SE Asia facing hidden extremist threat

Bangkok Post

07-07-2025

In May, Indonesia's counter-terrorism unit arrested an 18-year-old man in Gowa, South Sulawesi, on charges of spreading Islamic State (IS) propaganda and inciting bomb attacks on social media. Identified only as MAS, the suspect represents a deeply troubling development in Southeast Asia's struggle against terrorism: the rise of youth radicalisation driven entirely by online exposure.
While militant networks across the region have suffered operational setbacks in recent years, their ideological campaigns have not only persisted -- they have evolved. Today's battleground is no longer limited to physical spaces or clandestine training camps. It is digital, decentralised, and disturbingly effective.
As extremist propaganda migrates online, the radicalisation of youth has become a growing security and societal concern. This is Cyber Jihad 2.0 -- a sophisticated, borderless war for minds, fought in newsfeeds, private chats, and encrypted forums.
New battlefield, younger target
The internet has become the primary theatre for modern extremist movements. Since the collapse of IS's territorial hold in the Middle East, groups aligned with its ideology have increasingly embraced cyber-based strategies to sustain their influence. In this digital evolution, social media platforms are used not only for propaganda but also recruitment, indoctrination, and tactical instruction.
In Indonesia alone, the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) recorded over 180,000 pieces of extremist content circulating online throughout 2024. Instagram accounted for the highest volume, followed by Facebook and TikTok -- platforms where Southeast Asia's digital-native generation spends most of its time.
Teenagers like MAS are not only susceptible to these narratives but may also become amplifiers -- resharing, remixing, and spreading radical content across platforms. In this way, digital radicalisation is peer-driven, self-replicating, and largely invisible to traditional counterterrorism frameworks.
Singapore, too, has had to confront this threat head-on. At the Religious Rehabilitation Group's (RRG) annual retreat on June 24, Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs Faishal Ibrahim revealed that 17 youth have been dealt with under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in the past decade, with two-thirds of them detected in just the past five years -- most of them radicalised online.
Some cases have been especially alarming. In 2020, a 16-year-old Singaporean boy plotted to attack two mosques after being radicalised by far-right content inspired by the Christchurch massacre. He planned to use 3D-printing technology to fabricate a firearm and carry out a mass shooting. He was stopped in time, but not before admitting that the only reason he failed was his inability to obtain a weapon.
In February 2025, a 15-year-old girl became the first female teenager in Singapore to be issued a restriction order under the ISA. She had aspired to marry an IS fighter, raise a pro-IS family, and die as a martyr in Syria.
These cases demonstrate that radicalisation is no longer tied to a single ideology. Digital platforms are increasingly agnostic to ideology -- they simply reward emotional, sensational, and binary content. Whether driven by Islamist extremism or far-right nationalism, youth radicalisation now emerges from ideological echo chambers where misinformation and hate find fertile ground.
Singapore's proactive infrastructure -- such as the SGSecure movement, Emergency Response Teams, and elite counterterrorism units -- provides critical deterrence. But as Prof Faishal noted, today's digital threat landscape is evolving rapidly, and our prevention strategies must evolve with it.
Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD) has also emphasised the importance of early community intervention, especially by parents and guardians. In its guidance for families, ISD underscores that radicalisation often begins subtly -- through excessive consumption of extremist content, emotional withdrawal, or sudden changes in worldview. Young people may express intolerant views, glorify violence, or isolate themselves into online echo chambers. The ISD encourages families to foster open dialogue, promote critical thinking, and report early signs of ideological shifts. This approach reflects an important shift: counter-radicalisation is no longer the sole domain of security agencies, but a responsibility shared by schools, religious leaders, and especially families.
Radicalisation by stealth
Yet radicalisation does not happen solely in cyberspace. A more insidious dimension is unfolding in the form of transnational ideological mobility -- where young Southeast Asians travel abroad for religious studies, only to find themselves absorbed into more rigid, and sometimes radical, networks.
On Feb 7, 2025, four Indonesian nationals were arrested at the Saudi–Yemen border for allegedly using falsified student visas to enter Tarim, a centre of Islamic scholarship in Hadramaut. Though their journey appeared academic, the men -- alumni of conservative pesantren and graduates of Middle Eastern universities -- were reportedly working to expand ideologically aligned networks abroad.
Investigations accusingly linked their activities to institutions previously associated with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and noted efforts to connect with diaspora-linked clerics managing informal Islamic learning hubs. Their meetings and outreach have been doubted as a systematic strategy to embed ideological infrastructure under the cover of education.
This case marks a shift in modus operandi. Instead of underground routes or fake NGOs, actors now mask their mobility in legitimate-looking religious or academic travel, using manipulated visa classifications. It is a form of stealth jihad -- ideological expansion under the cloak of scholarship.
These developments point to a need for deeper scrutiny of outbound student flows, tighter vetting of overseas religious institutions, and stronger intelligence-sharing across borders -- particularly among countries like Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, which face overlapping risks from youth radicalisation and transnational ideological movements.
But the threat is not static. As extremist groups evolve, so too do their tools. Increasingly, artificial intelligence is being weaponised to generate deepfake propaganda, hyper-personalised content, and automated recruitment messaging. Sophisticated language models can now mimic religious discourse, producing seemingly authentic sermons, fatwas or manifestos tailored to appeal to specific youth subcultures. These developments blur the line between real and synthetic influence, making it harder for both youth and authorities to discern authenticity. In the near future, the ideological battlefield may be shaped not just by human preachers or influencers, but by algorithms trained to radicalise at scale. This underscores the urgency of building resilience -- not only in content moderation systems, but in the cognitive and moral faculties of the next generation.
A generational fault line
Cyber Jihad 2.0 represents a generational shift in how terrorism manifests. It is decentralised, deeply personal, and often camouflaged as religious awakening or ideological conviction. Its victims may never step foot in a conflict zone, yet their actions -- shaped entirely by online exposure or institutional influence -- can lead to real-world violence.
From the teenager in South Sulawesi to those in Singapore and the students detained in the Arabian Peninsula, the message is clear: radicalisation today is multi-layered, multi-platform, and increasingly hard to detect. And while Southeast Asia has made commendable progress in dismantling militant groups like Jamaah Islamiyah, it now faces a more elusive adversary -- one that mobilises through hashtags, visas, and digital incantations.
If we fail to act, the ideological soundness of an entire generation hangs in the balance.