Chinese national arrested at Delhi airport for ‘stealing credit cards of passengers'
The accused were identified as Benlai Pan, 30, and his associates Meng Guangyang, 51, Chang Mang, 42, and Liu Jie, 45.
The arrest came after the police received a tip-off from the Security and Vigilance team of Air India after suspicious activity was reported on board its flight AI-315 from Hong Kong to New Delhi. Officers said passenger Prabhat Verma, seated at 12C, was alerted by the cabin crew to unusual movement around his overhead baggage, following which he discovered his Bank of America credit card missing. It was later found under seat 14C.
The seat was occupied by Benlai Pan, who was not assigned there but had a ticket for seat 23C, officers said. Another passenger, Prashi, seated at 14A, reported that her mother's HDFC debit card was missing. A third passenger, Nafeez Fatima, provided a video capturing Pan opening cabin baggage and inspecting personal belongings, the police said.
Pan and his associates were questioned. Meanwhile, a police team coordinated with Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and airline security, analysed surveillance footage, secured cabin crew statements, and examined digital evidence. Immigration records and past travel data of the accused are being reviewed.
'During interrogation, Pan confessed that he and his accomplices were part of a coordinated syndicate operating on international transit flights. Their tactics included booking transit flights with longer durations to maximise access to unsupervised cabin luggage,' said Usha Rangnani, Additional Commissioner of Police, IGI Airport.
'They would spread group members across different seats to avoid detection as a coordinated unit. They would target sleeping passengers, carefully open their bags, and extract high-value items and cards. They would then discard the cards after attempting misuse, making detection harder. The group deliberately used flights between high-traffic international routes, exploiting long-duration flights and cabin fatigue,' the ACP added.
The police have so far recovered a Bank of America credit card found at seat 14C, along with several bags, wallets, and electronic items currently under investigation.
Benlai Pan has been arrested, while further inquiry continues against his three companions, the police said. Authorities are examining travel records from the past year to trace connections to other unresolved cases. Alerts have been issued across airports in India, and international enforcement agencies have been contacted to explore the possibility of a broader theft syndicate.
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The Air India Flight 171 crash investigation has left aviation professionals and the public deeply unsettled: not because it clarified, but because it seemed tailored to deflect. One glaring inconsistency lies in the heavy emphasis on Fuel Control Switches (FCS), framed as either a manual error by the pilots or a mechanical spotlight appears calculated: if not to direct blame, then certainly to sow suspicion. The cockpit voice recordings selectively quoted in the report hint at confusion and miscommunication, yet are strategically vague enough to insinuate pilot fault without explicitly stating the most critical aspect, which is FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control), remains conspicuously under-reported. This digital system is the nerve centre of modern engines, and any glitch or misinterpretation could trigger a dual engine shutdown. The fact that both engines failed within three seconds of lift-off, and that the switches allegedly transitioned to cutoff near simultaneously, should demand a forensic analysis of FADEC's role. Yet, the report barely acknowledges its presence. This article is based solely on the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) report and my experience as a commercial pilot. The report appears not only factually inconsistent but also contradictory. It states that although the aft Enhanced Airborne Flight Recorder (EAFR) was completely burned out and the forward EAFR was damaged, data was still retrieved via the Golden the report is based on EAFR data obtained through the Golden Chassis, then the numerous factual inaccuracies raise concerns about the reliability of that data. Could the EAFR itself have been compromised? In today's world of artificial intelligence, even a pilot's voice can be convincingly as an experienced pilot, my interpretation might shock everyone today, since the vested interest of the corporates has already spread a false narrative all over the world, insinuating the pilots' involvement in AI 171 my flying experience and the AAIB narrative, I am of the opinion that the Fuel Control Switches (FCS) were not moved to cutoff, nor did they transition to cutoff as stated in the report. I will prove this in the later part of this article. The engines never flamed out on their own, nor were they shut down using the Fuel Control distress that this report has caused among flight crews is profound. It's not just the implications but the insinuations. The omission of altitude data, engine telemetry, and a full transcript of pilot communications only intensifies suspicion that the report's true aim may be damage control, not absence of altitude data in the AI 171 crash report, especially during the climb phase, is deeply troubling. In any post-accident investigation involving a commercial aircraft, altitude traces are fundamental. Their omission raises serious concerns about the potential suppression of facts, or it is sheer critical anomaly is the landing gear status. Under normal circumstances, gear retraction occurs between 50–100 feet Above Ground Level (AGL), and by three seconds after lift-off, the aircraft should have reached approximately 100-150 feet. Yet, the gear was reportedly not opens two possibilities:1. Gear was selected 'UP' but remained extended. The report mentions the gear lever was in the 'DOWN' Figure 12 of the report page shows the lever in a position between 'UP' and 'DOWN', suggesting it may have been selected 'UP' but failed to true, this points to a failure in the ground-air logic system, which determines whether the aircraft is airborne. The system will not allow the gear to be retracted if it believes that the aircraft is still on the ground.A faulty signal could have led FADEC to misinterpret the aircraft as still on the ground, triggering an engine the aircraft gets airborne with FADEC at ground logic and at 10 feet radio altimeters, the FADEC gets an airborne signal conflicting with weight-on-wheels micro switch: FADEC may cut the engine power to Ground Idle or shut it down completely.2. The more likely possibility is that 'Gear' was never selected 'UP' due to pilots' distraction at takeoff. If the lever was genuinely in the 'DOWN' position, it implies that the pilots were distracted by a failure around 50 feet AGL or distraction could have prevented gear retraction and coincided with the dual engine rollback nature of this failure, possibly electrical or software-related, may have caused an FADEC reset, leading to fuel or engine thrust in the Thrust Lever QuadrantBoth thrust levers were found in the aft (idle) position as per the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained in the forward (takeoff) position until impact. This presents a critical mismatch between the physical lever positions in the flight deck and the digital command interpreted by FADEC: unless, of course, the levers were displaced post-impact due to mechanical or thermal this raises a deeper question: can we trust post-crash lever positions as reliable indicators of pilot intent? Or are we witnessing the limitations of forensic reconstruction in the face of high-energy impact and fire damage?advertisementIf the pilots attempted to relight the engines, it's plausible they moved the thrust levers to idle to manage the temperature surge that typically accompanies ignition. This is standard practice to prevent Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) overshoot, which can damage engine it is difficult to imagine FADEC initiating a relight sequence with the thrust levers digitally locked in the takeoff position, unless the system is designed to override lever input, restart the engine at idle, and then ramp up thrust in a controlled manner. If so, this behaviour should be explicitly recorded in EAFR and yet, the report suggests it wasn' FADEC can override thrust lever input during relight, but fails to log this override in EAFR, then we're dealing with a black box within a black box: a subsystem whose decisions are invisible to investigators. That's not just a data gap; it's a design philosophy problem and a clever technique to hide an era where automation is increasingly entrusted with life-critical decisions, shouldn't every autonomous action be traceable and auditable? If FADEC's logic is opaque, then post-crash analysis becomes speculative and safety improvements become reactive rather than discrepancy isn't just about lever positions. It's about how much control pilots truly have, and how much trust we place in systems that may act independently and silently. If FADEC made decisions that weren't recorded, then the investigation is chasing shadows. And if the levers were moved by human hands during a desperate relight attempt, then we owe it to those pilots to understand their final actions with clarity, not ambiguity and that desperate action took place at 08:08: READ: Engines dead, pilots glided plane for 120km over ocean, saved 306 livesThe gear and thrust lever's ambiguous position, combined with the missing altitude data, suggests a deeper systemic issue. Whether it was a mechanical fault, a logic misfire, or an electrical fluctuation, the implications point squarely at FADEC's role in engine power degradation. It is humanly not possible to shut down both engines within a span of one second since the fuel cutoff switches are mechanically spring-loaded, and it takes some effort to lift it from the detent, take it back and then put it in the the question is what is the time duration if FADEC cuts off both engines. A deeper analysis into the FADEC system reveals that if FADEC sends sequential commands due to processing order, it can take up to one second for cutting down both engines. While manually it is not possible to cut down both engines within one second, FADEC can do it anywhere from .1 to 1 second. As per the investigation report, both engines were shut down within a span of one vague AAIB ReportThe time versus distance information given in the report does not tally with technical data of the Boeing 787 aircraft. Since the AAIB did not have any type-rated pilots and qualified engineers in the team at the time of the preliminary investigation, the manufacturer and other officials were able to put their words into the mouths of AAIB officials who had no knowledge about the aircraft systems. It is also pertinent to ask here as to who decoded the EAFR data. Let us now examine the report one by conversationThe explanation for the selective pilot dialogues in the report may have been due to a misunderstanding at the critical time of the flight, which is as first officer was flying the aircraft and the more experienced captain was monitoring the flight. At three seconds after lift-off, both engines spool down to idle due to some FADEC fault (either Ground/Air contradiction or electrical glitch). Remember that I used the word idle and not fail or Fuel Control Switch captain who was monitoring the flight would be the first one to notice it and realises that both engines were losing power near simultaneously. Being an experienced Line Trainer, he quickly reacts to move both Fuel Control Switches to cutoff in order to put them back to run, since it is the only way to relight those engines if they fail and to get the required thrust back. However, the engines did not fail here: the N1 and N2 were reduced to PF who was busy flying the aircraft notices both engines spooling down a bit later, and, seeing the captain's hand on the Fuel Control Switches, mistook this action for cutting off the engines and hence, the question from the confused first officer. The captain may have been taken aback by this questioning and responded that he did not do so. He was ready to do so but the engines never failed at this time, but only N1 and N2 were reduced to idle power and, therefore, this action was never done at 08:08: will take approximately four to five seconds for the engines to spool down from takeoff power to idle. RAT (Ram Air Turbine) will deploy only when both engines' Revolutions Per Minute (RPM) falls below 'air idle'.Therefore, as given in the report, assuming that both engines were at full power and both engine Fuel Control Switches were cutoff at 08:08:42 + 1 (time delay as given by the report for cutting off), we will have to add at least four seconds for the rollback which would give the RAT deployment time as 08:08:47 assuming that RAT deploys instantly after both engines reach below flight practice, RAT takes two seconds to deploy after it gets the signal, and this extends our timing further ahead to 08:08:49. But the report says that the RAT was seen deployed immediately after lift-off, which indicates that the RAT had deployed before the Fuel Control Switches were allegedly three possibilities of automatic RAT deployment immediately after lift-off indicate either both engines failed at or above lift-off (which has not happened), a total electrical failure with power loss to the captain's and first officer's instruments, or full system hydraulic pressure RAT typically takes 5-6 seconds to start supplying power to the systems after the report says that RAT started supplying power at 08:08:47, reducing 6 seconds from this time brings the RAT deployment time as 08:08:41. This is the time when RAT was fully deployed. However, RAT takes 2 seconds to deploy once it gets the deployment signal, which brings the time to 08:08:39 and this is the most critical aspect which everyone needs to understand. 08:08:39 is the lift-off time given in the AAIB report. Therefore, it is clear to assume that the RAT did not deploy due to both engines failing at 08:08:42, as stated in the report, but due to some other reason at lift-off or immediately thereafter. The RAT cannot deploy on the if both Fuel Control Switches had transitioned from run to cutoff at 08:08:42, then two seconds later the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) inlet door should have opened, which did not happen. It is very clear from this that at 08:08:42 both engines did not fail, but FADEC may have reduced the takeoff thrust to idle or near it is safe to assume that the pilots did not move both Fuel Control Switches to cutoff at this time. It is also clear from the report that the throttle lever was in the takeoff position till the impact, which means that RPM was reduced to idle by FADEC with the throttle lever at takeoff therefore, the Fuel Control Switches were not activated at 08:08:42 but FADEC probably reduced the takeoff power to idle. Taking four seconds for both engines to spool down from takeoff power to idle and adding one second for the difference in both engines spooling down as given by the report, we are back at 08:08:47 where the previously reported conversation between the pilots took pilots found themselves in an unimaginable scenario: their aircraft was descending during takeoff with thrust levers at takeoff power, both engines at idle power, and a catastrophic outcome looming just seconds no prescribed action for such a situation and virtually unheard of in the annals of aviation, they made a split-second decision. At 08:08:50, as a last-ditch manoeuvre, they moved the Fuel Control Switches to cutoff and then the actions are: Fuel Control Switches (both), cutoff and then run, one by one. The first FCS was put to run at 08:08:52, which means the actions were initiated at least two seconds earlier, at 08:08:50. Engine No. 2's FCS was returned to the run position at 08:08:56, as per the report. Now imagine: to move both Fuel Control Switches from run to cutoff and then back to run, it took them at least six seconds or more. This action reset the FADEC, and both engines began to relight. Had they been just a bit higher in altitude, these two men might well have been hailed as again, since it was the first time that both engine RPMs wound down below idle, the APU door opened within two seconds at 08:08:54, as stated in the report. However, going back to our timing of 08:08:47 plus 2, the APU door should have opened at 08:08:49. But the report indicates it opened at 08:08:54. Therefore, this is not consistent with the APU auto-start logic as given in the report, but it does align if the Fuel Control Switches were moved to cutoff and then to run at 08:08: Versus RealityNow, analysing both situations, what could have possibly happened on AI 171 is as follows from the preliminary report. A detailed diagram is presented for easier understanding.1. An electrical glitch (possibly at lift-off or before) initiates the RAT deployment at lift-off or shortly thereafter (probably loss of all electrical power, including to the captain's and first officer's instruments). Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 2. The melting of the aft EAFR covering, composed of steel and titanium, indicates an exceptionally high-intensity fire far exceeding typical fuel combustion temperatures. One plausible source of such extreme heat could be a thermal event involving the APU's lithium-ion battery. If this battery were to catch fire, the temperatures could surge to levels capable of compromising and burning through the EAFR shielding. I have personally experienced a thermal runaway of the Li-Ion APU battery in B777 and the intermittent fire that erupted every 15 minutes was so intense that the battery had to be isolated from all other equipment on the tarmac.3. A high-voltage fire of such calibre may have created a total power failure or interruption/ fluctuation in the aircraft that compelled the RAT to deploy as soon as the aircraft was airborne. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 4. The FADEC got multiple resets as a result of power supply interruption/fluctuation.5. At 08:08:42, FADEC gradually reduced takeoff thrust to idle, or a thrust fluctuation may have occurred. This likely explains how the aircraft could climb from about 150 feet AGL and 180 knots to 425 feet AGL. If both Fuel Control Switches had been suddenly cutoff, the aircraft would have climbed a maximum of another 150 feet to a total of 300 feet AGL, considering the extra 30 knots above gliding speed, the sudden loss of thrust to near zero, and with gear and flaps down. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 6. The APU doors did not open within two seconds after both engines were cut off at 08:08:42. This clearly indicates that the Fuel Control Switches were never cut off, nor did they transition from run to cutoff. At this time, only Engine No. 1's thrust started to decrease.7. 08:08:43: Engine No. 2 Thrust starts to decrease. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 8.08:08:46: Engine No. 1 RPM reduces to idle. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 9.08:08:47: Engine No. 2 RPM reduces to idle. Communication between the pilots takes place. The RAT starts powering electrical and hydraulics. The aircraft reached its maximum altitude of 425 feet AGL. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 10. 08:08:50: The pilots begin to recycle both FCS to cutoff and run, in order to reset the FADEC and get the takeoff thrust back. A desperate attempt since both the engines were at idle with thrust lever at takeoff position. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 11. 08:08:52: Both engines' FCS are cutoff and No.1 FCS is moved to run. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital 12. 08:08:54: APU inlet door opens as a result of both engines shutting down two seconds earlier. This indicates both engines were shut down for the first time during the flight at 08:08:52. No 2 Engine FCS moved to run. 13. After both engines started relighting at 08:08:56, the report says, 'The Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT) was observed to be rising for both engines, indicating relight. Engine No. 1's core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery.' Very intriguing. Deceleration stopped from where? As per the report, at 08:08:42, both FCS transitioned from run to cutoff which means that both engines N1 and N2 will reduce to wind milling from that point onwards, and by 08:08:47, both engines should have been at wind milling RPM. Both N1 and N2 cannot go below wind milling RPM. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital Wind milling refers to the rotation of the engine's compressor blades caused by airflow rather than engine power. On the ground, when the engines are off, strong headwinds can cause the blades to spin. In flight, if both engines shut down, the forward speed of the aircraft forces air through the engines, causing the blades to rotate: similar to the effect of very admission that core deceleration stopped, reversed, and started to progress to recovery is an acknowledgement that both engines were at idle: moved to wind milling when both Fuel Control Switches were cutoff, and reversed when the Fuel Control Switches were returned to indicates beyond any doubt that both the engines were never shut down at 08:08:42. When both engines' FCS were moved to cutoff by 08:08:52, both engines had at least idle thrust which started deceleration to wind milling and started to relight when they were sequentially moved to run at 08:08:52. Image credit: Arun Prakash Uniyal/India Today Digital So where is the question of pilots or a mechanical fault triggering the Fuel Control Switches? The Fuel Control Switches were nothing but scapegoats to save FADEC. Today, the attention has been deviated from FADEC to FCS. Insinuation on the pilots may also be part of diverting scrutiny from the more complex and potentially culpable this light, the switches may be absorbing the blame for a deeper systemic failure, which may demand a closer inspection of the aircraft's digital engine control architecture and the design logic of overruling the pilots by FADEC. Such a design flaw, if proved, will turn catastrophic not only for aircraft manufacturers but also for engine manufacturers and all supporting companies associated with FADEC and other electronics.A pilot suicide theory will also take the heat off the insurers. Tomorrow, if the Fuel Control Switches report is changed to Fuel Control Valve as a typing error, it absolves the pilots and everyone will be happy, including the manufacturer, since the alleged culprit (FADEC) is long this shielding will continue is just a matter of time, but the manufacturer knows the truth through data from ADS-B (Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast) and ACARS (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System), along with full EAFR transcripts. Did the Board ask for these reports, or were these reports compromised? Does Air India B787's EAFR have a cockpit mapping facility? Not all regulators mandate such requirements. The Board needs to answer all these questions and address the flaws in their report, as stated above, in order to put the facts before the public and come clean. The nation owes this much, at least to all those unfortunate souls who lost their lives due to this AAIB report, through its flawed narrative and contradictory statements, has brought shame upon the nation. However, it is not too late to come forward, acknowledge the errors within the report, and restore its credibility by prioritising truth over corporate interests. Now that the team includes a type-rated pilot, it is imperative that qualified engineers from both mechanical and electrical disciplines are also brought on board to uncover the real cause of this heart goes out to the unfortunate souls who lost their lives in this tragedy, and to the brave pilots who fought valiantly until the very end. I cannot help but empathise with the poor fuel control switches, on which corporate greed seems to depend: in an attempt to shield a faulty FADEC system. Our great nation must hold its head high and commit to uncovering the truth, no matter the consequences.(From fighter jets to classroom desks, Dilip Desmond, former Indian Navy pilot, has lived a life packed with adventure: surviving two aircraft crashes and clocking thousands of miles on Boeing 777s with Air India. Now based near Trivandrum, he runs a school where he shares his experiences through stories and mentorship, turning tales of the skies into lessons for life)- Ends(Views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author)Tune InMust Watch
