Same slides, new fiscal year
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It is that time of the year again. No, not mango season — though that might offer more sweetness than what is coming. It is pre-budget seminar season in Pakistan, our annual economic charade where universities, think tanks, chambers of commerce, and just about every office with a whiteboard and Wi-Fi hold solemn gatherings to discuss 'The Way Forward'. PowerPoint clickers are charged, macroeconomic jargon is dusted off, and economists reappear like migratory birds, repeating the same truths that have now become ritual chants.
One wonders: is there a secret mandate from the Ministry of Finance compelling every economics department to host at least one budget seminar before June? Or is it just national cosplay everyone pretending their budget recommendations will somehow find their way into the corridors of power, where the actual budget is being stitched together in Excel sheets, under IMF supervision and political desperation?
The truth is that these seminars have become Pakistan's economic folklore. They appear in May, make a bit of noise, generate a few tweets, and vanish without a trace much like the budgets they try to influence.
Let us take a moment to salute our brave economic commentators. Year after year, they appear on stage like clockwork, armed with the same prescriptions: broaden the tax base, rationalise subsidies, increase exports, fix the energy sector, reduce the fiscal deficit, and invest in human capital. They are not wrong. But it is hard not to notice that they have been saying the same things since 2020. Or was it 2010?
Actually, some of these slides are so old you can almost smell the Windows XP on them. One prominent economist even used the exact same line this year as last: "We must delink politics from economic policy." If only he could also delink himself from this loop of budget déjà vu. And then there are the PowerPoint slides, gloriously adorned with World Bank graphs and IMF warnings, showcasing declining tax-to-GDP ratios (currently hovering around 9.2 per cent, the lowest in South Asia), rising debt-to-GDP (77.8 per cent in FY24), and current account deficits as if they were horoscope signs. Everyone nods solemnly. We have seen this show before.
Now let us ask the forbidden question: do these recommendations ever reach the Ministry of Finance? If they do, is there a designated intern who bins them with a polite auto-reply? Or do they simply fade into the budget void like an old PC's startup sound? One can only imagine the Finance Division receiving a report titled 'Budget Reform Proposal from Institute of Economic Rethinking' and responding with a group chuckle before going back to their IMF spreadsheets.
There is no evidence — none that these seminars have ever substantively influenced a federal budget. Not even a footnote. Even more absurd is that the actual budget-makers — bureaucrats, special assistants and IMF whisperers - rarely attend these events. It is like holding wedding rehearsals without the bride and groom. The audience is often a mix of students, donors, NGO representatives and retired civil servants enjoying the air conditioning.
What we are witnessing is not policy input. It is policy theater. There are photo opportunities, panel selfies, hashtags and post-event pressers. Some speakers use it to test-drive op-ed ideas. Others hope to impress the donors in the room. And a few institutions hold these seminars so that they can say in their annual report: "XYZ Think Tank contributed to budget discourse through a high-level policy roundtable." And why not? The show must go on.
After all, what else are we to do when the economic reality is bleak and largely pre-decided? Pakistan's FY25 budget will be written with one eye on the IMF (which has already demanded a tax revenue target of Rs12.97 trillion), and another on urgent financing needs from bilateral partners and financial markets.
Within this harsh matrix, how practical is it to propose, say, "cutting non-development expenditures" when 52 per cent of the budget is already going to interest payments and another 11 per cent to defence? What is the point of "rationalising tax exemptions" when those with the power to tax are often the ones enjoying those exemptions? And why talk about "reforming state-owned enterprises" when PIA and Pakistan Steel are now punchlines, not policy goals?
If this sounds cynical, it is but it is also empirically accurate. Our pre-budget seminars are economic rituals, not reform tools. Like a high-budget drama serial that resets every season, they offer emotional highs, some tears for the middle class, and the illusion of progress. In 2023, over two dozen budget seminars were held in Islamabad alone.
Yet Pakistan still missed its fiscal targets, borrowed five billion dollars more than expected, and delayed reforms on pension and energy subsidies again. Even as inflation briefly catches its breath at 0.3 per cent, the rupee continues its downward yoga, and foreign reserves dance around the eight billion dollar line with the enthusiasm of a tired ballerina. So why do we continue this spectacle? Because, much like sending good wishes to the Pakistan cricket team, it makes us feel better even when we know the outcome.
To be clear, debate is not the problem. Dialogue is necessary. But repetition without impact is a form of national gaslighting. If the same economists are saying the same things at the same places with the same results, maybe just maybe the problem is not the budget. It is the echo chamber. Let us save the seminar snacks, reduce paper waste, and redirect some of that pre-budget energy toward pushing for parliamentary hearings, public budget scorecards or citizen audit tools.
Until then, happy seminar season! Pass the microphone and the samosas.
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