G7 condemns 'provocative' Chinese military drills around Taiwan
'These increasingly frequent and destabilizing activities are raising cross-Strait tensions and put at risk global security and prosperity,' the ministers said in a statement released Monday.
'G7 members and the larger international community have an interest in the preservation of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,' the statement added. 'We oppose any unilateral actions to threaten such peace and stability, including by force or coercion.'
Members of the G7 — which groups Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States plus the European Union — 'continue to encourage the peaceful resolution of issues through constructive cross-Strait dialogue,' it said.
Last Wednesday, China's military concluded two days of military exercises near Taiwan that Beijing said included "long-range live-fire drills" and saw it practice simulated strikes on key ports and energy facilities on the democratic island.
China said the drills were intended to "test the troops' capabilities" in areas such as "blockade and control, and precision strikes on key targets,' as Beijing ramps up pressure on Taipei.
The drills, positioned strategically around Taiwan, seemed intended to rehearse cutting off vital shipping lanes essential to both the island and the global economy, experts said.
China views self-ruled Taiwan as its 'core of core issues' and regards the island as a renegade province that must be unified with the mainland, by force if necessary. Beijing regularly deploys military aircraft and warships around the island and has conducted a number of large-scale exercises.
While some experts said the exercises were intended to weigh any response by the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, Beijing has hinted that they also highlighted its growing ability to blockade the island while also giving troops a taste of what actual combat would look like.
'Those espousing the view that the People's Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command's joint exercises were intended to gauge the reaction of the U.S. should also be reminded that the drills were specifically tailored to hone combat readiness and familiarize troops with battlefield conditions to enhance operational capabilities and demonstrate the PLA's ability to crush secessionist forces,' the state-run China Daily newspaper said in an editorial after the drills concluded.
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4 hours ago
Energy from the North? Japan Eyes the Promise and Perils of Alaskan Gas Investment
Among the barrage of executive orders that US President Donald Trump issued upon taking office in January 2025 is one titled Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential, which proclaims the need to tap the state's natural resources, including liquefied natural gas, to rein in inflation, create jobs, correct trade imbalances, boost America's global clout, and counter moves by foreign powers to weaponize energy supplies. In conjunction with this policy, the Trump administration is urging Japan—under pressure from tough tariff negotiations—to invest in the Alaska LNG project, a costly plan to pipe gas across the state, liquefy it, and ship it to East Asian countries. Liquefied natural gas has a long history in Alaska. Japan's very first imports of LNG, back in 1969, were shipped from the state. But apart from the name, the Alaska LNG project being pushed by the White House has very little in common with its predecessor. Under the earlier plan, natural gas was extracted from reserves on the Kenai Peninsula on the south coast of Alaska, where it was processed into LNG and loaded onto ships for export. Total capacity was only about 1.5 million tons a year. Beginning in 2015, global LNG prices dropped as supplies increased and demand weakened, and it became increasingly difficult for Alaska to compete with other suppliers. In 2017, Alaska LNG's operations were shut down. The new Alaska LNG development project proposes to tap the North Slope gas fields on the Arctic Ocean coast in northern Alaska. A 1,300-kilometer trans-Alaska pipeline would transport the gas all the way down to the Kenai Peninsula, where chilling facilities would produce up to 20 million tons of LNG annually. Alaska Gasline Development Corp. (AGDC), the independent public corporation heading up the project (including construction of a natural-gas pipeline and liquefaction plant) hopes to begin shipping LNG around 2030. Alaska depends heavily on locally extracted natural gas for its own heating and industrial purposes, and the Kenai Peninsula's gas reserves have been dwindling, with supplies expected to run out sometime in the mid-2030s. For the state, therefore, development of the North Slope fields promises a new source of affordable energy for Alaskans, as well as significant revenue from exports. LNG Demand in East Asia In February 2025, the Japanese government released its Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, which calculates the outlook for energy supply and demand in 2040. Alongside its basic energy outlook, the plan incorporates an alternative scenario in which the official targets for adoption of nonfossil fuels (such as renewable energy and hydrogen) are not met. If the goals are achieved, demand for LNG in fiscal 2040 is expected to drop from the current level of 66 million tons (fiscal 2022) to somewhere between 54 million and 60 million tons. If the country falls short of the targets, though, it will need an estimated 74 million tons of LNG. In short, a certain level of demand for LNG is expected to persist through 2040. In the interim, the long-term contracts under which Japanese utilities and trading companies purchase LNG are coming up for renewal. New contracts will have to be signed to ensure a stable energy supply farther down the road, and Alaska LNG is one potential supplier. South Korea and Taiwan are in a similar position. Much like Japan, South Korea can only guess at the amount of energy renewables will be able to supply over the next 10 or 20 years. Taiwan, which shut down its last operating nuclear power plant in May this year, has adopted an energy strategy that calls for converting coal-fired plants to natural gas. All three countries have a clear need for LNG going forward, presenting a business opportunity for Alaska LNG. Geographical Merits Clearly, Alaska LNG enjoys the Trump administration's enthusiastic backing, but what are the relative benefits for Japan and its neighbors? The biggest advantage is probably geographical proximity. Japan already imports LNG from the United States, but those shipments originate in the Gulf of Mexico. The shortest route, through the Panama Canal, is about 17,000 kilometers. Moreover, because congestion has made it difficult for LNG tankers to transit the canal, the preferred route nowadays is around the Cape of Good Hope, a 29,000-kilometer trip. The southern coast of Alaska, by contrast, is only about 6,000 kilometers from Japan. The shorter distance and shipping time would mean lower transportation costs and more flexible delivery schedules. Shipping from Alaska is also attractive from the standpoint of safety of navigation. LNG from Qatar typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca before traveling north through the South China Sea. The Strait of Hormuz poses safety risks whenever the situation in the Middle East is unstable, and piracy continues to be an issue in the Strait of Malacca. China's increasingly assertive activity in the South China Sea, most of which it claims as its own territory, makes navigation problematic there. Shipping LNG from Alaska is a way of avoiding these safety risks. Cost Questions Remain But the Alaska LNG plan raises some serious questions centered on costs and lead time. Gas from the North Slope is inexpensive in and of itself, but the construction of a new gas treatment plant on the North Slope, a trans-Alaska pipeline, and a liquefaction plant on the Kenai Peninsula would incur enormous costs. An early estimate by the developer put the total expense at about $44 billion, but inflation has pushed up construction costs since then, and the challenges of laying pipeline through permafrost areas could add significantly to the expense. Any final decision must await a detailed, independent analysis, which will doubtless yield a higher price tag. For purposes of comparison, one might note that total investment in the Rio Grande LNG project, now under construction in Brownsville, Texas, is estimated at roughly $20 billion. To be sure, the two projects differ significantly in terms of the scale of construction and the kinds of expenses involved, but the comparison helps put the cost of the Alaska LNG project in perspective. The high initial investment required augments the challenges of financing the project and could also push up the selling price of the LNG thus produced. Bad Timing? The long lead time required for Alaska LNG to launch commercial operations is problematic on several counts. First, it could affect Alaska LNG's ability to compete with other LNG projects targeting Asian markets, including various US ventures, a Canadian project that began shipping LNG from the Pacific Coast in May 2025, and plans to expand production in Qatar. In short, Asian customers have multiple options for investing in and importing natural gas, and they will only choose Alaska LNG if it suits their needs with respect to timing and terms of sale. This is especially true in Japan, where most of the importers are private companies. In South Korea and Taiwan, where public corporations handle the importation of LNG, political considerations may play some role in purchasing decisions, but even so, buyers will have to decide whether the political benefits are worth the additional costs. Second, under the current timeline, Alaska LNG will not begin exporting until after the end of Trump's second term of office in January 2029. We have witnessed firsthand the policy U-turns that can result when a new president from a different party takes control in Washington. The next administration might well resurrect the environmental protections and climate-change policies that Trump has discarded, a shift that could spell trouble for Alaska LNG. Long-term business decisions require a measure of policy predictability, and in this key respect, the United States has become a high-risk country. The third issue with Alaska LNG's long lead time pertains to the target year for achieving net zero carbon emissions. Demand for LNG from Japanese and other East Asian importers is bound to decline sharply as the 2050 target year approaches. A 20-year LNG contract concluded in 2030 will last through 2049. If long-term contracts are needed to secure funding for the future, then it makes sense to begin export operations as soon as possible. Alaska LNG has very little time to spare. A Narrow Window of Opportunity Plans for tapping the North Slope's natural gas resources have been around for decades, but they have stalled repeatedly in the face of financial and political obstacles. Trump's executive order Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential presents an unprecedented opportunity for the Alaska LNG project. But given Trump's term of office and the looming net-zero deadline, the window of opportunity is narrow. Ultimately, speed and cost will determine whether Alaska LNG can tap into the East Asian market. In terms of speed, the project needs to make concrete progress—meaning a final investment decision and initial construction—soon, while the political winds are still favorable. Otherwise, the project will lose momentum, and the market will be snapped up by competing LNG projects. The importance of cost considerations goes without saying. It would be foolish to overrate the value of Alaska LNG solely on the basis of geography. That said, if Alaska LNG can offer its product at a price comparable to that of competitors, then its geographical location becomes a powerful inducement, vastly increasing its chances of claiming a share of the East Asian market. (Originally published in Japanese on July 25, 2025. Banner photo: A liquefied natural gas tanker arrives at Futtsu Power Station in Futtsu, Chiba Prefecture, in February 2023. © Kyodo.)
The Diplomat
5 hours ago
- The Diplomat
US Tariff Decision Gives New Zealand Plenty to Think About
The 15 percent tariff rate is a tough pill to swallow as the Luxon government tries to tout its economic policy. It could have been worse – but it could have been better. That was the message from New Zealand's trade and finance ministers in their initial response to the new, higher 'reciprocal tariff' imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump. New Zealand exporters of most goods to the United States now face a 15 percent import duty, a significant increase on the 10 percent 'baseline' figure in place since April. A stony-faced Nicola Willis, the finance minister, called Trump's move a 'disappointing development,' arguing that New Zealand had suffered from the application of a 'very blunt formula which does not take account of the low tariffs we impose on U.S. products.' The argument from Willis – echoed by Trade Minister Todd McClay – was that the tariff resulted from New Zealand's trade surplus with the United States. Essentially, New Zealand had been a victim of its own success. Both Willis and McClay pledged to protest the decision to their U.S. counterparts. In a statement, McClay said he was seeking an 'urgent call' with the U.S. Trade Representative, adding that the New Zealand government would 'advocate strongly for a resolution that supports our exporters.' Willis played down the extent of the trade surplus, saying that New Zealand exported only 'slightly more' to the United States than it imported in return. This is true for merchandise trade. New Zealand had a surplus of around 10 percent, or roughly NZ$900 million, on NZ$9.3 billion of goods exports for the year ending in March 2025. However, when services are included, New Zealand enjoys a much larger trade surplus of over NZ$4 billion on a total of nearly NZ$17 billion of exports. The distinctions – tariffs apply only to goods, not services – are unlikely to matter overly to Donald Trump. 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Australia, which succeeded in convincing the United States to keep it at the 10 percent baseline figure, would have been firmly on their minds – and on the minds of New Zealanders, who compare their economic fortunes most closely with their richer neighbor. The timing of the tariff news was unfortunate for Prime Minister Christopher Luxon, McClay, and Willis. The trio are all from the National Party, which was holding its annual conference in Christchurch over the weekend. The party wanted to use the conference as an opportunity to trumpet the Luxon government's economic management record. Now more than halfway through the parliamentary term – elections must be held by December 2026 – Luxon is keen to demonstrate progress on economic growth and cost-of-living measures. In her comments on Friday, the finance minister tried to provide some context and comfort, noting that New Zealand's exports had surged in value by 11.4 percent in the year to June. The increase has been driven by high food commodity prices. The success helped to generate GDP growth of 0.8 percent in the first quarter of 2025, a much stronger performance than economists had dared to hope for. The irony is that the export-led recovery has also led to higher prices for food at home, particularly for household staples such as butter. Annual inflation edged up to 2.7 percent in June, the highest figure in a year. Inflation and the cost of living remained the top priority for 55 percent of voters in a June survey by polling company Ipsos, an increase of 5 percentage points from the previous poll in February 2025. On the wider geopolitical front, the U.S. tariff decision will raise questions over New Zealand's strategy for handling Donald Trump's United States. Wellington has sought to forge closer ties with Washington in recent years. The approach has been accelerated by Winston Peters, the foreign minister who represents the New Zealand First party in the coalition government. In April, Peters advocated softly-softly tactics when dealing with Washington, publicly rebuking his own prime minister and telling him to 'call me next time' after Christopher Luxon conducted a series of calls with other leaders and advocated a solidarity-based approach by countries impacted by the tariffs. A week after Trump's 'Liberation Day' bombshell, Luxon gave a prepared speech to a business audience that suggested 'one possibility is that members of the CPTPP and the European Union work together to champion rules-based trade.' The CPTPP, or the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, is a free trade agreement co-founded by New Zealand that now involves 12 countries from around the Pacific Rim and the United Kingdom. The United States very nearly became a member, but Trump withdrew the U.S. from the deal at the start of his first term in January 2017. Behind the scenes, Peters met U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in a low-profile encounter at an ASEAN meeting in Malaysia in July, which built on an earlier discussion between the pair in Washington in March. For his part, McClay reported on Friday that he had held two in-person meetings and one virtual discussion with his counterpart since April to try and convince the United States to tread lightly when imposing tariffs on New Zealand. New Zealand has also made tactical decisions on other matters involving the United States to try to avoid giving Washington any cause for retaliation. Last week, for example, New Zealand police and defense ministers enthusiastically welcomed a visit by U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Kash Patel to Wellington to open a new 'standalone' office at the U.S. Embassy. While the FBI director's New Zealand counterparts highlighted benefits for cooperation in combating international criminal groups and drug smuggling, Patel released a video that cited 'countering the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] in the Indopacom theater' as a primary motivation for the new office. The line prompted an angry response from the Chinese Embassy in Wellington, stating that 'we strongly oppose any attempt to make groundless assertions or vilification against China.' China is New Zealand's biggest market, buying over NZ$21.5 billion of goods and services (more than 20 percent of New Zealand's total exports) in the year to March 2025. Meanwhile, New Zealand has stopped short of joining France, Canada, Malta, and the United Kingdom in pledging to recognize a Palestinian state at the United Nations General Assembly in September. This does not mean Peters is not sympathetic to the idea: to the contrary, he has said 'It's not a matter of if, but when.' The foreign minister has clearly been genuinely appalled by the war in Gaza. Peters has been remarkably outspoken on the issue, despite his affinity with the United States and Israel. For instance, in a ministerial statement to the New Zealand Parliament on July 22, Peters said: 'The international community is united in its revulsion to what is happening in Gaza. This horror must end.' The words followed a joint statement by Peters and 27 other foreign ministers released the previous day that said the 'suffering of civilians in Gaza has reached new depths' and reiterated calls for a ceasefire. And Peters subsequently signed a further joint statement with 14 other foreign ministers on July 29 that included a line noting the 'positive consideration of our countries to recognize the State of Palestine.' Last week, Peters also held a virtual meeting with the influential United Arab Emirates (UAE) foreign minister, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, in which 'developments in the Middle East, including Gaza, Iran and Syria' featured as a topic of discussion. New Zealand is clearly inching closer to recognizing a Palestinian state – a decision that will be deeply unpopular with both Israel and the United States. But the U.S. tariff decision has been made. New Zealand may no longer attempt to pull its punches. This article was originally published by the Democracy Project, which aims to enhance New Zealand's democracy and public life by promoting critical thinking, analysis, debate, and engagement in politics and society.
6 hours ago
Japan Foreign Chief Vows to Continue Supporting Ukraine
News from Japan Politics Aug 4, 2025 21:49 (JST) Tokyo, Aug. 4 (Jiji Press)--Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya on Monday pledged Tokyo's continued support for Ukraine, which has been invaded by Russia. At a meeting with visiting Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Taras Kachka, Iwaya said that Japan will keep working closely with the international community, including its Group of Seven partners, to support Ukraine's efforts to realize a just and lasting peace. Kachka replied that Ukraine hopes to deepen ties with Japan, including by utilizing an anti-mine conference set to be held in Tokyo in October. He also asked Japan for additional cooperation in the field of defense. The meeting was joined by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, who Iwaya shared a working dinner with later in the day. Kachka is visiting Japan to attend Ukraine's "national day" event Tuesday at the World Exposition in the western city of Osaka. [Copyright The Jiji Press, Ltd.] Jiji Press
