Japan to Step Up Fight Against Counterfeit Anime Goods Overseas; Part of Moves to Boost Content Industry
To combat the sale of counterfeit goods, the government will cooperate with the Content Overseas Distribution Association, an organization that tackles the issue of pirated publications. With China in mind, the government will join hands with foreign authorities to investigate and identify distributors of such fake goods and take legal action.
The government's policy is part of its Entertainment and Creative Industries National Strategy, which was formulated for the first time to promote the Japanese content industry, which includes fields such as anime and video games. It aims to support the global expansion of the Japanese content industry as it expects the global content market to grow.
The government has set a goal of increasing annual overseas sales of the Japanese content industry to ¥20 trillion by 2033, more than three times the current level. It has outlined 100 measures covering 10 priority areas in the strategy, which was revealed by the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry on Tuesday.
The overseas advancement of video games will be supported by the government through the creation of a database that lists the legal regulations, cultural norms and customs of various countries. For manga, the government will support the development of translation tools utilizing generative artificial intelligence.
The government will also work on the revitalization of bookstores in Japan, whose numbers have been decreasing rapidly in recent years, as they serve as important sales base of manga. It also considers support to manga to be important on the grounds that many manga titles receive anime adaptations.
To address the shortage of anime creators, the government will improve working conditions at production studios. It will also establish a certification mark that will be awarded to anime produced under appropriate working conditions.
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