Japan's security presence in Asean now ‘routine', as fears grow of China gaining sway amid US apathy

Straits Times

11-05-2025

Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force and Royal Cambodian Navy personnel at the Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, on April 19. PHOTO: AFP
News analysis Japan's security presence in Asean now 'routine', as fears grow of China gaining sway amid US apathy
– Two Japanese warships called on a Cambodian naval base on April 19, becoming the first foreign vessels to dock at a facility inaugurated just two weeks earlier after extensive China-funded upgrades.
The event at Ream Naval Base, hailed as 'historically significant' by the Japanese embassy in Phnom Penh, sent a strong signal of Japan's interest in maintaining a rules-based multilateral order in the Indo-Pacific through defence diplomacy, projecting its military presence in regional waters .
Over in Tokyo on April 15 , when announcing the port call, Defence Minister Gen Nakatani said Japan was watching China's 'highly notable' attempts to secure operational footholds overseas. Military experts had questioned if the Ream Naval Bas e , facing the Gulf of Thailand and near contested South China Sea waters, was a de facto hub for the Chinese military.
Days later, on April 29, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba described the Philippines as a 'quasi-ally' during a visit to Manila. Japan is building a network of strategic defence partners, although the United States is its only formal security ally, given constraints under Japan's pacifist Constitution.
Talks with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr included discussions about a military intelligence-sharing pact, and an agreement that allows their armed forces to share fuel, food, and logistical support services.
Japan is shedding its historical baggage as a wartime aggressor and growing its security presence in South-east Asia, amid worries that China will exert greater influence given US President Donald Trump's lack of interest in the region.
This is manifest in the steps now being taken as Japan relaxes its decades-old self-imposed arms export ban, with one such example being its Official Security Assistance (OSA) scheme. Now into its third year, the military counterpoint to the Official Development Assistance (ODA) programme – under which surveillance radars, patrol boats and other military equipment are provided to developing countries, including in South-east Asia.
Meanwhile, Tokyo is embarking on a broad diplomatic charm offensive, spooked by the idea of China exploiting America's unreliable commitment to Asean to win over countries – especially since China has stepped up its approach to countries following the scorched-earth Liberation Day 'reciprocal' tariffs unleashed by US President Donald Trump on April 2.
Mr Trump has barely shown interest towards Asean: in his first term, he skipped Asean-related summits for four consecutive years.
Japan believes it is in its interest to fill the vacuum, taking a calibrated approach that draws the line at making Asean countries pick sides. Since taking office in October 2024, Mr Ishiba has visited five out of 10 Asean member states – Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and the Philippines.
'Japan's diplomatic posture toward the region emphasises empowerment rather than coercion,' Dr Kei Koga of Singapore's Nanyang Technological University (NTU) told The Straits Times.
This, he said, gives Japan a wealth of goodwill as it seeks to build a broad base of friends and partners that can 'diplomatically counter potential disruptive actions by challengers to the existing international order, particularly China'.
Chinese President Xi Jinping's tour of Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia from April 14 to 18 had raised alarm bells in Tokyo. In all three countries, his main appeal was for a united 'Asian family' front against 'unilateral bullying' to protect the multilateral rules-based trading order.
The smooth talk alarmed Tokyo, which fears that Beijing was abusing its clout as the world's second-largest economy in portraying itself as the responsible guardian of the status quo, despite its dubious record of economic coercion by, for example, restricting trade in consumer and agricultural goods, commodities or services when countries come under Chinese crosshairs.
Tokyo fears that Asea n countries will fall for China's charm, even as Beijing tries to establish a fait accompli by asserting itself in the South China Sea and making no secret of its desires to reunify with Taiwan, by force if needed.
Mr Itsunori Onodera, policy chief of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party, said in Washington on April 29: 'More countries may distance themselves from the US and move closer to China — and that's not an outcome Japan would wish for.'
Thus, Tokyo is intensifying its regional engagements with Asean, which Japanese officials insist were in the works regardless of Mr Xi's tour, even though there was an uncanny parallel between the itineraries .
Mr Ishiba went to Vietnam from April 27 to 29, in a trip that Japanese officials said was being planned before Mr Xi's trip was announced. The countries agreed on a new vice-ministerial foreign and defence ministerial dialogue.
The Japanese leader also spoke by phone to Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim on April 16 – when Mr Xi was in Kuala Lumpur – while former prime minister Fumio Kishida visited the country as Mr Ishiba's special envoy from May 6 to 7.
The four-day port call in Cambodia by two Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) minesweepers starting April 19 began a day after Mr Xi departed from Phnom Penh. Captain Shinsuke Amano told reporters: 'Japan was chosen as the first country to make a port call as a result of the friendly relations accumulated with Cambodia.'
Professor Heng Yee Kuang of The University of Tokyo's Graduate School of Public Policy told ST that Japan offers Asean 'alternative strategic options' for more geopolitical manoeuvring space.
Japan is in a unique position to act as a potential stabiliser in Asia, given that its postwar rehabilitation has afforded it moral credibility: it has been ranked as Asean's 'most trusted partner' in several surveys.
But there are clear boundaries even as Japan tries to do more in defence , wary of coming across as coercive and betraying this hard-won trust.
Professor Heng said: 'Asean expects Japanese behaviour to be benign, beneficial and predictable, while Japan does not expect Asean countries to participate in, for instance, high-end military missions.'
This is evident in what he terms as 'smart power defence diplomacy', through a toolbox of measures that range from coast guard capacity-building to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, goodwill port visits, confidence-building joint exercises, to the OSA scheme.
Today, Japan's military presence in the Indo-Pacific has become 'routine', Prof Heng said, with its WWII past now 'less of an obstacle'.
The MSDF on April 21 kicked off its ninth annual Indo-Pacific Deployment exercise. The largest yet, the seven-month exercise ending Nov 21 includes planned stops in 23 nations including Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Timor-Leste in South-east Asia.
Such security ties are but one level of linkage between Japan and South-east Asia, with cooperation also deepening in other areas such as climate change, trade, investment, and human resource development.
Asean countries welcome these efforts, but have differing views on the extent of Japan's engagement with the region .
In 2022, Singapore's then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong encouraged Japan's greater participation in regional security to bolster 'collective security' – a point he reiterated in April 2025 at the launch of a book on Singapore and Japan ties.
And in Jakarta, senior fellow Shofwan Al Banna Choiruzzad of the Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia think-tank believes that Japan can afford to be more proactive and take more initiative to strengthen Asean's institutional capacity in wide areas from energy transition to maritime security, technology transfers and infrastructure development.
This, he said, would help the region navigate both China's rise and the US-China rivalry.
'Japan seems too complacent with its soft power, with less effort in building new networks or taking bold initiatives,' Dr Shofwan, who also teaches international relations at the University of Indonesia, told ST.
'China, on the other hand, is aggressively expanding its regional footprint through new initiatives, aware that it needs to forge stronger connections.'
But in Malaysia, senior fellow Oh Ei Sun of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs sees Japan as having to mount a delicate balancing act, with its economic influence waning in comparison with the US and China.
He told ST: 'Yes, Kuala Lumpur still wants security and defence cooperation, but in a lower-key manner than before, such that we don't anger China.'
This difference in attitudes – whether to do more or to pull back – points to the nub of Japan's calibrated engagement with Asean even as its military presence in regional waters has come to be accepted by Asean.
Dr Koga of NTU said: 'What Asean countries expect of it is precisely what Japan has been trying to understand.'
With reporting by Stania Puspawardhani in Jakarta and Shannon Teoh in Kuala Lumpur
Walter Sim is Japan correspondent at The Straits Times. Based in Tokyo, he writes about political, economic and socio-cultural issues.
Join ST's Telegram channel and get the latest breaking news delivered to you.