Born Free: Too many commissions, not enough justice – with Amahle-Imvelo 'Jaxa' Jaxx
Born Free
: Khumo Kumalo is joined by digital strategist Amahle-Imvelo 'Jaxx' Jaxa for a sharp dive into the crossroads of digital media, democracy, and South African politics. As President Ramaphosa announces a new commission of enquiry, we ask: reform or political smokescreen?
We also confront the erasure of liberation history — what does it mean for the 'Born Free' generation to grow up disconnected from the truths of our past?
From digital activism to generational memory, this episode challenges the narratives shaping our democracy.
#BornFreePodcast #KhumoKumalo #AmahleJaxa #SouthAfricaPolitics #DigitalMedia #Ramaphosa #DemocracyInSA #BornFreeGeneration #YouthVoices #SAHistory #CommissionOfEnquiry #PoliticalAccountability #LiberationStruggle #UnfilteredVoices #SouthAfricaToday
Khumo Kumalo
is the visionary behind
Misunderstood
and the dynamic co-host of
Born Free
. Named one of the
Mail & Guardian's Top 200 Young South Africans of 2024
, he is a bold voice in the country's evolving political discourse.
As the author of
Newsletter
94
(formerly Misunderstood), Kumalo delves into South Africa's complex history and shifting political landscape, reflecting on the dreams and realities of a post-apartheid nation. His passion for debate and current affairs was ignited at
St John's College
, later taking him to
Morehouse College in Atlanta, Georgia
, where he continued to sharpen his perspective on leadership and social change.
Kumalo isn't just asking questions—he's challenging narratives, sparking conversations, and pushing South Africa's youth to rethink what it truly means to be
Born Free
.
Otsile Nkadimeng
is a
published author, policy writer, and changemaker
, balancing his role as a
second-year university student
with a deep commitment to youth empowerment. Recognized by
News24
for his impact and awarded the
Young Nelson Mandela Award in 2023
, he is shaping conversations on democracy, governance, and sustainability.
As the
Executive Director of SoWeVote
, a platform he co-founded, Nkadimeng is making it easier for young South Africans to access critical information about politics and democracy. His advocacy extends beyond borders—he serves as a
Youth Advisor to the Embassy of Sweden in Pretoria
and is a
fellow at the International Youth Think Tank
, where he contributes to global youth policy discussions.
Passionate about sustainability, he has co-founded and led multiple initiatives aimed at environmental and social progress across South Africa. Whether in civic engagement, international diplomacy, or grassroots activism, Nkadimeng is at the forefront of youth-led change, proving that young voices aren't just part of the conversation—they're leading it.
Disclaimer:
'Born Free'
is an opinion-based podcast and does not represent the views of M&G Media (PTY) LTD, its owners, affiliates, employees, or partners. The opinions expressed by the hosts and guests are their own and do not reflect the editorial stance of the Mail & Guardian.
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