China planned car crash during Taiwan vice-president's Prague visit, says Czech intelligence
Taiwan's Vice-President Hsiao Bi-khim has said she will not be intimidated after Czech intelligence revealed a reported Chinese plan to stage a car crash during her official visit to Prague in 2024.
According to The Guardian, the Czech Republic's military intelligence said Chinese diplomats and intelligence officials based at the Chinese embassy in Prague had planned a staged 'demonstrative kinetic action' targeting Hsiao's motorcade during her visit.
Hsiao travelled to the Czech Republic in March 2024, in her first overseas trip after Taiwan's January election, alongside President Lai Ching-te. At the time, it was reported that a Chinese diplomat had run a red light while following her convoy from the airport.
This week, Czech officials told local media that the incident was part of a broader plan. Director of Czech military intelligence Petr Bartovský told public broadcaster Irozhlas that the driver stopped by police had been following Hsiao's convoy, and that intelligence services had uncovered further plans being developed within the Chinese embassy.
A spokesperson for the agency, Jan Pejšek, told Irozhlas: 'It was an attempt by the Chinese civil secret service to create conditions to perform a demonstrative kinetic action against a protected person, which however did not go beyond the phase of preparation.' According to The Guardian, this was understood to mean a staged car crash.
Pejšek added that other actions taken by Chinese officials had come close to putting Hsiao in danger. He said these activities 'flagrantly breach the obligations arising from the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations' and were carried out by individuals with diplomatic status at the Chinese embassy.
Hsiao thanked Czech authorities for keeping her safe. On Saturday, she posted on social media: 'The CCP's unlawful activities will NOT intimidate me from voicing Taiwan's interests in the international community.'
Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council strongly criticised the reported plan, calling it a serious threat to Hsiao's safety. The council demanded a public apology and explanation from China.
A spokesperson for China's foreign ministry, Guo Jiakun, responded by saying that Chinese diplomats 'always observe the laws and regulations of host countries.' He also criticised the Czech government for allowing the visit, describing it as 'gross interference in China's internal affairs.'
Guo referred to Hsiao as a 'diehard Taiwan independence separatist,' a label that in China carries harsh penalties, including the threat of the death sentence.
The Czech foreign ministry confirmed that it had summoned the Chinese ambassador over the incident at the time. It did not give additional comment on Friday.
Beijing claims Taiwan as part of its territory and opposes any diplomatic recognition of Taiwan's elected government. It routinely criticises foreign governments that host Taiwanese officials.
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