India has defused Pak's biggest weapon - its ability to cry nuclear wolf

India Today

16-05-2025

High-pitched nuclear rhetoric from Pakistan has been a standard feature of every crisis with India since it acquired nuclear capability. In a bid to deter India from responding to cross-border terrorism mounted by organisations nurtured and supported by elements of the Pakistani state - a fact that is well recognised today - it resorts to making thinly veiled nuclear threats. This time too, when India vowed to 'identify, track and punish' those behind the terrorist strike on hapless tourists on April 22 in Pahalgam, Pakistan was quick to draw the nuclear sabre.advertisementPakistan's railway minister first voiced the nuclear threat after India announced a slew of diplomatic measures. Next, Pakistan conducted a test of its 450km-range, nuclear-capable, surface-to-surface Abdali missile on May 3. Two days later, the Pakistan army also tested a Fatah surface-to-surface missile with a range of 120km. Then, after India's military strikes on nine carefully chosen terrorist infrastructure targets on May 7, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khawaja Asif said that the threat of nuclear war was "clear and present".India ignored these signals as it undertook a 'measured, non-escalatory, proportionate, and responsible' action against terrorist relevant targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. Within minutes of the operation's completion, the Indian Ministry of Defence issued a press statement time-stamped 1.44 am on May 7, underscoring 'considerable restraint in the selection of targets and method of execution' and that 'no Pakistani military facilities have been targeted'.advertisement
India made a distinction between the Pakistani state and terror infrastructure in choosing the targets. But Islamabad took this as a violation of its territorial sovereignty and hit Indian military and civilian sites. India responded proportionately against Pakistan's airfields and air defence systems. Meanwhile, cross-border firing along the Line of Control continued to be fierce. On the third day of the engagement, after first declaring and then denying a meeting of the National Command Authority, Pakistan called upon the US to bring about a ceasefire. We don't know what General Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif told US Secretary of State Marco Rubio or President Donald Trump, but it was enough to spook them to reverse an earlier hands-off approach in favour of attempts to de-escalate the situation.Three nuclear dimensionsWhile much fog persists around the crisis, at least three nuclear dimensions can be discerned. Firstly, Pakistan's ability to conduct nuclear blackmail has been progressively eroded by Indian military actions over the years. In 2016, surgical strikes were conducted just across the Line of Control in PoK. In 2019, India's air strikes on Balakot went deeper across the international boundary. And this time, Indian missile strikes and drone attacks went further into PoK and Punjab. By doing so, India defied the space threshold that Pakistan had once laid down as a red line for nuclear use.advertisementSecondly, Indian military action in every instance has been executed with high precision and calibration, not only to obviate collateral damage while hitting terror targets, but also to indicate restraint when targeting military sites. This has been enabled by the availability of the right military instruments to effectuate such precision.In a unique use of the salami-slicing strategy, India has chosen to slice not the 'salami' of territory but of Pakistani assets and infrastructure that are used to inflict damage upon India. India's focus on prioritising capabilities for the advantage of flexibility of employment, calibrated control over military engagement, and, hence, over escalation, has paid dividends. This has thereby allowed India's military actions to remain well below the stated military threshold of Pakistan's nuclear redlines.Thirdly, a declared doctrine of 'no first use' has allowed India to go deeper into hitherto virgin territory and targets to reclaim the space for a conventional response that Pakistan's nuclear strategy has tried to deny. Had India professed a first-use strategy, it would have exacerbated Pakistan's fear of losing its nuclear assets to Indian nuclear preemption.advertisementThis would have heightened the possibility of nuclear use in a conflict. By placing the onus of nuclear escalation on Pakistan and by executing its military action in a calibrated fashion, India has consciously stayed away from posing an existential threat that may cause Pakistan to feel the need for nuclear use.Overall, then, in showing the ability to mount a conventional response even in the face of nuclear brinkmanship and in emphasising that every future act of terrorism will be treated as an act of war, India has forced Pakistan to go back to the drawing board to redefine a credible nuclear strategy for itself. Its endeavour to use nuclear weapons as a shield for mounting terrorism appears to have reached a dead end.Three possible directionsIn finding possible pathways from here, Pakistan could take three possible directions.One, it could, and would most likely, decide to shore up its conventional military capability since, irrespective of a projection of a low nuclear threshold, the real action takes place in the conventional realm. With the help of China and Turkey, it could further its military build-up. This would impose a high cost on a fragile economy and a population already facing mounting social and environmental challenges. However, the Pakistan army will not find it difficult to rally the nation around the need to spend more on arms by raising the India threat.advertisementSecond, it could decide to double down on its existing nuclear strategy and adopt even riskier approaches to reestablish nuclear deterrence through brinkmanship. This would be a very risky path with no guarantees of how or where it would lead, especially since its ability to cry nuclear wolf will have limits. India has already shown this, and the international interlocutors, too, might be less taken in by such a strategy the next time.There could be a third road that goes towards peace with India, but that will probably remain the road not taken till Pakistan desires an alternative way of life. This could be possible only if there was a shift in the power structures in the country, with the military dropping its fixation to stay at the top of the pyramid by constantly raising India as a threat.The choice rests with Pakistan. India, meanwhile, in the short to medium term, will have to concentrate on buttressing its deterrence at all levels to safeguard itself against a neighbour that has nuclear weapons, houses terrorist outfits, and lives in denial of the threats that both pose. In the long term, though, there would be merit in thinking of how India could incentivise a change in Pakistan's behaviour. In the past, such attempts have failed. But given that Pakistan is our permanent neighbour, it is in our interest to both build our immunity against its recalcitrance while also continuing attempts to shape our region as we would like it to be.(Manpreet Sethi is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, and Senior Research Adviser to the Asia Pacific Leadership Network)(Views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author)Tune InMust Watch