India will continue to buy Russian oil, government sources tell NYT
"These are long-term oil contracts," one of the sources said. "It is not so simple to just stop buying overnight."
Mr. Trump last month indicated in a Truth Social post that India would face additional penalties for purchases of Russian arms and oil. On Friday (August 1, 2025), Mr. Trump told reporters that he had heard that India would no longer be buying oil from Russia.
Soured relations: The Hindu editorial on Trump's 25% tariff, 'penalty'
The New York Times on Saturday (August 2, 2025) quoted two unnamed senior Indian officials as saying there had been no change in Indian government policy, with one official saying the government had "not given any direction to oil companies" to cut back imports from Russia.
Reuters reported this week that Indian state refiners stopped buying Russian oil in the past week, following a narrowing of discounts in July.
"On our energy sourcing requirements ... we look at what is there available in the markets, what is there on offer, and also what is the prevailing global situation or circumstances," Foreign Ministry spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal told reporters during a regular briefing on Friday.
Mr. Jaiswal added that India has a "steady and time-tested partnership" with Russia, and that New Delhi's relations with various countries stand on their own merit and should not be seen from the prism of a third country.
The White House in Washington did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
Indian refiners are pulling back from Russian crude as discounts shrink to their lowest since 2022, when Western sanctions were first imposed on Moscow, due to lower Russian exports and steady demand, sources said earlier this week.
The country's state refiners — Indian Oil Corp, Hindustan Petroleum Corp, Bharat Petroleum Corp and Mangalore Refinery Petrochemical Ltd — have not sought Russian crude in the past week or so, four sources familiar with the refiners' purchase plans told Reuters.
India's top oil supplier
On July 14, Mr. Trump threatened 100% tariffs on countries that buy Russian oil unless Moscow reaches a major peace deal with Ukraine. Russia is the top supplier to India, responsible for about 35% of India's overall supplies.
Russia continued to be the top oil supplier to India during the first six months of 2025, accounting for about 35% of India's overall supplies, followed by Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
India, the world's third-largest oil importer and consumer, received about 1.75 million barrels per day of Russian oil in January-June this year, up 1% from a year ago, according to data provided to Reuters by sources.
Nayara Energy, a major buyer of Russian oil, was recently sanctioned by the European Union as the refinery is majority-owned by Russian entities, including oil major Rosneft .
Last month, Reuters reported that Nayara's chief executive had resigned after the imposition of EU sanctions and company veteran Sergey Denisov had been appointed as CEO.
Three vessels laden with oil products from Nayara Energy have yet to discharge their cargoes, hindered by the new EU sanctions on the Russia-backed refiner, Reuters reported late last month.
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Time of India
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Indian Express
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17 minutes ago
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Revisiting Chola grandeur with eyes wide open
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Parantaka's grandson Raja Raja Chola-I and great-grandson Rajendra Chola-I came to personify what made the Chola Empire a subject of unwavering awe — their towering temples, intricate bronzes, maritime prowess and administrative infrastructure. History enthusiasts are generally captivated by Chola polity's three-tiered system, constituted by nadu (supra-village), ur (village) and brahmadeya (Brahminical agrahara) assemblies, with nagarams (merchant-towns) governed by nagarattars. Simultaneously, Chola temples emerged as economic hubs endowed with devadana (land grants), and empowered as rheostats of irrigation and artisanal production. Remarkable as Cholas were in record-keeping — from the minutiae of irrigation-tank maintenance to rice-paddy yields — they were also a regime obsessed with surveillance. Wordy deeds codified brahmadeya, devadana and duties of village assemblies. State-appointed naduvagai ceyvars (accountants) and kankani nayakas (overseers) ensured that communal decisions aligned with royal revenue imperatives. Rigorous audits reviewed revenue targets and exemptions, wherein every remission required centralised ratification. Much euphoria has revolved around the concept of Chola elections by kudavolai (lottery) among the local committees. These offered a democratic veneer, but the franchise remained narrowly circumscribed within clannish coteries, while state commissioners retained veto power. Chola patronage of merchant guilds (ayyavole and manigramam) forged expansive trade-relations with South-East Asia and Sung China, while ships requisitioned from those guilds enlarged Chola warrior fleets. Revenues were reploughed for naval expansion in a commercial empire spanning over 2,200 miles — from Bengal to Sri Lanka and the Malay Archipelago. Here lies a well-concealed narrative of Chola supremacy, of profit-driven plunder. The Lankan chronicle Culavamsa recounts desecrated temples and monastic reliquaries around the 10th-11th century, around the time when Rajaraja-I and Rajendra-I's Lankan and South-East Asian raids targeted portable wealth, comprising temple treasuries, in the name of territorial expansion. Chola naval ascendancy clubbed martial hegemony with mercantile collaboration, provisioning warships, recruiting mariners and amassing siege-equipment without democratic will. This was at odds with the dharmic ideal of righteous rule. Though 11th-century Chola navies realigned trade from the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean, their profits were not redistributed for the upkeep of coastal nagarams. The Cholas were not classical democrats. The real reason behind their return to public discourse is not democracy but the same political impulse that led Margaret Thatcher to turn to the Victorians, or the Victorians to turn to the Greeks. There is no need to shy away from marvelling at the fluid grace of a bronze dancing Shiva from Chola times. Indians, like the Greeks, Britons and Americans, too deserve to celebrate their antiquity's heritage. But an uncritical historicism marks the vanity of present-day ideologues while concealing past foibles. One cannot help but also ruminate on the fact that back in 1940, Vedic scholar Justice T Paramasiva Iyer revealed that in the 10th and 11th centuries, during the reign of Rajaraja-I, Rajendra-I and Kulottunga-I, the supposed location of the Ram Setu was shifted from the Korkai harbour to its currently famed site at Adam's Bridge. The consecration of the Rameswaram lingam at the Rameswaram temple officiated a new tradition of Vaishnavite and Shaivite synergism in southern India. Political pundits may feel tempted to join the dots keeping in mind that a 21st-century history of the Cholas is also a history of the present. The writer teaches at O P Jindal Global University and is the author of The Great Indian Railways, Indians in London and Adam's Bridge
