Putin names desired minimum fertility rate for Russia
A replacement-level fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is enough to maintain a stable population. This figure accounts for child mortality and the fact that not every woman has children. It is widely considered the minimum needed to prevent population decline.
'I understand it's not easy to achieve, but it should be at least 2.1,' Putin said on Monday, responding to a report on regional demographic trends presented by the head of the Udmurt Republic, Aleksandr Brechalov.
Brechalov noted that Udmurtia's current TFR of 1.39 is below the national average, adding that the region, which is located west of the Ural Mountains, aims to raise it to 1.6 by 2030.
Falling birth rates and a shrinking population have become pressing issues for Russian lawmakers, spurring a range of proposed solutions, from tax incentives to abortion restrictions.
Earlier this month, Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova warned of a looming fertility crisis. She said the number of women of childbearing age has reached a historic low and is projected to fall further over the next decade.
To reverse the trend, the government has introduced a range of support measures, including lump-sum payments for childbirth, expanded maternity benefits, and ongoing financial assistance for families. The Soviet-era 'Mother Heroine' award that offers cash rewards to women who have more than ten children has also been revived.
Officials have proposed other policies as well, such as discouraging the promotion of 'child-free' lifestyles and offering extra tax breaks for larger families.
Putin has repeatedly stressed the importance of improving economic and social conditions to promote larger families and make parenthood a widely supported choice. In June, he endorsed the creation of a national family support service. Last year, he established a presidential council focused on family and demographic policy.
Russia's Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) reported only 1.222 million births in 2024, the lowest annual total since 1999. The figure marks a decline of one third since 2014.
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