Israel kills more than 300 Palestinians in 48 hours as ceasefire in balance
At least 30 people have been killed since dawn on Thursday. Thirteen died when Israeli forces targeted a tent in al-Mawasi in the south, and another 11 were killed and many wounded in an Israeli strike on the Mostafa Hafez school, sheltering displaced people west of Gaza City, according to medical sources speaking to Al Jazeera.
The Government Media Office statement on Thursday said the attacks over the last 48 hours had targeted civilians in shelters and displacement centres overcrowded with tens of thousands of displaced people, public rest areas, such as the 'al-Baqa' rest stop, Palestinian families inside their homes, popular markets and vital civilian facilities, and starving civilians searching for food.
United States contractors ostensibly guarding aid distribution sites in Gaza have been using live ammunition and stun grenades as hungry Palestinians scramble for food, according to accounts and videos obtained by The Associated Press news agency.
Two US contractors, speaking to the AP on condition of anonymity, said they were speaking out because they were disturbed by what they considered dangerous practices. They said the security staff hired were often unqualified, unvetted, heavily armed and seemed to have an open licence to do whatever they wished.
More than 130 humanitarian organisations, including Oxfam, Save the Children and Amnesty International, on Tuesday demanded the immediate closure of the controversial Israeli and US-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), accusing it of facilitating attacks on starving Palestinians.
The NGOs said Israeli forces and armed groups 'routinely' open fire on civilians attempting to access food.
Since the GHF began operations in late May, more than 600 Palestinians have been killed while seeking aid, and nearly 4,000 have been wounded.
Israel's war on Gaza has killed at least 56,647 people and wounded 134,105, according to Gaza's Health Ministry. An estimated 1,139 people were killed in Israel during the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attacks, and more than 200 were taken captive.
Ceasefire in the balance
Hamas says it is studying new proposals for a temporary ceasefire in Gaza, but insisted it is seeking an agreement that would bring an end to Israel's devastating war.
Hamas said in a statement on Wednesday that it had received proposals from the mediators and is holding talks with them to 'bridge gaps' to return to the negotiating table and try to reach a ceasefire agreement.
The group said it was aiming for an agreement that would end the Gaza war and ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the enclave.
The announcement comes a day after United States President Donald Trump said Israel had agreed to a proposal for a 60-day ceasefire in Gaza and urged Hamas to accept the deal before conditions worsen. Trump has been increasing pressure on the Israeli government and Hamas to broker a ceasefire and an agreement for the group to release the Israeli captives held in Gaza.
Al Jazeera's Hamdah Salhut, reporting from Amman, says, 'For the first time since the beginning of the war began, the Israelis are signalling a potential end to the war on Gaza.' Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been holding consultations with his security team, according to Israeli media and is showing flexibility, according to those reports, she added, due to pressure from Trump.
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The GCC's Strategic Footprint: Gulf Investment as an Emerging Power Bloc in Africa
Gulf investments in Africa have surged, driven by economic diversification and geopolitical ambitions. Targeting sectors like infrastructure, energy and agriculture, these investments offer growth potential but also risks, requiring African states to ensure sustainable, transparent and mutually beneficial outcomes. Recent reports revealed a surge in Gulf states' investments in Africa, as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—expands its strategic presence on the continent. These developments coincide with the pursuit of economic interests by some GCC countries in specific sectors in many African countries, with some geopolitical and security dimensions, and efforts to secure resources and enhance global influence. So, how are Gulf investments transforming the Gulf States into a rising power bloc in Africa? And what does this mean for Africa? GCC states' interests in Africa The Gulf states' interests in Africa are varied and rapidly evolving, motivated by economic imperatives, geopolitical aspirations and security concerns. In recent years, these interests have grown significantly, shifting away from traditional aid and collaboration and toward long-term strategic investments. This shift is also happening while Africa is witnessing rapid economic growth and an expanding middle class, providing promising market opportunities for Gulf states' products and services, as well as lucrative investment opportunities across various sectors on the continent. (1) Looking at recent data, it is clear that Gulf states have significantly increased their financial commitments to Africa. In 2022 and 2023 alone, they invested approximately $113 billion in foreign direct investment (FDI) into the continent, outpacing their total investments during the previous decade. (2) A UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report shows that Africa as a whole saw a 75% increase in foreign direct investment in 2024, driven in part by Egypt's mega infrastructure project. (3) The United Arab Emirates is Africa's largest Gulf investor, with commitments totalling $97 billion from 2022 to 2023, (4) and more than $110 billion between 2019 and 2023. (5) The first Gulf interest is evident in economic diversification efforts led by government agencies and private companies, as Gulf countries seek to reduce their reliance on hydrocarbons. Africa's economic capacities and potentials are consistent with this trend, given that the continent offers an ideal opportunity for new areas of trade and investment due to its enormous untapped resources, growing markets and population, and sizeable youth population. The investments of a number of Gulf countries also align with their national visions, such as Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030, (6) prioritising sectors in Africa such as renewable energy, infrastructure, logistics, agriculture, mining and technology. The significant investment in infrastructure and logistics services in Africa suggests that certain Gulf nations want to reinforce their position as vital logistical and commercial gateways between Africa, Asia and Europe. This has led to investments in African ports, airports and transportation networks to facilitate trade flows, which commonly linked them to Gulf commercial hubs. Examples of these investments include the Emirati company DP World, which operates ports in many African countries while continuing to expand into other African ports. (7) Qatari investments include approximately $1.3 billion in an airport under construction in Rwanda, (8) along with Qatar Airways' codeshare agreements and stakes in several African airlines, such as RwandAir, (9) Air Botswana, (10) and Airlink in South Africa. (11) The Saudi Public Investment Fund is also planning major investments in the logistics and transportation sectors in Africa. A number of Gulf countries are involved in Africa's oil, gas and energy sectors, where Gulf companies assist in exploration, refining and distribution operations and contribute to African energy transition efforts. Examples include Qatar's expanded investments since 2021 in the energy sectors of Zambia and South Africa; (12) the Emirati company Masdar's pledge to invest $2 billion in renewable energy projects in Africa by 2030; (13) and the Saudi company ACWA Power's investments in Africa, which were reported in October 2024 to have reached $7 billion. (14) Besides, Africa's rich mineral resources, including gold, copper and lithium, attract the interests of and significant investments from Gulf countries in order to secure access to vital minerals to diversify their economies and achieve their industrial ambitions and technological progress, especially in sectors such as electric vehicles and renewable energy. This is underscored by the multi-billion-dollar investments of companies such as the International Holding Company (headquartered in the UAE) in African mining operations, including a significant stake in Zambia's Mopani copper mines, (15) as well as mining deals in Africa concluded by Ma'aden, a Saudi company, and the Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia's sovereign wealth fund. (16) Gulf states have also substantially boosted their investments in Africa's communications and digital services industries. Companies such as the UAE's Etisalat (rebranded as 'e&') (17) and Qatar's Ooredoo (18) have invested in Africa's digital infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and supporting the continent's growing digital economies. Meanwhile, financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds from GCC countries are channelling capital into African startups, fintech initiatives, and emerging industries—such as Qatar's investment in Airtel Mobile Commerce, the mobile money division of Airtel Africa. (19) There's been a significant uptick in investment from Gulf countries into African agriculture, all in a bid to boost their food security. Given that GCC states rely heavily on food imports—up to 85% in some cases—due to their arid climate, (20) Africa's abundant arable land and water resources make it a crucial area for ensuring stable long-term food supplies. These investments include purchasing agricultural land, increasing food production, improving infrastructure, and establishing processing and logistical services for local consumption and export to the Gulf area, with a particular emphasis on staple crop and livestock production. (21) The geographical location of the Gulf States, along with their economic and political agendas, has given their engagement in Africa a geopolitical dimension—particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea region and beyond. These dimensions are linked to the fact that the stability of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea is crucial to the Gulf States as these two regions are vital to maritime trade routes linking Asia, Europe and Africa through the Suez Canal. This has sparked a wave of investments in ports and logistics services throughout the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. It also includes military and maritime partnerships, as well as active participation in regional security initiatives. One notable effort is the Council of Arab and African Coastal States on the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, (22) which was launched by Saudi Arabia in 2020. These initiatives are all geared towards safeguarding the economic and commercial lifelines in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea from threats like piracy, smuggling and conflicts. Through various frameworks of educational, religious, and humanitarian diplomacy, the Gulf states provide cultural programmes, scholarships and humanitarian aid to countries in the Horn of Africa, along the Red Sea and elsewhere on the continent, aiming to strengthen their geopolitical influence and foster goodwill among local populations. However, some strategies employed by some Gulf states to enhance their geopolitical presence in parts of Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, have led to accusations—especially against the UAE. Critics argue that these actions are undermining state sovereignty, disrupting political stability and exacerbating conflicts in Sudan, Somalia, Libya and Ethiopia. (23) The UAE has consistently denied these accusations, (24) and often framed its engagement in Africa as based on trade and development foundations, aiming to promote stability and economic growth through investment and infrastructure development. In addition, some Gulf capitals are consolidating their role in Africa as centres of diplomacy and conflict resolution. Qatar is at the forefront of these efforts, leveraging its economic ties and reputation as a neutral mediator—demonstrated by its successful diplomatic role in the Chad crisis in 2022, (25) its facilitation of ongoing peace talks between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda over the eastern Congo conflict, and the ceasefire agreement brokered in April 2025 between the Congolese government and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebels. (26). Gulf investment as an emerging power bloc in Africa Most Gulf States' previous investment strategies largely overlooked Africa, particularly sub-Saharan Africa. This was likely due to their economic priorities, perceived risks, and a narrower strategic outlook shaped by factors such as political instability, weak regulatory environments, limited infrastructure and underdeveloped financial markets. As a result, Gulf investments were directed toward established, liquid markets in the West or strategically significant regions closer to home, such as the Middle East and North Africa. It can also be argued that the diversification strategies of the Gulf States were less urgent and less expansive until the past decade, largely due to the oil-based nature of their economies. Although these countries provided humanitarian aid and engaged in limited trade with select sub-Saharan African states, there was little momentum for large-scale, diversified investments in the region's emerging markets. Moreover, broad opportunities in sub-Saharan sectors aligned with the core interests of the Gulf States were scarce—aside from the extraction of basic commodities in a few areas. As a result, sub-Saharan Africa featured far less prominently on the Gulf investment radar compared to the more mature and accessible markets of the West, the Middle East and North Africa. The recent surge in Gulf investments across Africa—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa—not only reflects a shift in the Gulf states' outlook toward the continent but also signals their emergence as an influential power bloc in Africa. This is especially evident given that a significant share of these investments targets strategic sectors such as infrastructure. Recent developments, including the alleged involvement of some Gulf investments in conflicts in East Africa and the Red Sea, further underscore this evolving dynamic. Moreover, the geographical proximity of the Gulf countries to Africa is an essential factor that helps its emergence as a major power bloc on the continent. This proximity, especially across the Red Sea, directly facilitates the expansion of vital trade routes, making Africa an indispensable part of the Gulf's global logistical and economic corridors. It also allows for shorter shipping times, lower transportation costs, and more efficient supply chains, linking African resources and markets directly to Gulf ports and re-export centres, enhancing the Gulf's role as a vital intermediary in global trade flows and augmenting its economic integration with the continent. Another key factor is that Gulf capital can help address Africa's significant infrastructure and development financing gaps, positioning Gulf states as indispensable partners for many African countries. This is reinforced by the Gulf countries' strategic efforts, such as regularly hosting high-level summits and forums that bring together African leaders, policymakers and business elites. These platforms facilitate dialogue on shared challenges, foster partnerships, promote investment opportunities in Africa, and enable Gulf states to present their vision for cooperation while demonstrating their long-term commitment to the continent. For instance, the Saudi-Africa Summit held in November 2023 (27) and the New Africa Summit, (28) organised as part of the eighth Saudi Future Investment Initiative in October 2024, have provided critical platforms for high-level engagement and relationship-building. These events promote the development of deeper economic and diplomatic ties that enhance the Gulf states' geopolitical influence while offering potential alternatives to other global actors, such as China, the European Union and the United States. This dynamic is further reinforced by the shared membership of Gulf and African countries in multilateral organisations—such as the G20, the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)—that facilitate political cooperation, economic investment and security collaboration across the continent. While one of the features of the recent economic participation of Gulf countries in Africa is that they often provide more flexible and rapid financing with fewer political conditions compared to Western models, which suits African governments seeking alternative financing, these Gulf economic investments are complemented by soft power diplomacy, given that the Gulf states are among the most prominent donors of humanitarian and development aid to African countries. They provide financial and material support during crises and natural disasters and for long-term development projects, which consolidates goodwill and positive perception for the Gulf countries and presents them as a sympathetic and reliable partner in times of need. The shared Islamic heritage between the Gulf states and many African countries enhances the Gulf states' influence on the continent. Several Gulf states fund the building and renovation of mosques, the establish of Arab-Islamic centres, religious cultural events and scholarships for African students to study at Gulf universities and religious organisations. These initiatives promote cultural exchange, strengthen common identities and build deep-rooted ties that go beyond purely economic transactions, which enhances the affinity for the Gulf states at the societal level. In addition, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, are making remarkable educational efforts and providing vocational training programmes for African youth. Scholarships offered to Africans at the most prominent Gulf universities are increasing, which contributes to the formation of future leaders in Africa who are likely to maintain positive relations with the Gulf countries. The emergence of the Gulf states as an active bloc in Africa also reflects their growing involvement in conflict resolution and peace-building efforts on the continent—recognising that peace and stability are essential for trade, investment, and safeguarding their own security and economic interests. Their approach includes initiatives that position them as constructive partners to African governments, earning them respect and political capital among African stakeholders and within the broader international community. Implications for Africa Understanding the implications of the Gulf's growing investments in Africa requires examining their defining characteristics—most notably, that a significant share originates from sovereign wealth funds and state-owned companies. This enables the implementation of large-scale, long-term projects aligned with strategic priorities. Gulf states often frame their investments as mutually beneficial partnerships: while they work to secure resources and diversify their economies, African countries gain much-needed capital to advance their national development agendas. Another characteristic of the Gulf investments is that they are often less prescriptive or tied to the terms of governance and human rights issues compared to some Western lenders; hence, their investments are attractive to African governments. Also, while there is competition between individual Gulf countries, there is also increasing coordination and joint ventures, indicating a more coherent 'bloc' approach over time. Many Gulf investments, unlike short-term aid, are linked to strategic concessions and partnerships spanning decades, indicating the commitment of Gulf states to sustainable or long-term engagement in Africa. Based on the above, the new wave of Gulf investments in Africa has positive indications on the continent. This is because the volume of the investments, which exceeds previous levels, could stimulate African economic growth and industrialisation efforts while creating job opportunities and promoting development in vital sectors, in addition to highlighting Africa's enormous potential in previously ignored sectors. Likewise, strategically directing Gulf investments toward sectors that address Africa's core development needs can strengthen the continent's efforts to achieve sustainable growth. Investment is particularly crucial for resolving infrastructure challenges, which can improve connectivity, lower trade costs and advance the integration of African economies. Gulf investments also offer an important alternative source of financing and expertise, reducing Africa's dependence on any single external actor. This aligns with Africa's broader vision for a more multipolar world order and enhances the agency of African countries in shaping their own development strategies. In addition to the above, Gulf investments, especially in logistics services and port infrastructure, which aim to enhance trade flows between Africa and the Gulf, can accelerate the integration of Africa into global supply chains. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) can also amplify these benefits by creating a larger and more attractive market. Similarly, while these Gulf partnerships in Africa are still in their infancy, they have great potential for technology transfer and skills development, as Gulf companies establishing their diversified operations within the continent will require bringing new technologies and management practices while providing vocational training for African employees, thus contributing to human capital development. However, these investments also present complex challenges for African countries. A key concern is that much of the Gulf's investment is driven by the pursuit of natural resources, such as minerals, agricultural land, oil and gas. This underscores the need for African states to ensure that such investments contribute to value addition within the continent, rather than perpetuating a model of raw material extraction. Without this, there is a risk of reinforcing a new form of the 'poverty paradox', where resource-rich countries and communities remain economically underdeveloped. Furthermore, although Gulf investments often come with fewer conditions than those imposed by Western institutions and lenders, the scale of these financial flows may contribute to rising debt burdens. In addition, resource extraction, if managed poorly, can fuel conflicts and social tensions. To mitigate these risks, African governments will need to establish robust regulatory frameworks and ensure meaningful local community engagement, particularly to address concerns around land rights, displacement and food security—especially where large-scale agricultural projects prioritise exports over local needs. Environmental sustainability must also be a priority, as resource extraction and industrial agriculture can threaten ecosystems if not carefully managed. Another key consideration is transparency and the geopolitical ramifications of increased Gulf engagement. African governments must pursue transparent negotiations and fair implementation of investment agreements to prevent corruption, safeguard national interests and ensure equitable benefits. At the same time, while Gulf investments offer diversification, they are taking place within a broader context of global competition for influence in Africa. If not navigated carefully, this dynamic may expose African countries to external pressures or deepen internal divisions linked to shifting geopolitical alignments. Conclusion The Gulf States' interests and expanding footprint in Africa are diverse and continually evolving, reflecting a clear commitment to building lasting partnerships. This engagement is driven by shared economic interests and a broader ambition to enhance their geopolitical influence both on the continent and globally. Gulf investments provide critical foreign direct investment (FDI), support infrastructure development, boost agricultural production, create employment opportunities, and offer alternative financing options, often with fewer conditions than traditional lenders. However, concerns remain regarding potential inflationary pressures, the impact of these investments on domestic resources, and the need to align projects with the long-term development priorities of African countries. Furthermore, Gulf engagement unfolds within a competitive landscape, where global powers—including China—vie for influence and strategic projects across Africa. Ensuring that this new wave of investment contributes to sustainable, inclusive development will require careful governance, transparency and proactive policymaking by African stakeholders. References 1- 'Rising Gulf Investments in Africa Unlocking Opportunities and Navigating Challenges', Afreximbank, 16 December 2024, (accessed 21 June 2025). 2- Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Čok, 'Diversification nations: The Gulf way to engage with Africa', European Council on Foreign Relations, 24 March 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 3- 'Africa: Foreign investment hit record high in 2024', UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 19 June 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 4- Prithvi Gupta, 'UAE's economic engagement in Africa', Observer Research Foundation, 13 February 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 5- 'UAE Drives Strategic Push into Africa's Oil & Gas Industry', African Energy Chamber, 10 April 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 6- 'Vision 2030 – Saudi Arabia', p.58 (accessed 25 June 2025). 7- Chisom Michael, 'Here are the major GCC port concessions transforming Africa's trade landscape', Business Day, 6 August 2024, (accessed 21 June 2025). 8- 'Kagame: Partnership with Qatar progressing well', CNBC Africa, 11 January 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 9- Mark Pilling, 'Qatar-Rwanda airline tie-up to be finalised shortly', Times Aerospace, 15 May 2025, (accessed 21 June 2025). 10- 'Qatar Airways Launches Code-Share Partnership with Air Botswana', Qatar Airways, 2 November 2016, (accessed 21 June 2025). 11- 'Qatar Airways Acquires 25 per cent Stake in Airlink', Qatar Airways, 20 August 2024, (accessed 21 June 2025). 12- 'Qatar Investment Authority Acquires 50% stake in Enel's South Africa and Zambia Projects', Green Building Africa, 13 January 2021, (accessed 21 June 2025). 13- 'Masdar Advances 10GW Africa Growth Plan to Unlock Energy Transition in Six Sub-Saharan Nations', Masdar, 7 December 2023, (accessed 21 June 2025). 14- Reem Walid, 'Saudi ACWA Power's investment in Africa reaches $7bn, CEO says', Arab News, 28 October 2024, (accessed 21 June 2025). 15- 'Mopani Copper Mines: Key Highlights of IRH's Transformational Operations', International Resources Holding, 31 October 2024, (accessed 21 June 2025). 16- Gracelin Baskaran, 'Saudi Arabia Has a Strategic Advantage in Sourcing Critical Minerals from Africa', Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5 December 2023, (accessed 21 June 2025). 17- 'e& pledges $6 billion to advance connectivity in 16 countries', e&, 1 March 2024, (accessed 22 June 2025). 18- 'Ooredoo and Iron Mountain Partner to Accelerate Data Centre Growth Across MENA', Ooredoo, 13 February 2025, (accessed 22 June 2025). 19- Amrit Sahota, 'IN BRIEF: Qatar invests USD200 million in Airtel Mobile Commerce', Morningstar, 30 July 2021, (accessed 22 June 2025). 20- Wael Al Mubarak, 'The GCC imports 85% of its food – here's how it is increasing food security through innovation', World Economic Forum, 14 February 2025, (accessed 22 June 2025). 21- 'GCC-Africa Agriculture', Gulf Research Center, 3 November 2024, (accessed 22 June 2025). 22- Naser Al Ali, 'Formation and purposes of Arab and African Coastal States of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden', Khalifa University of Science and Technology, June 2022, (accessed 22 June 2025). 23- Liam Karr, 'Africa File Special Edition: External Meddling for the Red Sea Exacerbates Conflicts in the Horn of Africa', Institute for the Study of War, 23 September 2024, (accessed 25 June 2025); Usman Butt, 'UAE: The scramble for the Horn of Africa', Middle East Monitor, 31 January 2021, (accessed 25 June 2025); Jesse Harasta, 'Imperialism and Resistance in the Red Sea', Review of African Political Economy, 16 February 2024, (accessed 22 June 2025). 24- 'UAE affirms its categorical rejection of the baseless allegations made by the Permanent Representative of Sudan in a letter to UN Security Council', United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 April 2024, (accessed 25 June 2025); 'UAE Welcomes Agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia', United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 December 2024, (accessed 22 June 2025). 25- Sansom Milton, Ghassan Elkahlout and Sana Tariq, 'Qatar's evolving role in conflict mediation', Mediterranean Politics Vol. 30, No. 1 (2025), pp. 53-77. 26- Andrew Mills and Ange Adihe Kasongo, 'Qatar presents draft peace proposal to Congo and M23 rebels, source says', Reuters, 5 June 2025, (accessed 22 June 2025). 27- Hammed J. Sulaiman, 'First Saudi-Africa summit: What Both Sides Stand to Gain', Alafarika for Studies and Consultancy, 26 November 2023, (accessed 22 June 2025). (accessed 22 June 22 2025).
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Will Gaza finally get a ceasefire?
The US president says he'll be 'very firm' with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Although it's not clear that Israeli leaders want to end the 'Forever War' they launched in the aftermath of the Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, the US has enough leverage to force a truce, argues Georgetown University visiting scholar, Khaled Elgindy. Annelle Sheline, a former State Department official who quit in protest of President Biden's Gaza policies, argues that Israel's war was 'not really about Hamas' but more about the Israeli desire to control Gaza, the West Bank and the wider region. Sheline and Elgindy delve into the details of the proposed ceasefire deal with host Steve Clemons.
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Iran says it is committed to NPT, slams Germany's support for Israel
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Tehran is committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), dismissing speculation that Iran would leave the accord in response to major attacks by Israel and the United States on its nuclear and other sites. Araghchi also said on Thursday that Iran will honour its safeguards agreement with the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite recently passing a law to suspend cooperation with the agency. Safeguards agreements between the IAEA and NPT signatories allow the UN agency to ensure that the countries' nuclear programmes remain peaceful. 'Iran remains committed to the NPT and its Safeguards Agreement,' Araghchi wrote in a social media post. 'In accordance with the new legislation by Majlis [parliament], sparked by the unlawful attacks against our nuclear facilities by Israel and the US, our cooperation with [the IAEA] will be channelled through Iran's Supreme National Security Council for obvious safety and security reasons.' It is not clear how that cooperation will proceed or when and how IAEA inspectors will be granted access to Iran's nuclear sites. Araghchi's comment was made in response to a German Federal Foreign Office statement decrying the Iranian legislation against the IAEA as a 'devastating message'. The Iranian foreign minister hit out at the criticism by Germany – one of Israel's most committed allies that backed the attacks against Iran last month. At the height of Israel's strikes, which were launched without direct provocation, Chancellor Friedrich Merz suggested Germany and the West are benefitting from the war. 'This is dirty work that Israel is doing for all of us,' he said. The remarks earned him praise from Israeli officials and caused outrage in some other quarters. On Thursday, Araghchi rebuked 'Germany's explicit support for Israel's unlawful attack on Iran, including safeguarded nuclear sites, as 'dirty work' carried out on behalf of the West'. He also accused Berlin of repudiating its commitments under the 2015 multilateral nuclear deal with Tehran by demanding zero enrichment by Iran. The pact – which US President Donald Trump torpedoed during his first term in 2018 – allows Iran to enrich uranium at a low grade under a strict monitoring regime. ''Iranians were already put off by Germany's Nazi-style backing of Genocide in Gaza, and its support for Saddam's war on Iran by providing materials for chemical weapons,' Araghchi said in a post on X. 'The explicit German support for the bombing of Iran has obliterated the notion that the German regime harbours anything but malice towards Iranians.' Companies from the former West Germany have long been accused by Iran of helping late Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein develop chemical weapons, which he used against Iranian forces during the war between the two countries in the 1980s. Iran has been calling on Germany to investigate its ties to Iraq's chemical weapons, but Berlin has not publicly acknowledged any role in the programme. Germany and other European countries came out in support of Israel in its recent 12-day war with Iran, which killed hundreds of Iranian civilians, including nuclear scientists and their family members, as well as top military officials. The US joined the Israeli campaign last month, bombing three Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran retaliated against the US attack with a missile strike against an airbase in Qatar where US soldiers are stationed. Hours later, a ceasefire was reached. Iranian officials have sharply criticised the IAEA not only for failing to condemn the Israeli and US strikes but also for passing a resolution on June 12 accusing Tehran of noncompliance with its nuclear obligations, the day before Israel attacked. International law offers special protection to nuclear sites due to the high risk of an environmental disaster if attacks result in the leak of radioactive material. The state of the Iranian nuclear programme after the US and Israeli strikes remains unclear. On Wednesday, the Pentagon said the US bombing operation set back Iran's nuclear programme by one to two years. But IAEA chief Rafael Grossi recently said Iran could be enriching uranium again in a 'matter of months'. Enrichment is the process of enhancing the purity of radioactive uranium atoms to produce nuclear fuel. Iran has repeatedly denied seeking a nuclear weapon while Israel is widely believed to possess an undeclared nuclear arsenal of dozens of atomic bombs.
