Twelve days that reshaped modern war - World - Al-Ahram Weekly

Al-Ahram Weekly

2 days ago

The 12 days of the Israeli-Iranian war were closely observed by both the US and China, who viewed it as a case study for potential future confrontations
More than a week has passed since a ceasefire was agreed between Israel and Iran in the 12-day war, one of the most intense conflicts both sides have witnessed in the past two decades. It offers priceless lessons to all nations that fight according to Eastern or Western military doctrines or those blending the two approaches.
The Chinese writer Sun Tzu wrote in his book the Art of War that 'if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.'
In fact, both sides understand each other well and have even developed the necessary tactics to achieve optimal results, not only on the military level but also politically.
Iran, like other Eastern countries, depends on the A2/AD concept of Anti-Access (A2) and Area Denial (AD). The former is a set of measures aimed at slowing or preventing unfriendly forces from reaching the operational theatre or even operating from long distances. The latter is a set of measures intended to obstruct the manoeuvering of unfriendly forces within the operational theatre.
To succeed in such a defence-oriented approach, it is essential to possess advanced electronic and cyber-warfare systems capable of jamming, disrupting, and intercepting communications or radar signals. These systems must be complemented by long-range surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, airborne, ground-based, and naval, as well as a layered integrated air-defence system (IADS) composed of mobile ground-based air defences (GBADs) to counter both long- and short-range threats.
These systems should be reinforced by air defence fighters and air superiority assets. Maritime borders must be secured with thousands of naval mines of various types.
On the offensive side, it is crucial to maintain an arsenal of thousands of highly accurate guided munitions and missiles of various classes with long ranges that can be launched from land, sea, and air platforms. Significant attention must also be given to submarine warfare, enhancing its capacity to launch cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons.
Israel depends on the NATO JAM-GC doctrine, or the 'Joint Access and Maneuver Concept for the Global Commons' that dates from 2015.
From this point of view, the ideal solution to counter Eastern military doctrine lies in developing a deeply integrated and interoperable force. This involves merging the capabilities of different branches of the armed forces, air, land, sea, and space, into a unified combat framework.
The aim is to conduct offensive operations deep within enemy territory, known as Non-Linear Integrated Attacks (NIA), to achieve three key objectives: disrupting, destroying, and defeating (D3) the adversary's A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) systems. By accomplishing these, the NATO doctrine can ensure that allied forces have the freedom to manoeuvre and operate across contested battlefields without constraints.
This strategy succeeds through three primary goals: first, disabling the enemy's command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying the adversary's integrated defence architecture; and third, neutralising any weapons systems introduced into the battlefield during the conflict.
These goals are achieved in two main operational phases. The first focuses on the launch of military operations. It begins with resisting the enemy's initial strikes, whether on the frontlines or rear positions of NATO and allied forces, and limiting losses through defensive tactics and manoeuvre warfare.
It continues with precision counterstrikes against pre-selected targets, especially command centres and strategic facilities that could disrupt enemy operations. These attacks also include strikes against ballistic missile stockpiles and launchers to neutralise the opponent's offensive capabilities. Simultaneously, efforts are made to regain the initiative across all domains: air, land, sea, and even space.
The second phase, called follow-on operations, is designed to maximise bargaining power in any subsequent negotiations. It includes expanding the scope of combat to sustain dominance across all theatres of war, imposing blockades through military force or economic sanctions, and maintaining logistical supply lines alongside ongoing operations. Crucially, it also involves accelerating military production, especially of precision-guided munitions, to keep pace with the demands of high-intensity warfare.
All this raises the essential question of which of these two doctrines is the best?
Western military doctrine is built on achieving the highest level of combat effectiveness in the shortest possible time, primarily due to the extremely high cost of operations and the complexity of logistical support. In contrast, Eastern doctrine focuses on denying the adversary its points of superiority for as long as possible. It relies on endurance and the low cost of equipment and logistics, albeit with initially lower effectiveness compared to Western systems.
However, over the medium and long term, the effectiveness of the Eastern doctrine approaches that of its Western counterpart through adaptive combat learning, studying the enemy, and employing a variety of evolving tactics. This differs sharply from the Western approach, which consistently seeks to impose its own rules of engagement on the battlefield.
As a result, the 12-day war witnessed a significant shift and began moving towards its conclusion due to its staggering cost, reaching $2.9 billion in just 12 days for Israel, solely from the use of precision-guided munitions. These expenditures spanned across air defence systems such as Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome, as well as the Israeli Air Force, which played a decisive role in the early stages of the conflict.
This role included the use of ballistic missiles like Golden Horizon and Rocks, along with precision-guided bombs such as JDAMs and their Israeli counterparts the MPR500 and Spice series. These were delivered by F-35 fighter jets, which had a critical mission at the beginning of the campaign: penetrating and completely neutralising Iran's air defence network.
Israel was spending millions of dollars per day in an intense war of attrition, while Iran was losing a significant portion of its air defence arsenal, air force, and even its missile capabilities, reportedly depleted by two-thirds.
Despite these losses, Iran invested its remaining resources in prolonging the conflict as much as possible. It relied almost exclusively on drones of various types, particularly the Shahed-136, 238, and 101 families, as well as Al-Quds cruise missiles. Although these systems achieved limited success due to Israel's resilient air defences, they maintained a high threat level within Israel, with at least one drone reportedly reaching deep into Israeli territory.
On the other side, Iran was unable to launch the intense barrages that were initially expected. However, even the small number of missiles that it did launch had a significant psychological impact, arguably more than operational, and this helped prolong Iran's presence in the conflict despite its mounting losses.
Iran also employed hypersonic missiles such as the Khorramshahr and Fattah, which managed to breach Israeli air defences, along with highly manoeuverable systems like Kheibar Shekan and Haj Qassem Basir.
Additionally, it deployed missiles capable of carrying glide vehicles such as the Emad and Ghadr as well as cluster-munition-equipped variants like the Shahin-3. This diversity of missile threats posed a daily danger to Israel that could not be underestimated. Even a single successful strike had the potential to cause significant destruction.
Even when victorious, modern warfare can cost millions of dollars each day alongside the immense logistical challenges required to maintain battlefield dominance. This financial and operational burden is precisely what pushed the 12-day war towards a swift conclusion.
Israel accepted a temporary end to hostilities after securing air superiority over Iranian territory, much like its ongoing operational posture towards Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime. Iran, for its part, accepted the ceasefire to begin rebuilding its military forces following severe losses in weapons systems.
The outcome was closely observed by both the United States and China, who viewed the conflict as a critical case study for learning lessons applicable to potential future confrontations in the Pacific.
Sun Tzu defined the golden rule for victory and the supreme art of war as the ability to subdue the enemy without fighting.
This is an accurate description of what is now known as 'strategic deterrence.' This primarily relies on a balance between effective strategic planning, efficient tactical execution, and a prudent political approach that avoids rushing into military operations. It denies the adversary an opportunity to fully assess and adapt to a state's military capabilities, something that could otherwise embolden it to escalate small-scale provocations into broader military campaigns.
This dynamic played out with Iran, which engaged in repeated limited clashes before eventually escalating its operations. A similar pattern occurred with Israel during the events of 7 October 2023, which followed a series of prior skirmishes with Hamas.
* A version of this article appears in print in the 3 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly
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