Germany's Deutsche Bahn to offer raft of discount rail tickets for summer
Deutsche Bahn's Stefanie Berk said: "In the future, we want to score even more points with offers that are precisely tailored to individual customer groups. We focus on the needs of bargain hunters as well as those who appreciate comfort and want to travel flexibly. There's something for everyone."
The discounts include:
Short-distance travellers:
The lowest price for the super savings price for short distances will be reduced from the current 9.99 euros to 6.99 euros from June 15th.
Young people:
MyBahnCard 50 for under-27s reduced to €49.99 instead of €79.90 euros from June 15th to December 13th, which DB says could make ICE trips as cheap as €9.74.
Seniors:
A Seniors BahnCard Plus will, for an extra charge, offer passengers free drinks on board, eight day lounge passes and preferential care in DB travel centers.
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Commuters:
Between June 15th and 28th, 25% discounts for commuters on personal monthly long-distance tickets.
Flexible travellers:
Flexpreis bookings made between June 15th and July 31st for travel over 28 days in advance will be cheaper. It will also be possible to cancel Flexpreis tickets up to one day before departure, rather than eight.
However, as well as enjoying discounts, travellers will face extensive disruption this summer, with works across the country causing delays and cancellations.
For more information in German
visit Deutsche Bahn's website
.
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