Putin is preparing for another invasion while Nato is fatally distracted

Telegraph

3 days ago

At the latest Nato summit in The Hague, the alliance announced that members had set a new target of spending 5 per cent of GDP on defence and security by 2035. In part, this is likely to have been driven by a realisation that Trump envoy Steve Witkoff's shuttle diplomacy and Europe's denunciations of Vladimir Putin will not be enough to end the war in Ukraine. More fundamentally, however, members are waking up to the need to deter Russia from attacking a Nato country – which, according to Mark Rutte, the alliance's secretary-general, it could be ready to do within five years.
As a military intelligence analyst specialising in Putin's thinking and Russian military strategy, I agree with Rutte's assessment about Russia's readiness for another offensive military campaign in just a few years. I'm less convinced that a Nato country is likely to be the Kremlin's next target, unless the alliance directly intervenes in Ukraine by deploying troops onto the battlefield. Nevertheless, what Nato does or doesn't do in the next few years could be highly significant in determining whether Putin decides to attack another post-Soviet state – such as Moldova.
The problem is that increasing spending on defence and security-related areas will not do the trick on its own. Money and technology, the staples of the West's style of warfare, do not by themselves prevent or win wars. Strategy does. And a successful strategy must be based on a deep understanding of the opponent's way of war, addressing the key elements of its military planning.
I briefed Nato members on Russia's war-fighting strategy in September 2013, just months prior to Putin's invasion of Crimea. Regrettably, no counter-strategy was developed by the Pentagon and its Nato counterparts. Hence Putin's invasions.
Developed by the Russian General Staff and often dubbed 'asymmetric warfare', Russia's strategy borrows heavily from the classic works of the British strategist Sir Basil Liddell Hart. He advocated indirect methods of fighting the opponent, rather than the brute application of force. The centrepiece of this approach is to bypass the enemy's areas of strength and focus on exploiting weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
Obviously, the war in Ukraine has developed into precisely the sort of conflict Russia seeks to avoid. But that doesn't mean that the Kremlin has fundamentally changed its approach to conflict, particularly when facing new opponents.
Since Nato militaries are technologically superior to the Russian forces, Moscow knows it will have to rely on seizing the strategic initiative during the initial period of any future war. It will not be seeking a repeat of what has happened in Ukraine.
Russian planners therefore envision undermining Nato's network-centric approach to war by disrupting its forces' 'kill chain', the process that enables military decision-making to detect, target, and destroy adversaries. This could be achieved by targeting, perhaps pre-emptively, the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and space systems on which Nato forces depend.
So Nato members need to do more than spend money. They need to understand what the Russians consider to be the alliance's vulnerabilities, and take action to remove the Kremlin's incentive to exploit them.
There are five principal areas that require action.
1. Secure space-related infrastructure
Russia has a formidable arsenal of counter-space weapons, designed to degrade or destroy US and allied satellites. It includes GPS-jamming systems, lasers, orbital interceptors, and anti-satellite missiles. The US Office of the Director of National Intelligence warned in its 2025 Annual Threat Assessment that Russia is training its space forces, fielding new anti-satellite weapons, and is already using electronic warfare to counter Western assets. Moscow is also developing a new satellite meant to carry a nuclear weapon as an anti-satellite capability.
2. Harden critical infrastructure against cyber attacks
Russia has one of the world's most destructive arsenals of cyber weapons, a sophisticated doctrine, and advanced expertise. The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment warned about Russia's repeated success in compromising sensitive targets for intelligence collection. Moscow is likely to already have access to critical infrastructure in the US and Europe. Moscow has a particular strength and practical experience in integrating cyber attacks with military operations in wartime.
3. Establish stronger protocols to guard undersea communications cables
Russia's General Staff Main Directorate has a highly secretive deep sea research programme, known as GUGI. Moscow is highly likely to have put this expertise into practice, with several suspected sabotage operations of undersea cables in the Baltic Sea since the war in Ukraine began. A similar risk applies to energy pipelines. In October 2022, the UK Ministry of Defence acknowledged that a Royal Navy frigate was deployed to the North Sea to assist Norwegian forces in protecting gas pipelines, after the rupture of Nord Stream in the Baltic.
4. Bullet-proof against Russian espionage
It hardly needs saying that Russia routinely infiltrates spies all across Europe and recruits locals to steal military, political, and economic secrets. But Moscow has also been able to insert intelligence operatives to conduct destabilisation operations, targeting critical infrastructure. Some estimates suggest that such sabotage operations almost quadrupled in number between 2023-24. Multiple arrests have taken place, including in Germany, Poland, and the UK. But the alliance must take a more pro-active approach, neutralising and disrupting Russia's espionage operations before they are able to do damage.
5. Establish advantage in total combat potential
Having moved onto a war footing several years prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia now produces more ammunition in three months than Europe does in one year. Scaling up production of air defence systems, tanks, drones, and ammunition is imperative for Nato to catch up to Russia and restock its depleted arsenals.
Weapons don't shoot themselves, however. The alliance must recruit, train, and equip a fighting force sufficient to change Putin's decision calculus. Moscow has been mobilising overtly and covertly throughout its three and a half year war in Ukraine. And on Tuesday, a bill was submitted to the State Duma introducing year-round conscription for military service. If approved and signed by Putin, the law will come into effect on Jan 1, 2026.
In Europe, only a few countries have mandatory military service, and so far most of the others are not considering it. But in a war of attrition, such as the one Russia is fighting in Ukraine, the side that has more manpower is better positioned to win.
The good news is that the alliance has time to get its act together to prevent another invasion. It would be tragic if the alliance fails to step up to the plate now, especially given the colossal price Ukraine is paying to defend itself against the Russians. Nato owes it to all those dead Ukrainians and their families to develop a viable counter-strategy to Putin's playbook.
Rebekah Koffler is a strategic military intelligence analyst, formerly with the US Defense Intelligence Agency. She is the author of 'Putin's Playbook', Regnery 2021. Her next book 'Trump's Playbook' will be published later this year. Rebekah's podcast Trump's Playbook is running on her channel Censored But Not Silenced and is available on most social media platforms @Rebekah0132.