How much of a threat is China to Japan?
For the first time, Tokyo says a Chinese military aircraft entered its airspace.
The incident is detailed in Japan's latest defence white paper.
It warns Beijing has also ramped up naval and air operations near disputed territories.
But China has hit back, accusing Japan of stoking fear.
So, is East Asia heading for a new era of military confrontation?
Presenter: James Bays
Guests:
Tomohiko Taniguchi – Professor at the University of Tsukuba, and former special adviser to the cabinet of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
Einar Tangen – China specialist and senior fellow at the Taihe Institute
Robert Kelly – Professor of international relations at Pusan National University, specialist on international relations of Asia and US foreign policy
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Al Jazeera
2 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
Contrary to India's fears, Bangladesh is not joining a China-Pakistan axis
On July 8, Indian Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan delivered a pointed message at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, raising alarms over a budding alignment of strategic interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The general cautioned that such a trilateral convergence, if it gains traction, could have serious implications for India's security and disrupt the regional balance of power. His remarks came in the wake of a widely circulated photograph from Kunming, China, showing diplomats from the three nations meeting during the inaugural trilateral talks held alongside regional economic forums. While the meeting was officially billed as a diplomatic engagement, the image has sent ripples through India's strategic community. Bangladesh, clearly aware of the sensitivities involved, has moved swiftly to contain the narrative. Touhid Hossain, foreign affairs adviser to Dhaka's interim government, publicly disavowed any intention of joining bloc-based or adversarial alliances. Dhaka reiterated that its foreign policy remains firmly nonaligned and anchored in sovereign autonomy. Despite these assurances, New Delhi's strategic calculus appears to be shifting. There is now a growing perception in New Delhi that, under the interim leadership of Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh may be recalibrating its foreign policy, moving away from the overt closeness seen under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Under Hasina, India and Bangladesh enjoyed unusually warm ties characterised by deep security cooperation, cross-border connectivity projects and shared regional objectives. Dhaka took strong action against anti-India insurgents, gave India access to transit routes through Bangladeshi territory and generally aligned itself with New Delhi's strategic priorities. Whether real or perceived, this shift is influencing how India reads the regional landscape. Chauhan also drew attention to a broader, troubling pattern: External powers – chiefly China – are leveraging economic fragilities across the Indian Ocean region to deepen their influence. With countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan increasingly beholden to Chinese investment and aid, concerns are mounting that Beijing is systematically encircling India through soft-power entrenchment. Bangladesh's case, however, remains somewhat unique. Its economy, though under pressure, is relatively resilient, and Dhaka continues to emphasise pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy over ideological alignment. The Kunming meeting, while symbolically charged, does not yet represent a formal strategic realignment. Still, the formation of a trilateral framework marks a significant development. Unlike previous bilateral engagements, this format introduces a new dimension of coordination that could evolve in unpredictable ways. The echoes of history are hard to ignore. In the 1960s, China and Pakistan maintained a tight strategic axis that tacitly encompassed East Pakistan – what is now Bangladesh. That configuration unravelled in 1971 with Bangladesh's independence. Today, however, subtle signs suggest elements of that strategic triad may be resurfacing – this time in a more complex geopolitical theatre. For Beijing, deepening ties with both Pakistan and Bangladesh serves its broader objective of consolidating influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. For Islamabad, it provides a layer of diplomatic insulation and strategic leverage. For Dhaka, the relationship is more tactical – an attempt to hedge against regional volatility at a time when its once-stable ties with New Delhi appear increasingly uncertain. Bangladesh's cautious posture is also shaped by volatile domestic politics. Since the July protests and the installation of an interim administration, internal cohesion has frayed. Polarisation is resurging, and with national elections looming in early 2026, the government's priority is stability, not strategy. Foreign policy in this climate is reactive – not transformative. Dhaka understands the risks of leaning too far in any direction. Lingering historical resentments with Pakistan remain politically sensitive while an overreliance on China would strain crucial trade and diplomatic ties with the West, especially the United States, where concerns over democratic backsliding and human rights have sharpened. In this context, any overt strategic alignment could invite unnecessary scrutiny and backlash. The Kunming meeting, despite its symbolism, was primarily economic in focus – touching on trade, connectivity, infrastructure and cultural cooperation. However, when China and Pakistan floated the proposal to institutionalise trilateral cooperation through a joint working group, Bangladesh demurred. This was not indecision. It was a deliberate, calculated refusal. Dhaka's foreign policy has long been defined by 'engagement without entanglement'. It maintains open channels with all major powers while avoiding the traps of bloc politics. This nonaligned posture is a core principle guiding its diplomacy. Bangladesh welcomes dialogue and economic cooperation, but it draws a firm line at military or strategic alignment. For India, interpreting Bangladesh's moves requires nuance. While Dhaka continues to broaden its international partnerships, it has not abandoned its critical role in India's security calculus, particularly in the northeastern region. The challenge for New Delhi is not just to monitor emerging partnerships but to reinforce the value of its own. Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, security cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka under Hasina's Awami League was pivotal in stabilising the border region. Bangladesh's decisive crackdown on militant groups, coupled with close coordination with Indian intelligence and security agencies, played a crucial role in suppressing insurgent threats. Today, with India's ties to both China and Pakistan under severe strain, any perceived shift in Dhaka's stance is scrutinised intensely in New Delhi. The fear that Beijing and Islamabad might exploit Bangladesh as a strategic lever to apply asymmetric pressure remains deeply ingrained in India's security mindset. Yet, Bangladesh's explicit rejection of the proposed trilateral working group reveals a clear-eyed understanding of these sensitivities. It underscores Dhaka's intent to steer clear of actions that could escalate regional tensions. This evolving dynamic poses a dual challenge for India: It demands a recalibrated response that moves beyond reactive defensiveness. New Delhi must embrace a more sophisticated, forward-looking strategy – one that transcends old political loyalties and adapts to the shifting diplomatic contours of South Asia. The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial stance.
Al Jazeera
2 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
How did the UK leak information about thousands of Afghans?
The British government has secretly resettled thousands of Afghans in the United Kingdom for fear they might be targeted by the Taliban after their personal details were leaked, Defence Secretary John Healey revealed on Tuesday. Details about the accidental data breach by a British soldier and the secret relocation programme for Afghans were made public after a rare court order known as a 'superinjuction', which barred the media from even disclosing its existence, was lifted on Tuesday. Here is what we know about what happened and how the government responded: Whose data was leaked and how did it happen? A spreadsheet containing the personal information of about 18,700 Afghans and their relatives – a total of about 33,000 people – was accidentally forwarded to the wrong recipients by email in February 2022, Healey told lawmakers in the House of Commons. These were people who had applied for relocation to the UK between August 2021 and January 7, 2022. That was the six-month period following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after the US and allied forces withdrew from the country. Most had worked as translators, assistants or in other capacities for the British military in Afghanistan. They had applied for the UK's Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme, which, like its predecessor, the Ex-Gratia Scheme (EGS), had been set up for Afghans who had worked for the British forces. The EGS was originally established in 2013 following a long campaign by activists and media in support of people who had assisted the British military in Afghanistan and who were considered likely to face reprisals from the Taliban. The British soldier at the centre of the leak, who had been tasked with verifying applications for relocation, is understood to have mistakenly believed the database contained the names of 150 applicants, when it actually contained personal information linked to some 18,714 people. The soldier was under the command of General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, who was director of special forces at the time and now heads the British Navy. His name had also been suppressed by the court order until this week. The UK's Ministry of Defence (MoD) became aware of the leak when someone else posted parts of the data on Facebook on August 14, 2023. The Facebook post was first spotted by an activist who was assisting Afghans who had worked with UK forces. The activist contacted the MoD, saying: 'The Taliban may now have a 33,000-long kill list – essentially provided to them by the British government. If any of these families are murdered, the government will be liable,' The Guardian newspaper reported. How did the government respond to the leak? The MoD told Facebook to take down the post with the leaked information, citing security threats from the Taliban. It also warned some 1,800 ARAP applicants who had fled to Pakistan that they or their families could be in danger. The UK government, led by former Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, then sought a court order barring any media disclosure of the data breach. On September 1, 2023, a High Court judge in London issued a 'superinjunction', which not only prohibits the disclosure of any details but also forbids revealing that the order exists at all. That superinjunction was lifted on Tuesday following a campaign led by The Times newspaper in London. In April 2024, the government created the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) to support Afghans who were not eligible for ARAP but were considered at high risk of reprisals from the Taliban as a result of the data leak. This scheme, which was kept secret, has now been closed, Healey told the House of Commons. However, he added that hundreds of invitations were issued to Afghans and their families under the scheme and these invitations 'will be honoured'. The government also launched the secret Operation Rubific to evacuate those Afghans deemed to be at risk directly to the UK. How many Afghans have been relocated to the UK under the secret scheme? As a direct result of the leak, the government says 900 people and about 3,000 relatives have already been flown to the UK under the secret relocation scheme and put up in hotels or military bases. In total, about 24,000 Afghans affected by the breach have either been brought to the UK already or will be in the near future, according to UK media reports. Through broader resettlement schemes, 35,245 Afghans have so far been relocated to the UK, official data suggests. Why is this information being disclosed now? The court order barring the details about the leak from being disclosed was lifted at noon (11:00 GMT) on Tuesday. Following several private hearings, a High Court judge ruled in May that the injunction should be lifted, citing, among other reasons, the inability of the public or parliament to scrutinise the government's decisions. British news outlet The Times reported it had spearheaded the two-year legal battle which resulted in the injunction being lifted. That decision was, however, overturned by the Court of Appeal in July 2024, due to concerns about the potential risks to individuals whose information had been leaked. Then came the 'Rimmer review'. Healey, a member of current Prime Minister Keir Starmer's ruling Labour party, said he was briefed about the leak when it happened as he was serving as shadow defence secretary at the time. However, he added that other cabinet members were only informed about the leak when Starmer's party was elected to power in the general election of July 2024. 'As Parliamentarians – and as Government Ministers – it has been deeply uncomfortable to be constrained in reporting to this House. And I am grateful today to be able to disclose the details to Parliament,' Healey said on Tuesday. Healey said that at the beginning of this year, he commissioned former senior civil servant and former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence Paul Rimmer to conduct an independent review. Quoting the 'Rimmer review' in Parliament on Tuesday, Healey said that four years since the Taliban's takeover in Afghanistan, 'there is little evidence of intent by the Taleban [sic] to conduct a campaign of retribution against former officials.' He added that the information the Taliban inherited from the former Afghan government would have already allowed them to target individuals if they had wished. Therefore, Rimmer concluded it was 'highly unlikely' that someone's information being on the leaked spreadsheet would be a key piece of information enabling or prompting the Taliban to take action. 'However, Rimmer is clear – he stresses the uncertainty in any judgements … and he does not rule out any risk,' Healey said. How safe are the people named in the leak now? The Times reported that after the superinjunction had been lifted, a new temporary court order was issued, barring the media from publishing specific sensitive details about what exactly was in the database. The Times said the government cited reasons of confidentiality and national security, arguing that the leaked list still poses a threat to the safety of the Afghans. In a webpage published on Tuesday, the MoD states: 'At present, there is no evidence to suggest that the spreadsheet has been seen or used by others who might seek to exploit the information; however, the UK Government cannot rule out that possibility.' It now advises those who applied for the ARAP or EGS programmes before January 7, 2022, to exercise caution, avoid phone calls or messages from unknown numbers, limit their social media profiles and use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) where possible. UK-based media outlets have reported that a law firm is suing the MoD on behalf of at least 1,000 Afghans affected by the data leak. How much has the leak cost the UK government? Healey said on Tuesday that it had already cost 400 million pounds ($540m) to bring an initial 900 Afghans and their 3,600 family members to the UK under the ARR. However, this does not account for the expenditures by other government schemes to relocate Afghans to the UK. Healey estimated that the total cost of relocating Afghans to the UK was between 5.5 billion and 6 billion pounds ($7.4bn to $8bn). Different figures for how much the leak cost the UK have emerged. An unnamed government official told Reuters that the leak cost the UK about 2 billion pounds ($2.7bn). Other outlets have reported that ARR is expected to cost the UK government a total of 850 million pounds ($1.1bn).
Al Jazeera
5 hours ago
- Al Jazeera
‘It's just better!' Trump says he has convinced Coca-Cola to use cane sugar
United States President Donald Trump has announced that Coca-Cola will start using cane sugar instead of high-fructose corn syrup in its US-made soft drink at his urging. 'I have been speaking to Coca-Cola about using REAL Cane Sugar in Coke in the United States, and they have agreed to do so,' Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Wednesday. 'I'd like to thank all of those in authority at Coca-Cola.' Trump said the switch would be a 'very good move', adding: 'You'll see. It's just better!' Coca-Cola neither confirmed nor denied Trump's announcement, but said it appreciated the president's 'enthusiasm for our iconic Coca-Cola brand'. 'More details on new innovative offerings within our Coca-Cola product range will be shared soon,' the Atlanta, Georgia-based company said in a brief statement. "I have been speaking to @CocaCola about using REAL Cane Sugar in Coke in the United States, and they have agreed to do so. I'd like to thank all of those in authority at Coca-Cola. This will be a very good move by them — You'll see. It's just better!" –President Donald J. Trump — The White House (@WhiteHouse) July 16, 2025 Trump, who is known for his love of Diet Coke, did not explain his push to change the original version of the soft drink's ingredients, but his health secretary, Robert F Kennedy Jr, has harshly criticised the prevalence of high-fructose corn syrup in the American diet. Kennedy, who has pledged to wage war on ultra-processed foods containing ingredients rarely found in kitchen cabinets, has called the sweetener 'just a formula for making you obese and diabetic'. High-fructose corn syrup, which is derived from corn starch, is favoured by many US manufacturers because it is cheaper than sugar, in part due to government subsidies for corn and tariffs on sugar imports. Coca-Cola began using high-fructose corn syrup in its US production in the 1980s, but still uses cane sugar in many versions of its signature beverage made overseas, including Mexico, whose version of the drink has developed a cult-like following for its supposedly superior taste. While Americans' high sugar intake is a major contributor to nearly three-quarters of the population being overweight or obese, there is currently no scientific consensus to suggest high-fructose corn syrup is less healthy than cane sugar or other sweeteners. In a 2018 fact sheet, the US Food and Drug Administration said it was 'not aware of any evidence' of a 'difference in safety' between foods containing high-fructose corn syrup and those with other sweeteners, such as sugar and honey.
