran alone—and executed one as a warning.
The Islamic regime also set up a special social media monitoring unit, arrested 60 people in Isfahan, and issued guidelines for citizens on how to identify collaborators, such as warning against people wearing sunglasses at night or homes with closed curtains.
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Forbes
40 minutes ago
- Forbes
Iran War Rekindles U.S. Proposals To Give Israel Strategic Air Power
A B-2 Stealth Bomber lands at the Palmdale Aircraft Integration Center of Excellence in Palmdale, ... More California on July 17, 2014, as the US Air Force and manufacturer Northrop Grumman celebrated the 25th anniversary of the B-2 Stealth Bomber's first flight. Northrop Grumman is the prime contractor for the US Air Force's B-2 stealth bomber, a key component in the nation's long range strike arsenal and one of the most survivable aircraft in the world. AFP PHOTO/Frederic J. BROWN (Photo by Frederic J. BROWN / AFP) (Photo by FREDERIC J. BROWN/AFP via Getty Images) The Twelve-Day War between Israel and Iran in June concluded shortly after the United States intervened by bombing Iranian nuclear sites with 30,000-pound bunker busters dropped by strategic B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. The U.S. intervention—the first-ever time America's military fought alongside Israel in a war—was necessitated mainly by Israel's complete lack of such bombers and munitions. The war has led to fresh calls in Washington to equip Israel with these capabilities. Introduced by U.S. Representatives Josh Gottheimer (Democrat-New Jersey) and Mike Lawler (Republican-New York) on Wednesday, the bipartisan Bunker Buster Act aims to authorize President Trump 'to support Israel's defense by providing the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), or 'bunker buster' bomb, and the aircraft required to deploy it – to take out Iran's underground nuclear infrastructure.' 'Equipping Israel with this capability directly strengthens American national security by eliminating Iran's pathway to a nuclear weapon,' the bill added. While it did not explicitly mention the B-2, 'the aircraft required to deploy' the GBU-57A/B MOP unquestionably refers to the U.S. Air Force's sole strategic stealth bomber since that's the only aircraft presently certified to carry it. Israel doesn't have any heavy bombers, stealthy or otherwise, capable of carrying such gigantic bombs. Its only manned stealth aircraft is the F-35 Lightning II strike fighter, which, of course, is far too small to carry the MOP in its internal bay or on any external hardpoints. (Israel's lack of any heavy bombers even led analysts to question the feasibility of Israel dropping a GBU-57s out of the back of its turboprop C-130 Hercules transport planes!) The Bunker Buster Act isn't the first proposal to furnish Israel with strategic air power—Gottheimer already proposed it twice in the last three years—and probably won't be the last if it doesn't pass. In a June 19 editorial, Michael Oren, Israel's ambassador to the United States from 2009 to 2013, recalled that he repeatedly requested Washington sell Israel at least one B-52 Stratofortress bomber, confident that it dismiss out of hand any request for its much newer B-2 or B-1 Lancers. 'By selling us even one B-52, I told White House officials, the United States would be sending an unequivocal message to the Iranian regime regarding America's commitment to preventing Iran from producing nuclear bombs,' Oren wrote. In the piece, he recounted twice requesting the B-52 in 2013 and for a third time in 2018 to no avail. It's worth recalling that the U.S. never exported any of its three strategic bombers, meaning that even a sale of the vintage B-52 would have proven unprecedented. An April 2014 Wall Street Journal editorial similarly advocated that the U.S. should supply surplus B-52s to Israel, although called for a dozen rather than just one, along with MOPs. The latter case was derided shortly thereafter as 'a silly little proposal with approximately zero chance of actually being implemented.' Such criticism of proposals to supply Israel with the B-52 highlighted that iconic bomber's lumbering speed and complete lack of any stealthiness, which would have left it highly vulnerable to Iranian air defenses and even Iran's aged air force. Nevertheless, Israel's 12 days of airstrikes rendered much of Iran's air defense capabilities wholly ineffective. Furthermore, the Israeli Air Force helped clear a path for the U.S. Air Force B-2 strike on June 22, Operation Midnight Hammer, by targeting air defenses across southern Iran in the preceding 48 hours. While using a B-52 for such a mission would have proven much more risky than using the B-2, Israel could undoubtedly have conducted an operation like Midnight Hammer independently had it possessed B-2s. It may have even proven capable of striking those nuclear sites with B-52s, given the extent to which it degraded Iranian air defenses. After all, it already excelled at suppressing enemy air defenses with its fighter jets. Israeli fourth-generation fighters even operated in Iranian airspace without any losses throughout the war. Logistical and technical considerations aside, the supply of B-2s and MOPs to Israel could be promoted politically as a way of avoiding America becoming entangled in another Israel-Iran War. In his editorial, published three days before Midnight Hammer, Oren also argued that had Washington granted his B-52 request, 'Israel would not be in a position of wondering whether the United States will perform the task for us.' 'We would mitigate the claims, now being made by both the left and the right in the United States, that Israel is dragging America into another endless Middle Eastern war,' he added. As stated above, Operation Midnight Hammer was the first time the United States directly entered a war on the side of Israel. Typically, it has supplied or sold Israel the means and munitions to fight its conflict by itself. An apt example of this was Operation Nickel Grass during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the Nixon administration airlifted large quantities of hardware, including fighters and tanks, to directly replenish heavy Israeli losses as the war was still raging. U.S. pilots flew fighter jets directly to Israel and gave them to their Israeli counterparts but did not directly participate in any combat. After the U.S. successfully convinced Israel not to retaliate to Iraq's Scud missile attacks during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Washington rewarded it with supplies of surplus F-15 and F-16 fighter jets along with AH-64 and UH-60A helicopters. If the Bunker Buster Act ultimately passes—and again, that's a big if—a U.S. provision of B-2s and MOPs could indicate Washington has reverted to that long-established pre-June 22 status quo. In other words, while the Israel-Iran War may not have been a one-off, direct U.S. military involvement in support of an Israeli offensive could well have been precisely that.
San Francisco Chronicle
an hour ago
- San Francisco Chronicle
American bombs in Iran also reverberate in China and North Korea
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — President Donald Trump campaigned on keeping the United States out of foreign wars, but it didn't take long to convince him to come to the direct aid of Israel, hitting Iranian nuclear targets with bunker-buster bombs dropped by B-2 stealth bombers and Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine. Beyond the attack's immediate impact on helping bring the 12-day war to a close, experts say Trump's decision to use force against another country also will certainly be reverberating in the Asia-Pacific, Washington's priority theater. 'Trump's strikes on Iran show that he's not afraid to use military force — this would send a clear message to North Korea, and even to China and Russia, about Trump's style,' said Duyeon Kim, a senior analyst at the Center for a New American Security based in Seoul, South Korea. 'Before the strikes, Pyongyang and Beijing might have assumed that Trump is risk averse, particularly based on his behavior his first presidency despite some tough talk," Kim said. China, North Korea and Russia all condemn US strike Ten days into the war between Israel and Iran, Trump made the risky decision to step in, hitting three nuclear sites with American firepower on June 22 in a bid to destroy the country's nuclear program at a time while negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still ongoing. The attacks prompted a pro forma Iranian retaliatory strike the following day on a U.S. base in nearby Qatar, which caused no casualties, and both Iran and Israel then agreed to a ceasefire on June 24. North Korea, China and Russia all were quick to condemn the American attack, with Russian President Vladimir Putin calling it 'unprovoked aggression,' China's Foreign Ministry saying it violated international law and 'exacerbated tensions in the Middle East,' and North Korea's Foreign Ministry maintaining it 'trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.' While the strikes were a clear tactical success, the jury is still out on whether they will have a more broad strategic benefit to Washington's goals in the Middle East or convince Iran it needs to work harder than ever to develop a nuclear deterrent, possibly pulling the U.S. back into a longer-term conflict. US allies could see attack as positive sign for deterrence If the attack remains a one-off strike, U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region likely will see the decision to become involved as a positive sign from Trump's administration, said Euan Graham, a senior defense analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 'The U.S. strike on Iran will be regarded as net plus by Pacific allies if it is seen to reinforce red lines, restore deterrence and is of limited duration, so as not to pull the administration off-course from its stated priorities in the Indo-Pacific,' he said. 'China will take note that Trump is prepared to use force, at least opportunistically.' In China, many who have seen Trump as having a 'no-war mentality' will reassess that in the wake of the attacks, which were partially aimed at forcing Iran's hand in nuclear program negotiations, said Zhao Minghao, an international relations professor at China's Fudan University in Shanghai. 'The way the U.S. used power with its air attacks against Iran is something China needs to pay attention to,' he said. 'How Trump used power to force negotiations has a significance for how China and the U.S. will interact in the future.' But, he said, Washington should not think it can employ the same strategy with Beijing. 'If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S., it may be difficult for the U.S. to withdraw as soon as possible, let alone withdraw unscathed,' he said. China and North Korea present different challenges Indeed, China and North Korea present very different challenges than Iran. First and foremost, both already have nuclear weapons, raising the stakes of possible retaliation considerably in the event of any attack. There also is no Asian equivalent of Israel, whose relentless attacks on Iranian missile defenses in the opening days of the war paved the way for the B-2 bombers to fly in and out without a shot being fired at them. Still, the possibility of the U.S. becoming involved in a conflict involving either China or North Korea is a very real one, and Beijing and Pyongyang will almost certainly try to assess what the notoriously unpredictable Trump would do. North Korea will likely be 'quite alarmed' at what Israel, with a relatively small but high-quality force, has been able to achieve over Iran, said Joseph Dempsey, a defense expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. At the same time, it likely will be seen internally as justification for its own nuclear weapons program, 'If Iran did have deployable nuclear weapons would this have occurred?' Dempsey said. 'Probably not.' The U.S. decision to attack while still in talks with Iran will also not go unnoticed, said Hong Min, a senior analyst at South Korea's Institute for National Unification. 'North Korea may conclude that dialogue, if done carelessly, could backfire by giving the United States a pretext for possible aggression,' he said. 'Instead of provoking the Trump administration, North Korea is more likely to take an even more passive stance toward negotiations with Washington, instead focusing on strengthening its internal military buildup and pursuing closer ties with Russia, narrowing the prospects for future talks," he said. China and Taiwan will draw lessons China will look at the attacks through the visor of Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island off its coast that China claims as its own territory and President Xi Jinping has not ruled out taking by force. The U.S. supplies Taiwan with weapons and is one of its most important allies, though Washington's official policy on whether it would come to Taiwan's aid in the case of a conflict with China is known as 'strategic ambiguity," meaning not committing to how it would respond. Militarily, the strike on Iran raises the question of whether the U.S. might show less restraint than has been expected by China in its response and hit targets on the Chinese mainland in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, said Drew Thompson, senior fellow with the Singapore-based think tank RSIS Rajaratnam School of International Studies. It will also certainly underscore for Beijing the 'difficulty of predicting Trump's actions,' he said. "The U.S. airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities caught many by surprise," Thompson said. "I think it demonstrated a tolerance and acceptance of risk in the Trump administration that is perhaps surprising.' It also gives rise to a concern that Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te, who in recent speeches has increased warnings about the threat from China, may be further emboldened in his rhetoric, said Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based foreign policy think tank Defense Priorities. Already, Lai's words have prompted China to accuse him of pursuing Taiwanese independence, which is a red line for Beijing. Goldstein said he worried Taiwan may try to take advantage of the American 'use of force against Iran to increase its deterrent situation versus the mainland.' 'President Lai's series of recent speeches appear almost designed to set up a new cross-strait crisis, perhaps in the hopes of building more support in Washington and elsewhere around the Pacific,' said Goldstein, who also is director of the China Initiative at Brown University's Watson Institute.
The Hill
an hour ago
- The Hill
American bombs in Iran also reverberate in China and North Korea
DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — President Donald Trump campaigned on keeping the United States out of foreign wars, but it didn't take long to convince him to come to the direct aid of Israel, hitting Iranian nuclear targets with bunker-buster bombs dropped by B-2 stealth bombers and Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from a submarine. Beyond the attack's immediate impact on helping bring the 12-day war to a close, experts say Trump's decision to use force against another country also will certainly be reverberating in the Asia-Pacific, Washington's priority theater. 'Trump's strikes on Iran show that he's not afraid to use military force — this would send a clear message to North Korea, and even to China and Russia, about Trump's style,' said Duyeon Kim, a senior analyst at the Center for a New American Security based in Seoul, South Korea. 'Before the strikes, Pyongyang and Beijing might have assumed that Trump is risk averse, particularly based on his behavior his first presidency despite some tough talk,' Kim said. Ten days into the war between Israel and Iran, Trump made the risky decision to step in, hitting three nuclear sites with American firepower on June 22 in a bid to destroy the country's nuclear program at a time while negotiations between Washington and Tehran were still ongoing. The attacks prompted a pro forma Iranian retaliatory strike the following day on a U.S. base in nearby Qatar, which caused no casualties, and both Iran and Israel then agreed to a ceasefire on June 24. North Korea, China and Russia all were quick to condemn the American attack, with Russian President Vladimir Putin calling it 'unprovoked aggression,' China's Foreign Ministry saying it violated international law and 'exacerbated tensions in the Middle East,' and North Korea's Foreign Ministry maintaining it 'trampled down the territorial integrity and security interests of a sovereign state.' While the strikes were a clear tactical success, the jury is still out on whether they will have a more broad strategic benefit to Washington's goals in the Middle East or convince Iran it needs to work harder than ever to develop a nuclear deterrent, possibly pulling the U.S. back into a longer-term conflict. If the attack remains a one-off strike, U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region likely will see the decision to become involved as a positive sign from Trump's administration, said Euan Graham, a senior defense analyst with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 'The U.S. strike on Iran will be regarded as net plus by Pacific allies if it is seen to reinforce red lines, restore deterrence and is of limited duration, so as not to pull the administration off-course from its stated priorities in the Indo-Pacific,' he said. 'China will take note that Trump is prepared to use force, at least opportunistically.' In China, many who have seen Trump as having a 'no-war mentality' will reassess that in the wake of the attacks, which were partially aimed at forcing Iran's hand in nuclear program negotiations, said Zhao Minghao, an international relations professor at China's Fudan University in Shanghai. 'The way the U.S. used power with its air attacks against Iran is something China needs to pay attention to,' he said. 'How Trump used power to force negotiations has a significance for how China and the U.S. will interact in the future.' But, he said, Washington should not think it can employ the same strategy with Beijing. 'If a conflict breaks out between China and the U.S., it may be difficult for the U.S. to withdraw as soon as possible, let alone withdraw unscathed,' he said. Indeed, China and North Korea present very different challenges than Iran. First and foremost, both already have nuclear weapons, raising the stakes of possible retaliation considerably in the event of any attack. There also is no Asian equivalent of Israel, whose relentless attacks on Iranian missile defenses in the opening days of the war paved the way for the B-2 bombers to fly in and out without a shot being fired at them. Still, the possibility of the U.S. becoming involved in a conflict involving either China or North Korea is a very real one, and Beijing and Pyongyang will almost certainly try to assess what the notoriously unpredictable Trump would do. North Korea will likely be 'quite alarmed' at what Israel, with a relatively small but high-quality force, has been able to achieve over Iran, said Joseph Dempsey, a defense expert with the International Institute for Strategic Studies. At the same time, it likely will be seen internally as justification for its own nuclear weapons program, 'If Iran did have deployable nuclear weapons would this have occurred?' Dempsey said. 'Probably not.' The U.S. decision to attack while still in talks with Iran will also not go unnoticed, said Hong Min, a senior analyst at South Korea's Institute for National Unification. 'North Korea may conclude that dialogue, if done carelessly, could backfire by giving the United States a pretext for possible aggression,' he said. 'Instead of provoking the Trump administration, North Korea is more likely to take an even more passive stance toward negotiations with Washington, instead focusing on strengthening its internal military buildup and pursuing closer ties with Russia, narrowing the prospects for future talks,' he said. China will look at the attacks through the visor of Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island off its coast that China claims as its own territory and President Xi Jinping has not ruled out taking by force. The U.S. supplies Taiwan with weapons and is one of its most important allies, though Washington's official policy on whether it would come to Taiwan's aid in the case of a conflict with China is known as 'strategic ambiguity,' meaning not committing to how it would respond. Militarily, the strike on Iran raises the question of whether the U.S. might show less restraint than has been expected by China in its response and hit targets on the Chinese mainland in the event of an invasion of Taiwan, said Drew Thompson, senior fellow with the Singapore-based think tank RSIS Rajaratnam School of International Studies. It will also certainly underscore for Beijing the 'difficulty of predicting Trump's actions,' he said. 'The U.S. airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities caught many by surprise,' Thompson said. 'I think it demonstrated a tolerance and acceptance of risk in the Trump administration that is perhaps surprising.' It also gives rise to a concern that Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te, who in recent speeches has increased warnings about the threat from China, may be further emboldened in his rhetoric, said Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia Program at the Washington-based foreign policy think tank Defense Priorities. Already, Lai's words have prompted China to accuse him of pursuing Taiwanese independence, which is a red line for Beijing. Goldstein said he worried Taiwan may try to take advantage of the American 'use of force against Iran to increase its deterrent situation versus the mainland.' 'President Lai's series of recent speeches appear almost designed to set up a new cross-strait crisis, perhaps in the hopes of building more support in Washington and elsewhere around the Pacific,' said Goldstein, who also is director of the China Initiative at Brown University's Watson Institute. 'I think that is an exceedingly risky gambit, to put it mildly,' he said. ___ Tong-hyung Kim in Seoul, South Korea, and Didi Tang and Albee Zhang in Washington contributed to this report.
