EDITORIAL: Ignoring TEPCO leaders' decisions on Fukushima plant an outrage
We cannot but doubt that the judicial branch is squarely facing up to the irreparable damage caused by the accident at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant of Tokyo Electric Power Co.
The Tokyo High Court rejected a request by TEPCO shareholders that former company executives compensate the company for the damages it incurred.
The district court ruling ordered compensation of about 13 trillion yen ($90 billion) be paid, but plaintiffs lost on the appeal.
Electric power companies that operate nuclear plants have an obligation to prevent a serious accident.
Company executives in making management decisions are called upon to be vigilant so their company does not have to shoulder responsibility for massive compensation.
However, the high court can be said to have taken the position that the responsibility of the executives will not be questioned even if no measures were taken unless there was an imminent possibility that called for halting nuclear plant operations because a huge earthquake might occur.
We fear that the logic widening the range in which slack management decisions are no longer questioned will lead to a loosening of discipline regarding safety and could trigger another serious accident.
While the ruling denied legal responsibility of the former executives, it also called on companies operating nuclear plants to fulfill their social and public interest duty to prevent accidents based on the latest knowledge.
If such an accident were to occur, it would cause massive damage over a wide area and could lead to the collapse of the nation.
The ruling pointed out that the former executives should shoulder major social responsibility because they were in a position to order measures to prevent an accident.
There is dissonance in a logic that contains both aspects.
The high court also included additional wording calling for consideration of moving in a direction of placing even greater responsibility on company directors in light of now having experienced an accident.
But regardless of whether it was before or after an accident, there should be no change in calling for a high level of safety to prevent a serious accident from occurring at all.
The accident 14 years ago caused irreversible damage to Japanese society.
Many people had their quiet lives taken away and work continues to decommission nuclear reactors.
The total cost of dealing with the accident has exceeded 10 trillion yen and the virtual burden on the people continues to accumulate.
The committee set up by the Diet to look into the accident concluded it was a manmade disaster.
But if the latest ruling is upheld, the legal responsibility of individuals well as TEPCO's negligence will not be called into question in other related lawsuits as well.
It will be difficult to be convinced that the accident should be considered as only an act of God.
As memory of the accident fades, the government has changed course on nuclear power and called for its maximum usage.
Not only TEPCO, but all other electric power companies with nuclear plants as well as the relevant government agencies must once again embrace a sense of tension.
Looking back, the major accident was the result of multiple layers of conceit and irresponsibility on the part of the electric power industry, relevant government agencies, politicians and local governments.
There is a need for society as a whole to continue thinking about why the accident was not prevented, where the responsibility lies and how to take advantage of the lessons learned.
--The Asahi Shimbun, June 7
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