The folly of trusting Taliban 2.0

Express Tribune

16-02-2025

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When the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in August 2021, there was optimism that the Taliban 2.0 would be different from their first term. When the Taliban government was overthrown by the US-led coalition after the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan was known as a hub of different transnational terrorist groups including Al-Qaeda. Given the Taliban's close ties with such groups, the international community's main demand of the "reformed Taliban" was not to allow Afghan soil to become a sanctuary for terrorist organisations. The conduct of the Kabul regime during the last three and half years suggests there is no major difference between Taliban 1.0 and Taliban 2.0.
Pakistan, once known as the main backer of the Taliban, was not happy with Kabul. Pakistan's concerns with regard to Afghanistan becoming a terrorist haven once again were not without merits. The latest report by the UNSC monitoring team prepared by independent experts sheds light on how the Afghan Taliban are still hand in glove with terrorist outfits.
The report reveals that with over two dozen terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan, Member States assessed the security threat emanating from the country as a continuing driver of instability in the region and beyond. Despite the loss of territory and attrition among senior and mid-tier leadership figures, the presence of terrorist groups in Afghanistan posed a serious challenge to the stability of the country, as well as to the security of Central Asian and other neighboring states. Notwithstanding the measures taken by the Taliban to counter ISIL-K, the group represented the most serious threat to the de facto authorities, ethnic and religious minorities, the UN, foreign nationals and international representatives in Afghanistan.
The sustained presence of ISIL-K and its activity in the country reflected the group's ideological commitment to its own brand, portraying itself as advancing the wider Khorasan, its ability to leverage relationships with particular communities and the Taliban's ineffective efforts to eliminate it. ISIL-K benefited from the Taliban's inability to protect itself against infiltration and corruption among its own ranks, despite raids conducted to arrest disloyal officials.
The UN report also busted Afghan Taliban's narrative that Pakistan was using Daesh as a proxy. In its findings, the UN said ISIL-K suffered a significant setback in the summer, when Pakistani security forces foiled an attempt by its external operations branch to establish itself inside Pakistan, resulting in the arrest of high-profile operatives. The status and strength of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan remained unchanged. The group sought to strengthen cooperation with regional terrorist organisations of non-Afghan origin (TTP, IMU, ETIM/TIP and Jamaat Ansarullah) operating in the country to expand its presence in neighbouring countries.
According to the report, the Taliban maintained a permissive environment allowing Al-Qaeda to consolidate, with the presence of safe houses and training camps scattered across Afghanistan. The most significant part of the UN findings was about the banned TTP. The status and strength of TTP in Afghanistan had not changed. The ambition and scale of its attacks on Pakistan, though, had significantly increased, with over 600 attacks during the reporting period, including from Afghan territory. The Taliban continued to provide TTP with logistical and operational space and financial support, with one Member State noting that the family of Noor Wali Masoud received a monthly payment of 3 million Afghanis (roughly $43,000). TTP established new training centres in Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost and Paktika (Barmal) provinces while enhancing recruitment within TTP cadres, including from the Afghan Taliban. There was increased collaboration between TTP, the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, conducting attacks under the banner of Tehrik-e Jihad Pakistan. These startling revelations merit a legitimate question: was it a mistake by the international community to trust the Taliban?