Ethiopia and SA — Shared struggles in transitional justice

Daily Maverick

13-06-2025

The key lesson is that transitional justice is not an event but an ongoing process that ends only when its goals are met.
A little over a year after Ethiopia adopted its landmark Transitional Justice Policy, the country is grappling with how to proceed while battling ongoing unresolved tensions. In this moment of uncertainty, Ethiopia can draw lessons from other contexts such as South Africa.
For both countries, reckoning with the past is foundational to their longer-term aspirations. South Africa's three-decades-long transition offers useful lessons on what to do (and what not to do), how to sequence the process, and which components are vital to success.
In March, a delegation of Ethiopian officials, legal experts and civil society representatives visited South Africa to draw insights from one of the most prominent historical examples of national reconciliation.
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is often touted as central to the country's efforts towards truth-seeking, justice and reconciliation. The TRC prioritised truth-seeking and conditional amnesty as preconditions for reconciliation, while keeping the door open for criminal accountability.
That decision was shaped by the realities of South Africa's political transition – a process in which elite negotiations necessitated compromises favouring political stability over criminal accountability.
Ethiopia now faces a similar dilemma. The country initially sought to implement a holistic process with elements of dialogue, criminal accountability, institutional reform, truth-seeking and reparations as interdependent pillars running concurrently rather than sequentially. This aligned with public consultations and survey data confirming that Ethiopians reject processes excluding any of these elements. Yet, tough decisions may need to be made to sequence the process.
In implementing its policy, Ethiopia will have to tackle difficulties that may be more complex than those South Africa faced. One prominent shared challenge is the risk of political interference.
In South Africa, the TRC's final report highlighted the obligation to prosecute perpetrators, referring 300 cases to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) for investigation and possible prosecution. But most of these cases were left inactive for decades, mainly owing to political interference that enabled impunity under the guise of national reconciliation.
While there were some prosecutions in the early 2000s (such as against Wouter Basson), it wasn't until 2021 that the NPA advanced some of these cases. A recent High Court decision paves the way for more.
The NPA's susceptibility to political pressure may have contributed to the delays, but institutional separation alone does not ensure prosecutorial independence, as Ethiopia's experience shows. Despite establishing a Special Prosecutor's Office in 1992 – distinct from the regular prosecutorial system – the office lacked autonomy, and its work was criticised as victor's justice. This underscores the need for robust safeguards ensuring functional independence and insulation from political influence.
Another key feature of transitional justice is reparations, which redress past wrongs and restore some measure of dignity to the aggrieved. Despite incorporating reparations, South Africa still struggles to effectively address the needs of apartheid victims. The TRC offered direct financial reparations only to those participating in its hearings.
Another lesson relates to the role of the courts. Although South Africa benefits from an independent judiciary with a supreme Constitutional Court, its judiciary is still transforming and includes some judges who enforced apartheid-era laws. This tension reveals the difficulty of transitions, which must balance judicial continuity with legitimacy and fairness.
Ethiopia faces a similar challenge. Less than a third of the population trusts judges or investigative systems. While mass purges of the judiciary could destabilise the legal system, failing to vet judges appointed during repressive regimes risks further eroding public confidence. A phased, transparent vetting process like that envisaged in the draft vetting law may enable Ethiopia to build judicial credibility without undermining institutional stability.
Another lesson relates to missing persons. Unlike Ethiopia, where mass grave exhumations post-1991 were conducted primarily for criminal trials, South Africa's Missing Persons Task Team goes beyond forensic investigations. It serves a symbolic and cultural function, offering dignity and closure that is not merely legal, but spiritual and communal.
Still, this dimension of South Africa's process remains incomplete. The success of the task team relied on the cooperation of perpetrators willing to disclose burial sites as part of their amnesty applications. In cases where perpetrators remain silent or did not apply for amnesty, families are left without answers. Many cases are unresolved due to the lack of a national strategy, inadequate resources and weak institutional follow-through.
In South Africa, civil society organisations (CSOs) play a vital role in the country's transitional justice process. They fill the void created by the government's institutional limitations by documenting abuses, providing psychosocial support, advocating for victim-centred reforms and litigating when the state fails to act.
Some commentators note that civil society kept transitional justice alive after the state moved on. Indeed, some of the ongoing cases related to apartheid-era crimes have been spearheaded by CSOs supporting victims' families and communities.
Ethiopia's Transitional Justice Policy recognises CSOs as key stakeholders. As in South Africa, the outreach, documentation, legal aid and monitoring roles of Ethiopian CSOs will be indispensable. This engagement should be substantive throughout both the design and implementation phases.
Without meaningful civil society engagement, transitional justice can become a top-down exercise disconnected from the communities it aims to serve. Also, vital and often uncomfortable questions essential for guiding the process are unlikely to be raised.
Perhaps the most enduring lesson from South Africa is that transitional justice is not an event but a process whose business remains unfinished until all its aims are met. It unfolds over decades, often inconsistently, requiring sustained political will, institutional endurance and public engagement.
Transitional justice must be seen as iterative: policies set the stage but must be refined through continuous learning and adaptation.
In Ethiopia, transitional justice should be rooted in the country's legal traditions, historical grievances and societal aspirations. The government and citizens must acknowledge that securing society-wide endorsement and legitimacy will take time, as will effective implementation. DM