Bigger, faster, stronger: China's state-owned giants set out 2025 goals
China's local state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have pledged to serve as the 'cornerstone' of the nation's economy and focus on restructuring and merging their businesses to improve their efficiency in their plans for 2025.
Expanding their investments, supporting emerging industries, and making a strong start to the Year of the Snake were also major themes as local authorities managing SOEs across the country set out their agendas for the year.
The moves come as China focuses on finding fresh drivers of economic growth amid rising external uncertainties and intensifying competition with the United States.
'Amid new circumstances, tasks and goals, Beijing's state-owned assets and enterprises must continue to serve as a cornerstone of the capital's high-quality economic and social development,' said a readout from 2025 work meeting of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) in Beijing, which was released this month.
The body also pledged to 'make every effort to drive sustained improvement in the state-owned economy, shoulder greater responsibilities, and deliver stronger results.'
Similar rhetoric stressing SOEs' contribution to economic growth has been echoed by other local SASAC branches – including those Hubei, Sichuan and Anhui provinces, as well as Shanghai – in recent months.
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South China Morning Post
20-06-2025
- South China Morning Post
Word is bonds: China's provinces use special-purpose funds to pay debts
Hunan has become the first province in China to use the proceeds of special-purpose bonds to guarantee government payments to enterprises, with 20 billion yuan (US$2.78 billion) allocated for this year. The inland province made the adjustment to its annual fiscal budget last month, marking the first time the bonds – typically earmarked for revenue-generating construction projects – will be used to cover government arrears. Proceeds will be distributed based on eligible outstanding debts from existing investment projects, according to a statement from the province's department of finance issued last week. The department said the disbursements will be prioritised to help cities and counties across Hunan complete ongoing construction, clear their obligations and reduce fiscal risk. David Wong, a lecturer at Hang Seng University in Hong Kong, called the move 'a step in the right direction,' but warned that the 20-billion-yuan sum could be 'a drop in the bucket' compared with the scale of local government debt 'It remains unclear which arrears will be prioritised or which firms will actually receive payments,' he said. 'The more complex issue is that this is not simply a matter of 'government owing enterprises' but a complex web of entangled triangular debts.' Criss-crossing chains of obligation make the repayment picture opaque for a number of localities, Wong said. 'In many cases, local governments have indirectly incurred debts through state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which in turn owe money to each other. Some SOEs are involved in circular guarantees and cross-debt relationships with both local governments and private companies.'
AllAfrica
04-06-2025
- AllAfrica
The hard road to a clean and profitable Danantara
The recent inauguration of Danantara, Indonesia's new sovereign wealth fund, marks a remarkable development in the Southeast Asian nation's economic strategy. Established through amendment to the State-Owned Enterprises Law (Law No. 1), Danantara's creation has sparked significant discussion, often drawing comparisons with regional giants such as Singapore's Temasek Holdings and Malaysia's Khazanah Nasional. Yet, a critical aspect often overlooked is the profound disparity in legal frameworks that govern these entities and the implications for Indonesian state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Indonesia's legal framework for managing SOEs has traditionally been rigid and risk-averse. Under the former SOE Law, boards of directors were perpetually at dual risks: navigating business losses and evading potential corruption charges. This ambiguity often stemmed from the blurred legal lines that failed to distinguish between genuine business losses and misappropriation of public funds. Consequently, SOEs were involved in a stringent compliance framework that stifled innovation, promoted bureaucratic conservatism and hindered the development of a dynamic and competitive economy. The reformed SOE Law attempts to mitigate these challenges by reclassifying business losses as corporate losses instead of losses to state finances, significantly reducing the criminal liability under Indonesia's principal anti-corruption law (UU Tipikor). However, a more detailed review of UU Tipikor—particularly Articles 2 and 3—suggests that corruption may still be conducted based on two criteria: losses to state finances ( keuangan negara ) and harm to the state economy ( perekonomian negara ). While the new SOE Law narrows the risk associated with state financial losses, the interpretation of 'harm to the state economy' remains nebulous and broad. Unlike financial losses, which are measurable and direct, harm to the state economy is a much broader notion. It could be interpreted to include impacts on the country's investment climate, economic system stability or other material adverse effects. Governance and oversight weaknesses pose the most immediate risk to Danantara's mission. Unlike well-established funds such as Temasek or Khazanah, which are overseen by independent boards with rigorous checks, Danantara is ultimately controlled by the Executive Office of the President. Its enabling law (Law No. 1 of 2025) places the fund under the president, delegated via the SOE Ministry. This centralized control has raised alarms that Danantara could become a vehicle for political patronage rather than objective investment management. Worryingly, Indonesia's national audit body (BPK) currently lacks a clear mandate to scrutinize SOEs' books at this stage, removing a critical layer of independent oversight. The exclusion of the state audit agency from the fund's oversight framework means billions in public assets could be managed with limited external accountability, a structural flaw that undermines transparency and investor trust. If the foundation of this institution is built on insufficient checks, the door opens to mismanagement or worse. Closely intertwined is the risk of political interference. By design, Danantara's management answers to political authorities, which heightens the possibility of government directives influencing investment decisions. Past governance issues in Indonesian SOEs often stemmed from political interest superseding commercial logic, and Danantara's current setup may not fully solve this. Analysts note that the fund remains 'inherently tied to the government and political influence' under the present structure. That has manifested in market fears, despite presidential assurances of open audits ; there are persistent concerns that the fund could be misused for short-term political goals or the benefit of cronies . Such interference would erode not only Danantara's profitability but also its reputation. The first week of trading after Danantara's launch vividly illustrated this: mere speculation about heavy state control was enough to send Indonesian stocks tumbling and investors fleeing. Legal and structural uncertainties add another layer of risk. Danantara represents a radical reorganization of state assets, and not all roles and responsibilities have been clearly delineated. Tension could emerge between Danantara and existing institutions like the Finance Ministry or the SOE Ministry over who ultimately calls the shots on strategy and budgets. Some experts warn of a potential conflict of authority that could create bureaucratic bottlenecks and confusion in managing the fund's portfolio. Unless comprehensive legal alignment is achieved, Indonesia risks undermining the very goal of creating a more dynamic, innovative and business-friendly SOE sector. To secure Danantara's success and allay early concerns, Indonesia should swiftly implement a set of governance and integrity reforms. First, establish independent oversight by creating a truly independent supervisory board or council for Danantara composed of reputable professionals (including international experts and domestic technocrats) who are not beholden to the current administration. This body should have the authority to oversee the fund's strategy and audit its finances as well as provide checks and balances. Second, strengthen corporate governance and integrity to ensure Danantara and its portfolio SOEs adopt the highest standards of corporate governance, clear performance benchmarks, risk management frameworks, and zero-tolerance policies on corruption. The executives running the fund and the companies under it must be selected based on merit and insulated from political pressure. A code of conduct should bar political office-holders from interfering in day-to-day decisions. Over time, consider partial listings or independent trustees for some holdings to introduce market discipline. These steps will professionalize operations and guard against the fund becoming a 'vehicle for political patronage.' Finally, legally guarantee non-interference by enshrining in law the operational autonomy of Danantara's management. The government should explicitly limit its role to a shareholders-like function, setting broad objectives and risk appetite but not micromanaging investments. Fixed terms for the fund's CEO and directors, removable only for cause, could help shield them from political turnover. Clarify the legal framework to resolve any overlaps; for instance, formalize how the Finance Ministry supports the funds or handles any needed capital injections, to remove uncertainty. Clear, stable regulations will provide the legal certainty global investors need to partner with Danantara. We hope that the government will uphold public trust by strengthening oversight, depoliticizing management, tightening compliance and committing to transparency. If governed with integrity, Danantara can indeed be a powerful engine of growth and a legacy-building institution for Indonesia. But if mismanaged, it risks becoming a US$900 billion liability. We should remain optimistic yet vigilant, ensuring that the government actively mitigates all risks and takes necessary precautions. Ahmad Novindri Aji Sukma is a PhD researcher at the University of Cambridge, specializing in criminology. Arfian Setiaji is a senior legal officer and a University of Washington alumnus specializing in corporate and tech law.
AllAfrica
20-03-2025
- AllAfrica
JFK assassination-related docs lift secrecy veil from CIA covert ops
These materials are reproduced from with the permission of the National Security Archive. On the day of President John F. Kennedy's inauguration in January 1961, '47 percent of the political officers serving in United States embassies were CAS' – intelligence agents working under diplomatic cover known as Controlled American Sources, White House aide, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. reported in a Top Secret memorandum on 'CIA Reorganization.' In the U.S. Embassy in Paris, 123 'diplomats' were actually CIA undercover agents; in Chile, 11 of the 13 Embassy 'political officers' were CIA undercover operatives. 'CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as [the] State [Department] – 3900 to 3700,' Schlesinger reported to President Kennedy. 'About 1500 of those are under State Department cover (the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover).' (Document 1) The memorandum, declassified in full for the first time, is part of a final release of records on the Kennedy assassination under the Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Pursuant to a directive from President Trump on January 23, the National Archives released 2,182 records (63,400 pages) in two tranches on the evening of March 18 and noted that more would be released as they were digitalized. The new release includes hundreds of CIA records as well as White House and NSC documents relating to covert operations abroad – particularly in Latin American nations such as Cuba and Mexico, which are fixtures in the history of the Kennedy assassination. Most of them were released before but with key redactions to protect intelligence sources and methods and covert operations abroad from being revealed. For the first time, these records on CIA covert operations are being released uncensored. Among the revelations are completely unredacted copies of: A key document from the CIA's famed 'Family Jewels' series describing 'examples of activities exceeding the CIA's charter,' including a CIA counterespionage operation against the French embassy in Washington, DC, that included 'breaking and entering and the removal of documents from the French consulate' and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone's dealings with the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, which 'could and would raise eyebrows in some quarters.' (Document 4) The CIA Inspector General's report on the 1961 assassination of Rafael Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, revealing the names of CIA officers and others who assisted in the plot. (Document 6) A series of summaries of briefings by DCI John McCone to members of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) that provide more details about known CIA political action programs and previously unknown details about 'the Agency's covert financial support to political parties in the fight against communism' around the world. (Document 2) A CIA inspector general report on the workings of the CIA station in Mexico City providing one of the most detailed views of how the CIA organizes its operations on the ground. (Document 3) A history of CIA operations in the Western Hemisphere covering 1946-1965, including expenditures by CIA stations in Latin America, and details on CIA payments and influence operations in Bolivia to orchestrate the election of their chosen candidate General René Barrientos. (Document 5) 'There is no doubt that the JFK Records Act has advanced public knowledge of CIA covert operations – who they targeted, how they were conducted and who conducted them – more than any other declassification in the history of access to information,' said National Security Archive senior analyst Peter Kornbluh, who has studied CIA operations for decades. 'Without this law and its implementation over the last 27 years, these operational CIA files would likely have stayed Top Secret for eternity.' Comparison of page from 1964 CIA history of Mexico City station. The JFK Records Act Congress passed the 1992 JFK Act in the wake of a public uproar over Oliver Stone's popular conspiratorial movie, JFK. The film – starring Kevin Costner as New Orleans District Attorney James Garrison, who mounted a failed, conspiracy-driven prosecution of a local businessman for killing Kennedy – finished with a statement that over five million pages of records on the assassination remained secret. 'The suspicions created by government secrecy eroded confidence in the truthfulness of federal agencies in general and damaged their credibility,' noted the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) in its final report. 'Finally, frustrated by the lack of access and disturbed by the conclusions of Oliver Stone's JFK, Congress passed the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act), mandating the gathering and opening of all records concerned with the death of the President.' After the JFK Act was passed, the National Security Archive played a role in advising the five-member oversight board and its staff to establish a broad definition of an 'assassination-related' document. The ARRB mandated the full release of thousands of documents related not only to the immediate crime, but on covert action and espionage operations in Cuba, and Mexico, among other countries, and on FBI operations and the mafia. To date, the documents have produced countless revelations of the CIA and FBI's operational histories. CIA expenditures in Latin America by country for FY 1961. (See Doc 5) 'The Review Board has worked hard to obtain all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy and to release the records to the fullest extent possible to the American people,' the Assassination Records Review Board members wrote in a letter to President Clinton in September 1998, when they turned in their final report. 'We have done so in the hope that release of these records will shed new evidentiary light on the assassination of President Kennedy, enrich the historical understanding of that tragic moment in American history, and help restore public confidence in the government's handling of the assassination and its aftermath.' The National Security Archive is just starting to sort through this treasure trove of new revelations. Watch this space for future postings on CIA operations and much more. Click on a title for full-sized document and discussion: Document 1 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. to President Kennedy, 'CIA Reorganization,' Secret, June 10, 1961, 5 pp. Jun 10, 1961 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 157-10002-10056 Compare to 2023 release. Document 2 CIA, Minutes from Meetings of the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB), Top Secret, various dates from 1962-1963, 41 pp. 1962-1963 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 104-10302-10000 Compare to 2023 release. Document 3 CIA, Extracts of Inspector General's Survey of Mexico City Station, Secret, 1964, 11 pp. 1964 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 104-10301-10010 Compare to 2022 release. Document 4 CIA, Walter Elder 'Family Jewels' memorandum for William E. Colby, 'Special Activities,' Secret/Sensitive/Eyes Only, June 1, 1973, 7 pp. Jun 1, 1973 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 104-10303-10007 Compare to 2023 release. Document 5 CIA Historical Staff, 'Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-1965,' Secret, December 1973, 24 pp. Dec 1973 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 104-10301-10001 Compare to 2023 release. Document 6 CIA Inspector General's Report, 'Trujillo Report' [Report on Assassination of Dominican Dictator Rafael Trujillo], Secret-Eyes Only, Undated [Circa Spring 1967], 64 pp. Spring 1967 Source National Archives, JFK Assassination Records, 2025 release, Doc ID: 104-10214-10034 Compare to previous release. Related links Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board Understanding the CIA: How Covert (and Overt) Operations Were Proposed and Approved during the Cold War Mar 4, 2019 The Family Jewels: The CIA, Secrecy, and Presidential Power book by John Prados The CIA's Family Jewels Jun 21, 2007 LITEMPO: The CIA's Eyes on Tlatelolco Oct 18, 2006
