IAF needs a transformation. Bring in 5G fighters, fast-track Tejas Mk2, upgrade AMCA to 6G

The Print

2 days ago

However, India's principal adversary is China, and in relative terms, Pakistan is a mere irritant. The adversaries are strategic partners, too. For the last 40 years, India's strategy has been to maintain (and when necessary, impose) an 'offensive deterrent' against Pakistan, and a 'dissuasive deterrent' against China.
The Indian Air Force's (IAF) performance in Operation Sindoor stands out, as it was facing an adversary with near parity. It was also constrained by nuclear thresholds, while the Israeli and US air power was applied uncontested.
A hundred and four years after Italian General Giulio Douhet theorised that air power would emerge as the decisive factor in winning wars, he was proven right. In 48 days, air campaigns turned out to be the predominant instruments for achieving political and military aims, from India's Operation Sindoor to Israel's Operation Rising Lion to the United States' Operation Midnight Hammer .
For the last 20 years, India's national security strategy has been to prepare for a simultaneous two-front war. Yet, in inflicting a psychological defeat on Pakistan, whose air capability is approximately 40 per cent of China's, the IAF was stretched to its limit. 'By the skin of its teeth,' I wrote. Imagine a situation where the collusion is more direct, as it is likely in the future.
During Operation Sindoor, glaring shortcomings became evident with respect to the IAF's capacity, technology, operational strategy, and tactics. It urgently requires a transformation.
Strategic review
Without delay, a strategic review must be carried out for the armed forces, with a special focus on air power. It must include a critical assessment of existing capabilities and a 25-year technological perspective to dovetail emerging technologies for future development of manned/unmanned air power. Clear timelines must emerge in terms of long-term, medium-term, and short-term requirements.
Also read: India's AMCA is a chance to break HAL's monopoly and finally build an aerospace ecosystem
National Security Strategy
India needs to formalise its National Security Strategy and the contingent National Defence Policy to rapidly transform its armed forces. This will pave the way for a military strategy catering to threats across the spectrum of conflict. The political security doctrine spelled out in public speeches of the leadership must translate into a rational strategy.
Like the 'new normal' with Pakistan's terrorism-driven proxy war, a clear strategy needs to be laid down against China's exploitation of the undemarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) to assert its hegemony.
The National Defence Policy must also lay down concrete timelines: a short-term timeline of 2030, a medium–term timeline of 2040, and a long-term timeline of 2050. China's transformation model could be instructive in this regard.
India should have the capacity and capability to enforce deterrence on Pakistan as and when required. It should also be in a position to challenge China by 2035 and seek parity in military prowess by 2047. To achieve this, the defence budget must immediately surge to 4 per cent of the GDP for a decade, and be maintained at no less than 3 per cent thereafter.
The proposed budget increase of a meagre 0.6 per cent is like a drop of ink in the ocean. Even at the current suboptimal GDP growth rate of 6.5 per cent, the Indian economy will likely double by 2035, hitting $8 trillion. By 2047, it will be approximately $17.5 trillion. At 3–4 per cent of the GDP, the defence budget should correspondingly rise to $240–320 billion by 2035, and $525–700 billion by 2047.
Operational strategy
Air power is best applied preemptively. And if it has to be applied reactively, it is best done with minimum loss of time. On the western front, this can be done either by keeping the adversary on tenterhooks for a prolonged period after red lines are crossed, or by striking within 24 hours of them being crossed. On the northern front, effective intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) can help preempt an attack by detecting unusual mobilisation in the relative proximity of the LAC. During Operation Sindoor, both these principles were violated. The adversary was given 15 days' notice, complete with rhetorical drum–beating, to prepare itself.
The application of air power has to be decisive from the word go, covering tactical, operational, and strategic level targets simultaneously. Gradual application only allows the enemy to seize the initiative with an overwhelming response. This happened on 7 May after the strikes on the terrorist hubs and during the air battle that followed, resulting in the loss of fighter aircraft.
It was clearly a case of a fundamental error of judgement when the IAF failed to carry out the Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defence before or simultaneously with the strikes on terrorist hubs. Poor tactics and wrong assumptions about the enemy's intent and capability only compounded the problem. Whatever may have been the political constraints, nothing stopped the IAF from adhering to the fundamentals by orchestrating events. In a fast-moving air battle, who would know what actually happened. Look at the results achieved by Israel in the first 24 hours of Operation Rising Lion. That the IAF carried out decisive strategic air strikes on the nights of 9 and 10 May without any loss only proves the point.
Imagine a scenario where the IAF had lured the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into the air through deception and targeted it with long-range air defence systems to send it scurrying to the Afghan border—while simultaneously targeting the air defence systems en masse with Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and air-to-ground missiles. Immediately thereafter, the terrorist hubs, airbases, and command/control centres would have been simultaneously targeted. All of this was practical in a span of 12 hours, as has been proved by Israel.
Also read: Afghanistan is starving—and its farmers are fighting to save the poppy
Quantity and quality
India's fighter aircraft strength is dwindling by the day. It will be down to 31 squadrons by the end of the year, down from the desired 42. It will further reduce when Mirage 2000, MiG-29, and Jaguar squadrons are phased out by 2030. With HAL's capacity to produce 24-32 Tejas Mk1A annually, the gap is unlikely to be bridged before 2040. The manufacturing capacity has to be enhanced with the participation of the private sector.
China is already fielding two fifth-generation (5G) fighters: J-20 and J-35. It has also showcased two 6G fighters to be inducted from 2030 onward. Pakistan may soon acquire 40 J-35s, and possibly also the Turkish KAAN fighters. India's Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is still under development and is unlikely to begin induction before 2035. Apart from the stealth features, the J-35's PL-17 air-to-air missile, with a range of 400 km, will outrange all other similar missiles.
India will have to give serious thought to bridging the current gap in quantity and quality by importing or license-manufacturing at least 6-7 squadrons of 4.5/5G fighters. It will also have to upgrade the AMCA to a sixth-generation fighter with an indigenous aero engine. There is also a case for terminating the Tejas Mk1A project, after the first order of 83 aircraft is completed, and commencing the manufacturing of Tejas Mk2 at the earliest. The IAF cannot afford to be outranged by the adversary's air-to-air missiles.
Force multipliers
Without airborne early warning & control, electronic warfare, ISR, and air-to-air refuelling aircraft, air power can't be optimally applied. India needs to enhance the quantity and quality of these force multipliers.
Air defence is now an intrinsic part of air power, both for offensive and defensive operations. Look at Israel's air dominance, established by suppressing Iran's air defence and safeguarding itself against ballistic missiles and drone attacks through superior air defence systems.
There is no choice for India but to create an elaborate air defence network to shield its critical assets and complement the counter-air operations in the adversary's territory. It requires at least 15 long-range air defence systems like the S–400 and S–500 to cater to both fronts. Without an effective air force of its own, Ukraine has primarily relied upon air defence to keep the mighty Russian Air Force at bay.
UAS have added a new dimension to air power. The exploitation of UAS in Operation Sindoor was only 25-30 per cent of what will unfold in future operations. Operation Rising Lion and Operation Spider's Web, as well as the war in Ukraine, have demonstrated that UAS will play a major role in modern wars. It is a cost-effective technology that must not be ignored and can offset investment in other costly weapon systems.
Long-range surface-to-surface missiles supplement air power, as demonstrated by the use of Tomahawk missiles in Operation Midnight Hammer. Nuclear thresholds have imposed caution on the use of ballistic missiles, but it may not be so going forward. Despite all odds, Iran continued to target Israel with ballistic missiles. This is one field in which India has the expertise to create an arsenal that is out of Pakistan's reach, and to match China.
Also read: China's information war against Rafale
Multi-domain operations
The PAF certainly stole a march on the IAF in multi-domain operations. It has integrated all elements of air power with satellite data links, enabling synergised operations using multiple detection and weapon platforms. Air-to-air, air defence, and surface-to-surface missiles may be employed by detection of the target by one platform, being fired from another, and guided by yet another.
The IAF uses diverse aircraft of foreign origin, faces manufacturers refusing to share source codes, and does not have dedicated indigenous real-time ISR and guidance satellites. While this makes multi-domain operations difficult to achieve, the task is certainly not impossible for the IAF.
Without multi-domain capabilities, air power will not realise its full potential. Ideally, this has to be an integrated tri-service capability.
Theatre commands
With air power playing a predominant role in future conflicts, India's approach to theatre commands requires a relook. Our capacity does not allow dedicated air resources for individual theatre commands. It would be prudent to keep the IAF concentrated in a Strategic Air Command.
An integrated staff must undertake detailed planning for each theatre and coordinate with the Strategic Air Command. However, UAS, helicopters, and short/medium-range air defence systems can be brought under theatre commands.
Without transforming the armed forces, India can't become a great power capable of safeguarding its strategic autonomy. And a transformed IAF is the sine qua non for this quest.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)