South African troops: Withdrawing from the DRC peace mission
South African troops joined the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC) under Operation THIBA.
The mission aimed to assist the Congolese army in neutralising rebel armed groups while securing humanitarian routes in North Kivu.
On 17 November 2023, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the SADC signed a Status-of-Forces Agreement (SOFA).
The presidential report of 12 February 2024 states that President Cyril Ramaphosa authorised 2 900 members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) under Section 201(2)(c).
The SADC Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government approved SAMIDRC on 8 May 2023.
The March 23 Movement (M23), founded in 2012 by Sultan Makenga and Bertrand Bisimwa, resumed fighting in late 2022.
The M23 accuses the DRC of breaking the 2009 peace agreement on rebel integration and discriminating against the Congolese Tutsis.
The DRC charges M23 with war crimes and accuses it of acting as a proxy for Rwanda.
United Nations (UN) Report S/2024/969 described Rwanda's military assistance to M23, including its troop presence in the east of the DRC.
The UN Resolution 2773 condemned foreign support for armed groups in eastern DRC, specifically M23.
The SAMIDRC mission, including troops from Tanzania and Malawi, operated in the eastern DRC, including Sake and Rutshuru.
M23 mortar attacks near Sake killed nine of the South African soldiers; a further fatality later brought the total to 14 through the mission. Tanzania and Malawi troops also suffered losses.
Defence analyst Helmoed Heitman told SABC News the mission's success was limited due to a lack of air support and unrealistic terrain expectations.
After the 13 March 2025 summit, SADC leaders agreed to end SAMIDRC. South Africa began withdrawing troops on 29 April 2025.
According to the SADC communiqué, M23's takeover of Goma and Bukavu and blockade of aid routes made the mission impossible.
Rising costs and casualties were also key factors in the decision to terminate the mission.
During the withdrawal, the military evacuated equipment via Rwanda due to damage to Goma's airstrip.
249 members of the SANDF returned to Waterkloof Air Force Base in Pretoria from the DRC on 13 June 2025.
Defence Minister Angie Motshekga welcomed the troops and reaffirmed South Africa's commitment to a peaceful, stable, and prosperous African region.
South African troops began a four-day demobilisation programme with reintegration assistance, health examinations, and trauma counselling. The remaining soldiers are expected to be home by the end of June 2025.
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