Japan rice price index projects decline
The Rice Stable Supply Support Organization released the findings of its June survey on Friday. The index on the outlook for the next three months dropped by 24 points from a month earlier to 35, on a zero to 100 scale.
The margin of decline was the largest since the survey began in 2012.
The index for the current rice prices fell 10 points to 83.
A reading of 100 means respondents strongly expect prices to be higher compared with the previous month.
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