China announces joint Pacific naval exercise with Russia in August
will take place in the sea and airspace near Vladivostok, Russia's far eastern port city on the Sea of Japan. Some of the forces in the exercise will then take part in the subsequent joint patrol in designated ocean areas, according to ministry spokesman Zhang Xiaogang.
'This is an arrangement within the annual cooperation plan between the Chinese and Russian militaries. It is not targeted at any third party, nor is it related to the current international and regional situation,' Zhang told his monthly press briefing in Beijing.
He did not specify the dates of the drill or the size of the event.
This announcement came as the US Air Force is hosting the 'Resolute Force Pacific 2025' exercise in locations including Hawaii, Guam and Japan, as well as international airspace, which began on July 10 and extends to August 8, is described by the US Air Force as their 'biggest combat exercise in the region', involving more than 400 aircraft and 12,000 personnel from the US and allies such as Japan and Australia.
'The US, clinging to its Cold War mentality, has been constantly flexing muscles in the Asia-Pacific region and attempting to gang up under the guise of 'military drills', intimidate and pressure other countries, and undermine peace and stability in the region,' Zhang told reporters.
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