New NHS plan will slash foreign recruits from 34% to less than 10% of workforce
TOI Correspondent from London:
UK PM Keir Starmer has announced plans to cut the number of overseas staff recruited for the NHS from its current level of 34% to under 10% by 2035, according to the 10-year NHS health plan unveiled this week.
The largest cohort of foreign doctors and nurses in the NHS are Indian nationals. As of June 2023, there were 60,533 Indian nationals working as staff in the NHS. Of these, 10,865 hospital doctors and 31,992 nurses were Indian.
'While the NHS has always welcomed recruits from abroad, today, the NHS disproportionately relies on international recruitment…We will need to reduce the NHS' dependence on overseas staff from its current level — where 34% of new recruits have a non-UK nationality.
It's our ambition to reduce international recruitment to less than 10% by 2035,' the plan states.
It also says UK medical graduates will be prioritised above overseas recruits for foundation training, and will be prioritised, alongside those who have worked in the NHS for a significant period, for specialty training. It said that the 2020 decision to open competition for postgraduate medical training to international trainees on equal terms with UK-trained graduates meant the competition ratios for postgraduate places had increased to a level which was 'unacceptable'.
Ramesh Mehta, president of BAPIO, which represents Indian-origin doctors and nurses, is opposed to the plan. He said a third of UK-trained medical graduates left the country last year and went to places like New Zealand, Canada and Australia. 'The number of medical staff required will continue to grow and will be impossible to have enough local graduates to fill the roles, especially if they continue to move abroad,' he said.
He said the authors of the plan are 'living in dreamland' because unless things in the NHS change, local graduates will continue to emigrate.
'Last year almost 10,000 Indian doctors came to the UK to take the screening exam to work in the NHS. But many have no jobs and some have gone back. There are no jobs in the NHS at a junior level. Many doctors can't get postgraduate training in India so that's why they want to come to the UK,' he said, explaining training posts should be given on merit to those already working in the NHS, not on nationality.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Hindu
13 minutes ago
- The Hindu
Modi in Brazil LIVE: PM to attend BRICS summit today
Prime Minister Narendra Modi will today (July 6, 2025) kick off his four-day visit to Brazil, as part of which he will be taking part in the BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Also read | BRICS has no plan to create an alternate currency, says Brazil's Ambassador to India This is the fourth leg of his five-nation visit. The prime minister was accorded a ceremonial welcome upon his arrival at the Galeao International Airport on Saturday evening (local time). 'Hoping for a productive round of meetings and interactions during this visit,' Mr. Modi said in a post on X. The Prime Minister arrived in Brazil from Argentina, where he held wide-ranging talks with President Javier Milei and agreed to diversify two-way trade and ramp up cooperation in defence, critical minerals, pharmaceutical, energy and mining sectors. Mr. Modi attendance at the BRICS Summit will be followed by a state visit, for which he will travel to Brasilia. It will be the first bilateral visit to the country by an Indian Prime Minister in nearly six decades. Follow live updates here:
Hindustan Times
17 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
BJP demands apology from Karnataka CM Siddaramaiah over remarks linking vaccines to heart attacks
The BJP on Sunday mounted a sharp attack on Karnataka Chief Minister Siddaramaiah, demanding an unconditional apology over his recent comments linking a rise in cardiac arrests, particularly in Hassan district, to COVID-19 vaccination. The demand comes after an expert committee, appointed by the state government itself, found no scientific evidence to support such a link. Karnataka CM Siddaramaiah Also Read - Ganesh idol desecrated in Karnataka's Shivamogga: BJP alleges rising anti-Hindu acts under Congress rule Union Minister Pralhad Joshi led the charge, calling Siddaramaiah's remarks 'irresponsible and politically motivated.' Addressing the media in Hubballi, Joshi said, 'Premier institutions like ICMR, NCDC, and AIIMS-Delhi have already clarified that COVID-19 vaccines do not cause heart attacks. Now, the Karnataka government's own expert panel, led by Dr Ravindranath of the Jayadeva Institute of Cardiology, has confirmed the same. Will the Chief Minister apologise now?' Joshi alleged that Siddaramaiah's statements were part of a broader attempt to discredit vaccines developed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's tenure. 'They thought the pandemic would work against the Prime Minister, but he managed the crisis with care and compassion. The vaccine rollout saved millions, and now the opposition is resorting to misinformation,' he said. Why did the controversy begin? The controversy stems from Siddaramaiah's recent remarks suggesting a connection between the sudden spike in heart attacks in Hassan and the COVID-19 vaccination drive. He had also questioned the speed at which the vaccines were approved, comments that drew criticism from scientists, political opponents, and industry leaders, including Biocon chairperson Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw. Also Read - Indie dog goes missing in Bengaluru, army doctor who rescued him flies home for search: Report To investigate the matter, the Karnataka government had constituted a panel led by Dr Ravindranath. In its findings, the committee stated that there was no causal link between COVID-19 vaccination and sudden cardiac deaths. Instead, it described the issue as multifactorial, pointing to behavioural, genetic, and environmental risk factors. The Jayadeva Institute's report echoed findings from global studies, reaffirming that vaccination offers long-term protection against cardiac events, rather than causing them. BJP spokesperson and former minister Dr CN Ashwath Narayan also slammed Siddaramaiah, accusing him of spreading unverified claims that could erode public trust in vaccines. 'The Chief Minister made a reckless statement without citing any scientific evidence. His comments undermine the credibility of Indian-made vaccines. He owes an apology to the people of Karnataka,' Narayan said.
Hindustan Times
17 minutes ago
- Hindustan Times
Five years of India-Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
In 2009, India and Australia signed a strategic partnership to strengthen political and security relations, but few could have predicted the meteoric rise of the relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP). A significant shift occurred in the June 2020 virtual summit between Prime Minister (PM), Narendra Modi and the then-Australian PM Scott Morrison, where the two agreed to elevate the strategic pPartnership to a CSP, building on a decade-old bilateral strategic engagement. With $ 50 billion in two-way trade, Australian universities opening campuses in India, and a million-strong Indian diaspora strengthening people-to-people ties, the tripling of direct flights between India and Australia since 2022, and a leader-level annual summit since 2023, bilateral ties have grown significantly. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Australian deputy prime minister Richard Marles met in Delhi on Wednesday. ani (ANI) As the two countries chart an ambitious future—from defence cooperation to increased security ties—the question remains: How has the bilateral partnership evolved since the establishment of the CSP? To what extent has it deepened and matured, and what further steps can be taken to strengthen it? To mark the 5th anniversary of this significant partnership, Australian deputy PM Richard Marles arrived in Delhi to meet the Indian PM on June 4, 2025, on his first overseas visit since taking office this year—reflecting Canberra's importance to New Delhi and highlighting the growing strategic alignment between the two. Both countries clearly recognise the relevance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific, and hence, reaffirm the principles of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based region. This necessitates expanding areas of cooperation in areas like improving maritime security, strengthening diplomatic ties, and deepening defence and military cooperation—in sync with growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The seriousness of the partnership from both sides is amplified by the high-level bilateral exchanges that have been institutionalised, with India now holding annual leader-level summits beginning in 2023, followed by the second dialogue in 2024, along with the 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue in 2021 and 2023—upgraded from the continuing 2+2 secretary-level dialogue in June 2020. Australia is perhaps the third country, in addition to Japan and Russia, with which India has institutionalised such regular high-level structured dialogues, indicating a strategic premium that New Delhi places on its partnership with Canberra. Notably, the quantity and quality of bilateral dialogues have increased: the Foreign Minister's Framework Dialogue, a bilateral stock-taking mechanism; the 2+2 Foreign and Defence Secretary-level consultations, a precursor 'inter-sessional' activity prior to the 2+2 ministerial dialogue; Defence Policy talks; and the Maritime Security Dialogue have respectively concluded their 14th, 4th, 9th, and 6th editions. This is undoubtedly an elevation from just discussing their fondness for cricket to promoting and expanding inter-bureaucratic linkages, offering mechanisms to exchange views and buttressing a common strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific region—an area that has drawn the attention of major global powers in recent years. Military and defence ties are also transforming, exhibiting historic first trends and increasing complexity in military exercises, interoperability, and entanglements. Military-related activities, including joint exercises, meetings among defence officials and service staff, port calls, and the military officials' participation in events and conferences, have seen a noticeable rise, increasing from 38 in 2018 to 53 by 2023 and counting. In 2023, Australia's inaugural hosting of the Malabar exercise—a quadrilateral naval exercise involving the US, Japan, Australia, and India—demonstrated the aggregation of anti-submarine activities, air defence and gunnery exercises, and the integration of communication operations along with replenishment practices. In its 2023 edition of the Indo-Pacific Endeavour—a regionally-tailored multilateral defence exercise—an Indian Navy maritime patrol aircraft, P-8I Neptune, and Australia's P-8A Poseidon aircraft engaged in a joint maritime interoperability training session. In the same year, India's INS VAGIR, made a port call to Perth—the farthest docking of an Indian submarine so far. Furthermore, the Indian Navy travelled to Australia's Cocos Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean region, which the Australian department of defence depicted as 'a groundbreaking visit.' Bilaterally, AUSINDEX—a biennial maritime exercise—concluded its 5th edition in 2023 on complex maritime operations involving aircraft and maritime patrolling jets. Also, AUSTRAHIND, a joint Indian and Australian army exercise, carried out sub-conventional operations curated to manage contingencies in arid conditions and a semi-urban landscape in its recent edition. In addition, India participated as an observer in TALISMAN SABRE, a multilateral exercise, in 2023 (for the second time), and in KAKADU, a multinational exercise, in 2022. In a way, bilateral military entanglements aid participation in multilateral exercises by enhancing operational familiarity between military hardware and embracing joint practices. India's inaugural participation in PITCH BLACK—a multinational air defence exercise—in 2018 recorded the first case of 'mid-air refuelling' between India's Su-30MKI and a RAAF aircraft (KC-30A), paving the way for a bilateral air-to-air refuelling agreement in November 2024. Such an arrangement will enhance the operational capacity of the Indian Navy's P-8I Neptune surveillance aircraft in the Indo-Pacific region. As a result, the rapid transformation in naval exchanges and defence entanglements was essentially facilitated through the signing of the Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement in June 2020, which mandated complex military engagement and logistical cooperation to enhance military cooperation between the countries. More specifically, in 2021, the Australian government dispatched its inaugural liaison officer to the India Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region, maintained by the Indian Navy, to enable maritime situational awareness with the intent to secure sea lanes of communication. Defence science and industry collaboration has made initial strides, with the participation of Indian defence industry partners in the 2024 Indian Ocean Security and Defence Conference to boost defence industry and start-up collaboration. Previously, Thales Australia exported mine-sweeping systems to India, and a similar potential for defence trade remains between both countries. To begin with, military exercises could extend beyond individual service levels and be jointly pursued—similar to India's Tiger Triumph exercise with the United States. Furthermore, these exercises can be designed to emulate Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) scenarios and simulate military contingencies. Also, Australia does not have a National Security Council or National Security Advisor (NSA), making an NSA-level mechanism inconceivable—yet having one would help Australia better coordinate and engage in the growing number of global NSA-level dialogues. The recommendation for such a mechanism was officially raised in the 2009 Security Cooperation arrangement between India and Australia. India already has dedicated NSA-level working mechanisms with countries like the US, Russia, and Japan. India even has one with China under special representative-level talks. Such dedicated institutional mechanisms help India in continuing dialogue on mutual security issues with Australia. Other potential areas for collaboration can include surveillance and reconnaissance, marine warfare, and armed unmanned aerial vehicles, mainly spearheaded by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and tech start-ups that can offer innovative solutions. The INDUS-X bilateral defence technology partnership between India and the U.S. provides a structured template for exploring potential bilateral collaboration. Finally, convergences in Quad have become more pertinent. Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020-2021, Australia and India worked together in Quad to deliver 400 million vaccines, and this proven collaboration offers significant policy scope to coordinate activities at minilateral and multilateral setups in the medical and humanitarian sectors. Given America's inward focus, India and Australia can explore leadership roles in Quad because of their growing strategic interests, regional influence, and shared commitment to a stable and rules-based order. This article is authored by Rishi Gupta, assistant director, and Rahul Jaybhay, research analyst, Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi.
