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China says Japanese ‘harassment' behind close encounter with ASDF spy plane

China says Japanese ‘harassment' behind close encounter with ASDF spy plane

Japan Timesa day ago
China on Sunday denied that it had risked a collision in close encounters with Air Self-Defense Force surveillance aircraft over the East China Sea last week, calling 'close-in reconnaissance and harassment' by the Japanese side 'the root cause' of the latest incident.
Chinese JH-7 fighter-bombers came within 30 meters of the Japanese YS-11EB electronic intelligence aircraft on Wednesday and Thursday, according to the Defense Ministry in Tokyo, making 'unusual approaches' over international waters.
But Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson Jiang Bin called the move 'entirely justified, reasonable, professional and up to standard' after ASDF aircraft 'repeatedly entered China's East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) for close-in surveillance.'
'The close-in reconnaissance and harassment by Japanese vessels and aircraft are the root cause of maritime and aerial security risks between China and Japan,' Jiang said. 'We hope Japan will work with China in the same direction to foster a conducive atmosphere for the stable development of bilateral relations.'
Japan said Thursday that the move had 'raised serious concerns,' adding that it had 'strongly urged the prevention of such incidents from recurring.'
Last week's close encounters came as Japan's top diplomat met with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of a regional summit in Malaysia to voice unease over a recent spate of military moves by Beijing — including two similar encounters last month.
In early June, Chinese J-15 fighter jets from the country's Shandong aircraft carrier risked collisions with Maritime Self-Defense Force P-3C surveillance aircraft over the Pacific Ocean after flying within 45 meters of the Japanese plane on June 7 and just 900 meters in front of its flight path — a distance that can be covered in a matter of seconds by the plane — the following day.
The latest encounters echoed two that occurred in 2014, when Chinese fighter jets also came within 30 meters of Japanese patrol planes over the same waters in the East China Sea, near the disputed Senkaku Islands, which are controlled by Japan and claimed by China, where they are known as the Diaoyu.
Concerns have been growing in Tokyo over China's moves in the waters and airspace near the Senkakus after a Chinese government helicopter violated Japanese airspace around the uninhabited islets in May and as Beijing continues to send government ships to the area on a daily basis.
China announced its East China Sea ADIZ in November 2013, saying aircraft entering the zone must obey its rules or face "emergency defensive measures.' The move, which encompassed the area over the Senkakus and overlaps with Japan's own ADIZ, was strongly protested by Tokyo.
Beijing has in recent years ramped up military activity and training in the waters and airspace of the ADIZ — as well as in even more far-flung areas of the Pacific Ocean — highlighting its growing prowess farther from its shores.
China's two operating carriers were spotted conducting simultaneous operations in the Pacific for the first time last month, in what Japanese defense officials have said is a significant expansion of Chinese naval activities.
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