Chinese startup Leapmotor to supply EV platform to state-owned luxury carmaker's Hongqi brand
The deal brings together an unlikely pairing. Leapmotor, a profitable upstart automaker in China's crowded EV market, will supply the underpinnings for a new EV model to the country's oldest auto brand, which got its start supplying sedans for Communist Party leaders and emerged as a fast-growing premium brand in recent years.
The agreement represents a win for Leapmotor, which has partnered with Stellantis and created waves with its recent rollout of an all-electric B10 SUV equipped with smart-driving features and lidar sensing technology for less than $18,000.
"We have finalized the partnership to jointly develop a model for overseas market," Leapmotor CEO Zhu Jiangming told Reuters in an interview on the sidelines of this week's Shanghai auto show.
Mass production of the new model under the Hongqi brand - translated as Red Flag in English - will start from the second half of 2026, Zhu said.
Hongqi did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
Chinese automakers and suppliers have been pushing such technology licensing deals for EV platforms or "skateboards" to reduce the costs and speed development for companies looking to slash the threshold to profitability on a new EV model.
Ferrari CEO Benedetto Vigna visited Leapmotor in February. Zhu posted a selfie with Vigna on his social media account on April 14 as the two met again. "Hope we can have more communication and cooperation!" Zhu posted then.
Asked during the interview if Leapmotor was talking with Ferrari about EV-architecture partnerships, Zhu said: "Yes, we have been talking about other projects with other brands," without naming them.
Leapmotor clarified in a statement to Reuters on Friday that there were no ongoing talks with Ferrari. "Up to now, Leapmotor and Ferrari have not started any negotiation or discussion over cooperation," the automaker said.
Ferrari declined to comment.
FAW and Leapmotor signed a memorandum of understanding in March but the details of the deal to supply an EV architecture to Hongqi had also not previously been reported.
The new Hongqi model will share the same platform as Leapmotor's B10 and will be manufactured in Leapmotor's Hangzhou plant in eastern China, according to a person with direct knowledge of the matter who was not authorised to discuss the deal.
The new car will be an SUV like the B10 with both pure electric and range-extended versions that could be sold in overseas markets including Europe, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the Middle East, the person said.
Leapmotor declined to comment.
Giles Taylor, who oversees Hongqi's design, said the new car would take its underpinnings from Leapmotor but look and feel like the other models in the Hongqi lineup, with a design flair he has described as rooted in Chinese aesthetics.
"The challenge with taking a platform from Leapmotor is making it into a cool, relevant, trendy, but good-looking Hongqi. It has to be Hongqi," Taylor, who was formerly chief designer for Rolls-Royce, told Reuters.
"I've got no problem taking the powertrain, but we apply a magic on top."
Last month, Leapmotor began pre-sales of the B10 in China with a starting price of 109,800 yuan ($15,115). A variant with lidar and urban navigation is priced from 129,800 yuan, or $17,870.
The EV maker said on Wednesday it had delivered 8,000 of the new B10 vehicles within 13 days of launch. The company sold just over 300,000 cars last year, less than a tenth of the volume of industry leader BYD 002594.SZ, though it was profitable in the fourth quarter, a year ahead of its own earlier forecast.
In 2023, Stellantis bought a 21% stake in Leapmotor for $1.6 billion. The two automakers also formed a joint venture, Leapmotor International, in which Stellantis holds a 51% stake.
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