US detention of Filipino green card holder, other Asian immigrants spark deportation fears
Philippine -born green card holder who has lived in the United States for five decades has raised alarm among Filipino and Asian-American communities over the security of their immigration status.
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Observers say the case highlights the drastic shift in US immigration enforcement under President
Donald Trump , with even documented immigrants now at risk of being caught up in politically motivated crackdowns. Legal scholars warn that the rapid pace and sweeping scope of recent actions – often based on vague legal grounds – were eroding long-standing protections of due process.
Officials of the US
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained Lewelyn Dixon, 64, on February 28 as she was returning to her home in Seattle, Washington, after a trip to the Philippines.
Her niece, Emily Cristobal, told local news that she had been visiting the Philippines for a few weeks before her detention and that her family did not find out about what happened to her until March 2.
Officials did not explain to Dixon's family why she was being held, but her lawyer, Benjamin Osorio, said it may have been triggered by an old embezzlement conviction in 2001 for which she was sentenced to 30 days in a halfway house and fined US$6,400.
Lewelyn Dixon has lived in the United States for five decades. Photo: Melania Madriaga
Osorio said that Dixon had previously travelled outside the US with no issues.
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