Foulkes extends fundraising edge over McKee. Here's how much she has in the bank.
Foulkes, the former CVS executive who came in second to McKee in the 2022 Democratic primary, raised $636,125 in the second quarter of the year and had $2.1 million in the bank at the end of June, her campaign said Tuesday, July 29.
McKee raised $205,000 in the second quarter, a third of Foulkes' haul. He had $879,000 in the bank at the end of June, according to his campaign, less than half Foulkes' total.
In a news release, the McKee campaign noted that $171,000 of his quarterly total came in June after he hired a full-time finance director.
"Governor McKee will be re-elected because he has a strong record of fighting for Rhode Islanders and delivering on the issues that matter most," McKee campaign manager Rob Silverstein said in the release. "Our campaign will continue to highlight the governor's decisive actions on raising family incomes, education, reproductive care, clean energy, and gun safety – all while articulating a forward-looking vision for the state's future."
McKee is the only candidate to have officially announced a 2026 campaign for governor, but Foulkes is widely expected to run.
House Speaker K. Joseph Shekarchi remains a wild card in the race for governor and would still have the largest campaign war chest if he decides to get in the race.
Shekarchi has not yet announced his second-quarter fundraising total − filings are not due to the state Board of Elections until July 31 − but had $3.4 million in the bank at the end of March.
This article originally appeared on The Providence Journal: Helena Foulkes extends fundraising edge over incumbent RI Gov. Dan McKee
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Forbes
16 minutes ago
- Forbes
Moving Forward: International Tax After The OBBBA
In this episode of Tax Notes Talk, Alan Cole of the Tax Foundation discusses the international tax provisions in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act and what may be next for negotiations on a global tax framework. Tax Notes Talk is a podcast produced by Tax Notes. This transcript has been edited for clarity. David D. Stewart: Welcome to the podcast. I'm David Stewart, editor in chief of Tax Notes Today International. This week: rethinking revenge. When the House released their initial version of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the international business community was concerned by the proposed section 899, which came to be known as the revenge tax. We covered this provision in a previous episode, which we'll link to in the show notes. Since then, the bill has been through a number of changes at the behest of senators and one significant change requested by the administration, concluding in the final version signed into law by President Trump. So where did Congress end up on international tax? And what does the bill mean for efforts to reach a consensus on international corporate tax? This episode is part of an ongoing series on the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. As we continue to dive deep into the most important tax changes and provisions in the coming weeks or even months, we'd like to hear from you. If there's an aspect of the bill you'd like to hear more about, please email us at podcast@ But for now, here to talk more about this is Tax Notes senior reporter Jonathan Curry. Jonathan, welcome back to the podcast. Jonathan Curry: Hello again, Dave. David D. Stewart: Now, I understand you recently talked to somebody about this. Who did you talk to? Jonathan Curry: Yeah. I talked to Alan Cole of the Tax Foundation. He's a senior economist there, and he's full of great insights. David D. Stewart: And what things did you talk about? Jonathan Curry: Well, we focused on the international tax provisions of the OBBBA, or the One Big Beautiful Bill Act. We covered quite a lot of ground, to be honest. Of course, this didn't happen in a vacuum. We went through the context, the history that led us to this point. We cover some of the major provisions in the bill, things that a lot of our listeners are, I'm sure, familiar with: the [global intangible low-taxed income, foreign-derived intangible income, and base erosion and antiabuse tax] and now the sad, new nicknames we all have to memorize in order to keep track with this evolving tax landscape that we're in. You'll hear things like the foreign tax credit haircut, the [controlled foreign corporation] look-through rule, things that might not necessarily jump off a page when you're scanning a bill. But it's stuff that's important for a lot of multinational corporations, international tax practitioners in particular, and it's going to have a lot of impact for certain industries. There are going to be some winners, some losers, and things like that. And of course, we talked about one of my favorite topics — which I'm sad it's not going to be in law anymore — the revenge tax, section 899. You'll hear Alan's views on what impact it had on the tax debate and international negotiations. And on the topic [of] international negotiations, all these international tax changes took place in the context of the pillar 2 global minimum tax framework. And you'll hear how he thinks that this moves us in some ways closer to that and some other considerations there. David D. Stewart: All right. Let's go to that interview. Jonathan Curry: Well, Alan, it's great to have you here on the Tax Notes podcast. I know you're excited to talk about your favorite topic in the world: international tax. Welcome. Alan Cole: Thank you. Absolutely great to be here. Jonathan Curry: Yeah. So we're going to dive in and start off by talking from a 30,000-foot view, the big picture here. What was the international tax landscape prior to this new "big beautiful bill" coming into effect? I mean, why were lawmakers even wanting to make changes on the international tax end in the first place? Was this a major reform? Is this [Tax Cuts and Jobs Act] 2.0? What are we looking at here? Alan Cole: Mostly, we're looking at TCJA 2.0 on the international side. This is a very similar coalition to the one that wrote the international tax reform in 2017. Same party, same president. And that means that there's a limited desire to tinker with too much. And on top of that, the coalition had a pretty narrow majority in the House of Representatives, and that also lends itself to not making too many ultra controversial changes. That said, there were reasons to tweak TCJA even from the perspective of a party that had already passed it in recent memory. Jonathan Curry: Yeah. Now, the House version of the bill, when we got the first draft of it, I remember seeing the draft document come out and thinking, "Oh, boy, here's this whole new set of stuff to write about." And I looked at it, and there wasn't very much in there on the international tax space, except for section 899, which we'll get into later. But I mean, can you imagine the world in which international tax just got ignored altogether and the system we have currently in place was just left to continue running? Or was the Senate vision of making some changes here inevitable? Like this was going to have to happen one way or another? Alan Cole: One way you could look at it would be from the House's perspective, it's hard to get unanimous approval for something among the Republican members, and you effectively need unanimous approval in order to get a majority in the House if you're relying only on Republican votes. And that lends itself to just doing what you did before because that's the baseline that everyone can at least start from. But on the other hand, international corporate income tax is not usually an area that draws a lot of political controversy where you'll see a big dispersion in what different members believe. Especially if you're doing things carefully and relatively evenhandedly, and not trying to create big winners and losers. So there was room for a little more reform. I'm not surprised that ultimately the Senate did more to change international corporate income tax provisions than the House did, because the Senate definitely felt like they had room. They had effectively a larger majority than the House majority. But ultimately the House just agreed to the Senate's changes because international corporate income tax is not that politically controversial among members in the sense that there aren't different beliefs among members. So if you're going to present a package and say, "This is the best that our writers could do given the constraints," most of the members are probably going to go, "OK." And that's kind of what happened. The House roughly accepted the Senate's changes, and that's how we ended up with a somewhat more interesting international package than the initial House bill looked like. Jonathan Curry: Well, we've been talking about changes to the international tax portion of our laws here. Let's go over some of those changes. Let's start with the big three: GILTI, FDII, BEAT. Can you just run through us real briefly just a high-level view of what the changes that were made were? Alan Cole: GILTI and FDII both have new names now. Their acronyms are now NCTI [net CFC tested income] and FDDEI [foreign-derived deduction-eligible income]. Those names actually kind of existed before. They were intermediate steps in the calculations that got you to GILTI and FDII. But the reason for the name change is that one of the final steps is no longer there, and that is the subtraction of [qualified business asset investment] from the base of both of those tax bases. And the subtraction there is effectively a subtraction of the return on tangible investments. The idea is if you start with all income and then you subtract the return on tangible investments, what you have left is your intangible income. And that's indeed where the I's in GILTI and FDII come from. Both have an I that stands for intangible, and then the other I stands for income. Now they are each down to one I, just the one that stands for income, and they no longer target intangibles. That change is a "made in America" Trump agenda type change, I think. It's one of the places where you can see a bit of a Trump ideological stamp. And overall, I'm not a fan of this for reasons we can get into, but it's one of the few places where this is really something more than just an update to TCJA. It goes in a new direction, and it takes away the original purpose of GILTI and FDII, which was to target intangible income. Jonathan Curry: And about those acronyms, they used to have these memorable acronyms: GILTI, FDII. We still have BEAT, of course. Have you settled on a way to refer to these new acronyms, the two new acronyms we have here? It's NCFCTI and FDDEI. Any good quick shorthand in your mind that you've settled on? Alan Cole: We're talking about NCTI versus NCFCTI? The C standing for CFC, which stands for controlled foreign corporation. That's the international income component of the new bill. Usually I'm hearing NCTI that can maybe be turned into "necktie" or "nicktee," but I'm not sure which one of those two will win out. And some people have gone with "fidday" for the new FDII, F-D-D-E-I. But it's always been awkward to come up with good names for these things, and certainly the long acronyms are doing themselves no favors. Jonathan Curry: Yeah. It will take a while for the dust to settle and for the tax community to settle on an agreed-upon way to refer to these, I think. Personally, I vote for "necktie." So GILTI and FDII had some pretty substantial changes. BEAT, as I understand, is fairly not that different, correct? Alan Cole: BEAT we can actually go through pretty simply. There was an idea for a whole bunch of changes to BEAT in the Senate draft, but they got rid of that set of changes and went with a much more simple rate hike to BEAT, not as big as the rate hike that it was scheduled for. It was scheduled to go from 10 [percent] to 12.5 [percent], and instead they made it go from 10 [percent] to 10.5 [percent]. So they kind of curved much of the rate increase in BEAT, and they preserved the current-policy treatment of credits and set it in law permanently. So mostly, they punted on BEAT. But there was an effort to do something more interesting, which was a high-tax exemption. And that would have actually done a lot to put BEAT a little bit more towards its intended purpose, or at least its stated purpose. It says it's a base erosion tax. That's what the B-E stands for. And base erosion would be when you're trying to get to a lower-tax jurisdiction, you're taking deductions in the U.S. by making payments out to some lower-tax jurisdiction so that your income shows up there instead. And the U.S. doesn't like that; the U.S. calls that base erosion because they would rather the income be in the U.S. and taxed as U.S. income. And that would make sense if all instances of stuff taxed under BEAT were base erosion. But in many cases, it's effectively just going after normal large countries with high corporate income tax rates because it doesn't actually make any determinations based on what kind of country a company is making payments to, or what kind of presence they have there. It just looks at categories of accounting that are deemed suspicious. So the Senate had an idea: "Well, let's actually look what kind of country it is. And if it's a high-tax country, defined as having at least 90 percent of the U.S. tax rate, then we can exempt you from BEAT, because there, you're not base eroding, you're just paying tax to another country that has a similar tax rate to ours. Presumably because you honestly believe that the royalty payments actually do belong to your enterprises in that other country." And that makes sense if you're a Japanese company and you say that a lot of your work comes from engineers based in Japan. That's a very believable claim, and that's not really a tax evasion-like claim. Same with France, for example. That's not a country that you would try to increase your income tax liability in because it's a high-income tax country. So that idea had a lot of promise, but I think the Joint Committee on Taxation scored it more expensively than perhaps writers thought it would be. I was surprised to see the number that high. I had been conditioned to think that the Joint Committee on Taxation thought that BEAT was a relatively smaller provision. And then we got this larger number, and then sure enough, it was gone in the next draft, and they did something simpler on BEAT. So I think it was just a matter of they didn't get the score they wanted and they pulled back from it. Jonathan Curry: I see. So you don't think it's a policy decision that lawmakers are like, "We don't think we should do this." It's more like, "Well, maybe on the margin, it's just not really worth making the change because it will add to our numbers, our bad math here, the deficit numbers." OK, well, that's interesting. Alan Cole: Yes. I think they were working within a current-policy revenue-neutral framework on the international side. So they were looking at 2025. What are we collecting in 2025? Let's try to design a system that collects about the same amount but is a little bit better. And if the BEAT score stopped them from reaching that goal, then that would be a reason to reverse it. Jonathan Curry: Yeah, yeah, interesting. Now there were a couple other changes in here too — CFC look-through rule, FTC haircut. Anything that surprised you? Or are these all pretty expected provisions to include in this package of proposals? Alan Cole: I think there are two categories here, and actually each of your examples comes from one of the categories. CFC look-through rule, and we could also go with the downward attribution glitch fix. There are some things that are so into the weeds that you can only really get coverage of them in a place like Tax Notes. These are really complex glitches in TCJA, or they are things that have been extended a long time, and it would be complicated if they ever went away. CFC look-through is like that. It would make the handling of U.S. multinationals much more complex without necessarily raising that much revenue. And so they made the CFC look-through rule permanent. That's a patch to the whole CFC look-through issue. And then they also included the patch to fix the problem in constructive ownership rules that was accidentally made in TCJA. It's pretty clear that there was a section of U.S. tax law that was supposed to be amended and instead it got removed, and it creates exceptions to constructive ownership rules. And that exception disappeared entirely rather than being rewritten. And as a result, people were kind of credited with having much greater CFC reach than they actually should have, and it was a whole big mess. So those are the bug fix types. And those, I think, were not big surprises. A lot of them you could see that members like Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Thom Tillis (R-N.C.) were talking about these things for a while, and they didn't cost much. So those were definitely going to make it in there. And then the other category has to do with kind of the way that the international situation has evolved since TCJA. It's not so much that TCJA was written in a flawed way in 2017 in these cases. It's more that the way the rest of the world does things has changed, although Republicans are not always singing the same tune as the rest of the world on international corporate income tax. Here, there were a few lateral changes that can just harmonize the U.S. with foreign tax cuts a little bit more. And basically, the situation was that the U.S. had what appeared to be lower rates, but actually its rules were less generous in unique ways that were anomalous to the United States. Those are things like expense allocation, the FTC haircut, as you mentioned. Those things make it a little bit worse to be a U.S. company. But in TCJA, you had lower nominal rates than the 15 percent target that the Europeans and OECD want a lot of people to settle on. The Senate took a look at that and said, "Well, we can just remove some of these U.S. idiosyncrasies, and that gives us effectively tax cuts for corporations. And then we can raise the nominal rate, take some of that money back. That's a neutral trade, but it makes our tax code look a little bit more in line with the 15 percent target." But notably, they went only to 14 [percent], not to 15 [percent], as if almost to say, "You're not the boss of us, we will do something slightly different than your target." But effectively, the U.S. at 14 [percent] with its rules is still maybe a little bit worse, a little bit less taxpayer friendly, at least revenue-wise, than a 15 percent rate. So I don't think U.S. companies are getting away with a lot with the 14 [percent] instead of the 15 [percent]. Jonathan Curry: With this new suite of changes that we have, are there any obvious winners and losers here? I mean, you alluded to the Trump administration having a vision and putting its stamp on things. They've talked a lot about increasing domestic investment. Did these changes move the U.S. more towards that? Alan Cole: I think there are some changes that are intended to have a real impact that aren't just a little bit of lateral shuffling and creating a 14 percent rate rather than a lower 13 percent rate. There are some things that are a little bit more intended to be substantive. But even there, from an individual company's perspective, I think a lot of these things come out to be roughly a wash relative to the 2025 tax code. For example, the elimination of QBAI — the attempt to maneuver the system previously directed at intangibles towards a little bit more of a tangible and America First and export-focused tax system — that may not have that much of an impact on an overall taxpayer bottom line because, actually, the sort of company that has a lot of QBAI domestically also has a lot of it internationally. And one of those is a tax cut, and one of those is a tax hike, so they balance out for an individual taxpayer. But overall, you want to be the sort of company that has a lot of capital expenses in the U.S. or research and development in the U.S. and then maybe exports a lot. Whether using your tangibles or intangibles, that probably comes out pretty well. The big thing that I see flagged as a likely downside from large corporate practitioners is a change to [section] 163(j) interest limitations. Effectively, international income doesn't count for that, and that means that those become much tougher on some firms. Jonathan Curry: Yeah. I've certainly heard the same listening to a lot of webinars and hearing from different tax practitioners and what they're saying their eye is on and what's the big thing for their clients to look out for. [Section] 163(j), the foreign element of it definitely comes up quite a lot. So you alluded to this earlier, the current-policy baseline. Republicans did get a little mischievous with their math this time around. They used the current policy as opposed to current law, which broke with a lot of precedent. Can you tell me: How did the math add up here on the international tax provisions? Did we come out roughly revenue neutral in terms of the changes that are the higher rates, but a broader base and so forth? Where did we land in terms of the numbers? Alan Cole: Well, the tax code that was enacted in 2017 under current-law baseline rules, there, in order to make the corporate income tax side of the TCJA permanent, they had to do a fair amount of surprise tax hikes at the very, very end of the budget window. And you can count from 2017 out to 2026. That's when those tax hikes showed up. In a few cases, they had them show up a little bit earlier so as to reduce the score of the TCJA within the budget window, but there was a suite of tax hikes. In the international sphere, a lot of those tax hikes come directly in 2026, but they kind of went for current policy 2025. So what they managed to do as a result of the switch to current policy was effectively cancel out those last minute hikes on the international side and then make permanent the slightly lower, not quite revenue neutral, TCJA international side that wouldn't have passed Byrd rule muster in 2017 without those hikes. They canceled those hikes and made that permanent. So they did get some benefit if you're looking at it from the taxpayers' perspective, or they did create some revenue loss that probably would not have been possible under the current-law baseline. Jonathan Curry: To talk about one of my favorite provisions that's actually no longer in law, section 899, the retaliatory tax, the revenge tax. I certainly had a lot of fun writing about this. It makes for a great headline, and it was such an interesting piece of policy that has kept evolving throughout the process. Section 899 had two elements, correct? There is one that was going to impose these higher, progressively higher withholding rates on corporations, individuals, countries that had what we deem the discriminatory or unfair tax, undertaxed profit rules, UTPRs, and income inclusion rules. And there was also an element that was going to target digital services taxes, which later in the Senate was only going to be happening through the so-called super BEAT that was going to supercharge the base erosion and antiabuse tax. We did get a G7 deal at the end of this where they agreed that they were going to scrap their UTPRs and IRRs. They left aside, shelved for now, the question of DSTs. But in your view, how big of an impact does section 899 have on the international discussion? Do you think that was key to the U.S. getting this agreement with the G7? Or was that just a little sideline, sideshow? Alan Cole: I think [section] 899 was a very dangerous gamble, and I think it paid off. I had concerns about it while it was still in the bill. It didn't make it into the final law, and that was actually the outcome that [section] 899's architects kind of were hoping for, I think. It would have been pretty ugly if it had happened, but it was a threat they didn't want to have to go through on. So yeah, one of the biggest aspects of the OBBB international is effectively the thing that wasn't in the bill. We talked about, I'd say three categories of things that are in the bill. There's the Trump priority type stuff with the QBAI; there's the bug fixes; and there's the moving towards the 15 percent target by doing some lateral trades. But the OBBB also had [section] 899, the retaliatory provision, kind of our doomsday device, our mutually assured destruction thing. And it was supposed to target two foreign taxes, and the G7 agreed to get rid of one. And we said, "OK, good enough." And we put it down. And I think one reason that it worked well was there's broad support for combating UTPR and DST much beyond the Trump administration. One characterization you could make of the Trump administration is it starts a lot of arguments with foreign countries. And in some cases, those arguments are idiosyncratic to the Trump administration specifically. For example, arguing that Canada is not doing enough to combat fentanyl crossing the northern border of the U.S., that was not on most people's radar. That seems like a fight idiosyncratic to the Trump administration. And maybe even fighting over bilateral trade deficits, that's pretty idiosyncratic to the Trump administration. But within the U.S. business community, within the U.S. Congress, there's actually quite a lot of opposition to UTPR and to DST. The former because it usurps Congress's authority. It's a little bit like, "Oh, the Treasury went out and talked to a bunch of people over the Atlantic. Now Congress has to rewrite the U.S. tax code in a bunch of ways. Some of them kind of arbitrary, but don't seem to have much rationale." That wasn't going to fly, if only because it was a usurpation of Congress's authority. And practitioners also didn't like it because it would be a lot more work and it would turn out to not actually have much of an impact on U.S. companies' taxes. DSTs, meanwhile, are basically just tariffs in disguise. They're a way for foreign countries to effectively tariff the large number of U.S. tech companies that have done really well globally. Foreign governments have seen those as big bags of money, like pinatas that they can whack at and the money will fall out and they get a treat. And there's no support in the U.S. for letting these things stand. And so in some cases, when the Trump administration is saying something, there's a little bit of a feeling, "Well, can we wait this out? Might they get distracted?" For example, they don't seem to be talking much about buying Greenland anymore. That was a big thing for a few months, and then they just moved on. And also, there's the reality that there will be a new president and maybe that president is not going to have the same idiosyncratic Trump priorities. But I think [section] 899 being there in legislative text made a lot of people realize that not only is Congress behind the president on DSTs and UTPR, but maybe even most of the rest of the United States is as well. And so there's no way of waiting out the president and maybe making inroads with opposition or with people within his party who don't agree with all of his stuff. No, this was unanimous among Republicans, and I think probably even some Democrats really would actively want these things to go away, and few would make a big priority of arguing for them. So I think [section] 899 showed Congress's stacking order of priorities, and showed the American business community's stacking order of priorities. It even went so far as to say, "These are the specific offenses that we want [section] 899 to apply to. We're going to call out them by name, and we're also going to come up with a list of things that aren't offenses and [section] 899 can't be used for." They narrowly cabin the retaliation to be just these two things. So I think if you're a foreign government and you're not sure what to do with the more hostile or bellicose U.S. trade posture — well, the things that have broad opposition in the U.S., you probably are more likely to make a concession on those than on things that are less workable. And especially with respect to the UTPR, that's something that isn't even in effect yet. So it's easier to not do something that you haven't even started doing yet. It's easier to flake out on a plan that you haven't yet brought to completion than to stop doing things the way you were already doing them for a long time. So all of those reasons, I think, meant that the UTPR was the easiest domino to fall. I don't think that the Trump administration is going to get all of its priorities. For example, the stuff about value added taxes being an unfair barrier to trade. Well, I don't think that Europe is going to reorder its entire tax system. Value added taxes in Europe probably raise something on the order of €4 [trillion] or 5 trillion per year, if you add all of the countries together. Jonathan Curry: Sounds significant. Alan Cole: Yeah, something like that. Jonathan Curry: That's not a small chip in a poker game here. No. Alan Cole: Yeah, yeah. They're not going to just come up with something new within the next three years in order to appease one U.S. president who has idiosyncratically said that VATs are an unfair barrier to trade. Jonathan Curry: Well, Alan, so looking ahead, is there any unfinished business on the international tax front? Or do you think that this round of changes will satisfy lawmakers, policymakers for the next, I don't know, couple of years, three, five years, 10 years before they decide to give things another look? Alan Cole: The biggest unfinished business is in the area of how the U.S. international income tax system will coexist with pillar 2. The G7 deal didn't say that pillar 2 is fully going away, although that's still an outside possibility. More likely, Europe continues to implement its version of CFC rules, its effective equivalent of GILTI or now NCTI. That's all likely to still happen. The U.S. wants to be independent of pillar 2, not have pillar 2 go over and touch things that have previously been touched by the U.S. tax code. In many cases, that's relatively simple. You can think of companies that are American and companies that are German, and obviously at the very top level, you'll have one or the other of the two systems. But it starts to get more complicated when you have nested acquisitions. That's something you see in, for example, the pharmaceutical industry a lot because there are both tax and operations reasons that pharmaceutical companies have long chains of acquisitions. Often there's one type of company that does research, and then another one says, "This is good research. We're going to buy your company and figure out how to distribute the drug everywhere." Once you get those nested things, it's much, much harder to figure out exactly how the income inclusion rule, like the European international rules, would coexist or sit side by side with NCTI without colliding with it. So that's an area of unfinished business. Digital service taxes, also unfinished business. That's effectively kind of the European hidden tariff inside of corporate income tax policy. On our side, BEAT I think is actually unfair in some of the same ways that digital services taxes are. And then the big elephant in the room is all of the other trade policy stuff often done under the economic emergency rationale, which is actually being challenged in U.S. courts, and potentially just normal section 301 retaliatory tariffs too. All of those things create a chaotic international negotiation environment. But overall, the U.S. international tax system would hold up pretty well. My one question is, in the change to make it less targeted at intangible investment, does that end up having an effect on how, say, intangible-heavy firms look at the U.S. tax system? Jonathan Curry: Yeah, that'll be something to watch. All right. Well, Alan, thank you so much for taking time to chat with us today. I appreciate it. Alan Cole: Absolutely. Thank you for having me.
Time Magazine
17 minutes ago
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GOP-Led House Panel Subpoenas Epstein Files and Testimony From Clintons
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ICE uses starkly different tactics to arrest immigrants in red and blue states, data shows
The Trump administration is apprehending hundreds of immigrants every day across the country – but there's a stark split in where Immigration and Customs Enforcement makes those arrests in blue states and red states. In states that voted for President Donald Trump, ICE agents are far more likely to arrest immigrants directly from prisons and jails, a CNN analysis of data from the agency found. In Democratic-leaning states, by contrast, ICE is frequently arresting immigrants from worksites, streets and mass roundups that have sparked protests and intense backlash in cities such as Los Angeles. Most of those arrested don't have any criminal record. The ICE data shows that overall, more immigrants are being arrested in red states than blue states – both in the community and, especially, in prisons and jails. But there is a clear divide in where ICE is apprehending people: 59% of arrests in red states took place in prisons and jails, while 70% of arrests in blue states took place in the community. That partisan gap between red and blue states existed before Trump's second term began – but it has widened since last year. Trump officials say the differing tactics are simply a downstream effect of sanctuary policies in many Democratic-controlled states and large cities, which can limit prisons and jails from cooperating with ICE. In many of those states, local authorities can't hold immigrants in custody based on ICE orders alone – so they're often released before immigration officials can arrest them. 'Sanctuary cities are going to get exactly what they don't want, more agents in the communities and more worksite enforcement,' Trump border czar Tom Homan told reporters last month. 'Why is that? Because they won't let one agent arrest one bad guy in a jail.' Fliers showing those arrested by ICE agents are displayed outside immigration court in Manhattan on July 24. A migrant is detained and escorted by federal immigration officers at immigration court in Manhattan on July 17. But advocates for immigrant rights say the community arrests – from raids at factories and restaurants to surprise detentions at ICE check-ins – are punitive measures aimed at instilling fear in blue states and cities. The aggressive tactics reflect 'a deliberate federal strategy to punish Massachusetts and other immigrant-friendly states for standing up against Trump's reckless deportation machine,' argued Iván Espinoza-Madrigal, the executive director of Lawyers for Civil Rights, a Boston-based nonprofit that represents immigrants in court. An ICE spokesperson did not respond to requests for comment on CNN's analysis. The divide is especially dramatic in Massachusetts, where 94% of immigrants arrested by ICE were apprehended in the community, and 78% of them had no criminal record. The state has a court decision and local policies that limit law enforcement from cooperating with ICE. The agency's regional office was also led until March by Todd Lyons, who is now the acting ICE director, and who has described the focus on community arrests in Massachusetts, his home state, as a direct response to sanctuary policies. 'If sanctuary cities would change their policies and turn these violent criminal aliens over to us, into our custody, instead of releasing them into the public, we would not have to go out to the communities and do this,' Lyons said at a press conference in June. Regardless of the cause, the varying local laws and ICE tactics are creating a 'patchwork system' across the country, said Kathleen Bush-Joseph, a lawyer and policy analyst with the Migration Policy Institute. Immigrants are facing 'really divergent outcomes based on where people live,' she said. Different playbooks for arrests CNN's analysis is based on ICE records obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request by the Deportation Data Project, a research group associated with the UC Berkeley law school. The analysis covers the period since Trump took office through late June. In its annual reports, ICE defines arrests in two categories: those that happen in prisons and jails, and 'at-large' arrests in the community. In prisons and jails, ICE typically sends a detainer request to corrections officials for undocumented inmates, and then agents come to the facilities to arrest them before they leave custody. Community arrests, by contrast, include everything from workplace raids to teams trailing and apprehending immigrants. A woman waves an American-Mexican flag in a protest of immigration raids near Camarillo, California, on July 10. In 2024, under President Joe Biden – whose administration said it was prioritizing arresting and deporting undocumented immigrants with criminal records – about 62% of ICE arrests were from prisons and jails, while 27% were in the community, the data shows. So far in Trump's term, arrests overall are up, and the balance has changed: 49% have been in prisons and jails, and 44% in the community. But those percentages diverge widely between the 31 states won by Donald Trump and the 19 states won by Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris, which have similar total undocumented populations, according to 2023 estimates from the Center for Migration Studies, a nonprofit. In the Trump-voting states, ICE is not only more likely to arrest immigrants already in custody, but they're also more likely to have a record: 41% of those arrested in red states had a prior criminal conviction, compared to 36% of immigrants arrested by ICE in Harris states. Most prior convictions are for lower-level crimes like traffic offenses, immigration violations and other non-violent charges, a CNN analysis of internal ICE data found earlier this summer. In part, that disparity comes from how states and cities without sanctuary policies respond to ICE detainer requests. In most red states, those detainers are honored, allowing ICE to pick up thousands of undocumented immigrants directly from jail or prison. But in many blue states and cities, sanctuary policies direct officials to refuse ICE detainer requests without a court warrant. Some states go further in limiting local police's collaboration with ICE: Boston prevents officers from even asking about immigration status, for example. Federal agents stand guard as immigration officers carry out an operation at an agricultural facility in Camarillo, California, on July 10. The ICE data suggests that some sanctuary policies are blocking the agency from arresting immigrants – to a point. In Mississippi, for example, which has banned the establishment of sanctuary policies in the state, 87% of immigrants ICE filed a detainer request for through the end of May were later arrested by the agency in prisons and jails. In New York, which has state and local policies limiting cooperation with ICE, only 4% of the immigrants that ICE had requested detainers for were arrested in prisons and jails. So in blue states, the Trump administration has instead relied more on a different policy: immigration raids and community arrests. In Los Angeles, where those raids sparked unrest earlier this summer, Trump deployed the National Guard. The administration later sued the city for its sanctuary policies, saying the city was contributing to a 'lawless and unsafe environment.' Many activists, though, say the nature of those blue-state raids – and especially ICE's efforts to promote and publicize them – show they serve a broader purpose beyond just evading sanctuary policies. Those aggressive tactics are 'shocking and they're such a departure from the norm,' Bush-Joseph said. 'But their intent might be more so about deterrence and trying to dissuade people from coming to the US-Mexico border, as well as trying to get people to self-deport.' Overall, ICE's arrest and detention machine may just be ramping up. The recent budget reconciliation bill signed by Trump includes billions in new funding for the agency. And a growing number of local and state law enforcement agencies – largely in red states – are signing up for an ICE program that allows them to help enforce immigration laws. Massachusetts neighborhoods seeing impact of ICE arrests ICE's embrace of public arrests is particularly pronounced in Massachusetts. While Massachusetts doesn't have a formal sanctuary law at the state level, a 2017 state supreme court ruling bans law enforcement from holding anyone beyond the time they would otherwise be released on the basis of an ICE detainer request. Boston and several other cities also have policies that go further, preventing law enforcement from coordinating with ICE more broadly. Lyons, the acting ICE director, led the Boston ICE office – which is responsible for arrests in Massachusetts and five other New England states – before being elevated to his current role. In interviews and statements, he's decried sanctuary policies in the state. 'Boston's my hometown and it really shocks me that officials all over Massachusetts would rather release sex offenders, fentanyl dealers, drug dealers, human traffickers, and child rapists back into the neighborhoods,' he told reporters this summer – without addressing the fact that a large majority of immigrants arrested in the state this year had no criminal convictions. Hundreds of people gather in Boston on June 10 to defend immigrants and protest the actions of ICE. Photos of detained immigrants are shown at an ICE news conference on June 2. In May, ICE carried out what officials described as the largest enforcement operation in the agency's history, arresting more than 1,400 people in communities across Massachusetts. Around New England, other high-profile cases have included ICE officers detaining a Tufts PhD student who co-wrote a student newspaper op-ed critical of Israel and smashing the window of an immigrant's car and yanking him out of the passenger seat in front of his wife. ICE's aggressive tactics in the region have been defined by 'a general level of mean-spiritedness and brutality,' said Daniel Kanstroom, a Boston College law professor who founded the college's immigration and asylum law clinic. 'We've never seen masked agents before. We've never seen students arrested for writing op-eds before. We've never seen people dragged out of immigration court before.' Stepped-up community arrests are having a marked impact on immigrant-heavy neighborhoods in the Boston area, local advocates say. In suburbs like Chelsea and Everett, which have large Salvadoran and Central American communities, some immigrants are staying home out of fear of ICE raids. 'We're seeing people not going to their doctor's appointments, kids not going to school, folks not going grocery shopping,' said Sarang Sekhavat, the chief of staff at the Massachusetts Immigrant & Refugee Advocacy Coalition. 'You're seeing a lot of businesses in some of these neighborhoods really suffering because people just don't want to leave home… bustling, active neighborhoods that have become very quiet now.' ICE's dragnet has picked up people like Geovani Esau De La Cruz Catalan, who was arrested by immigration agents on the street outside his Chelsea home in June – just days after he crossed the stage at his high school graduation. Geovani Esau De La Cruz Catalan. The 20-year-old, who has no criminal history, came to the US from Guatemala in 2022. He told CNN his hopes to build a new life in America were dashed when he was detained. 'I thought they were going to take away all the dreams I had,' De La Cruz said in Spanish. 'I was in shock.' De La Cruz spent two weeks in ICE custody before being released with a future immigration court date. His stepmother, Mayra Balderas, said he has a work permit, but it's unclear whether he'll be allowed to stay or deported back to Guatemala. Balderas, an American citizen who immigrated to the US more than three decades ago, said ICE agents were frequently patrolling her Chelsea neighborhood, something she'd never seen before Trump took office. 'Since I've been here, I never have any experience like that – going into the neighborhoods and pulling people and doing what they're doing,' Balderas said. 'They are scaring people.' Methodology CNN analyzed data on ICE arrests and detainers published by the Data Deportation Project, a research group associated with UC Berkeley law school. The data includes administrative arrests, in which immigrants arrested face deportation, not criminal arrests for human trafficking or similar crimes. For data that was missing information about the state where an immigrant was arrested, when possible, CNN inferred the state based on which ICE field office conducted the arrest, using areas of responsibility described on the ICE website. A state could not be identified for about 11% of arrests, and those are not included in state-by-state totals. Based on information in ICE annual reports and interviews with policy experts, CNN defined arrests in jails and prisons as those with an apprehension method described in the data as 'CAP Local Incarceration,' 'CAP State Incarceration,' or 'CAP Federal Incarceration' (referring to ICE's Criminal Alien Program) and arrests in the community as those listed as 'Non-Custodial Arrest,' 'Located,' 'Worksite Enforcement,' 'Traffic Check,' or 'Probation and Parole.' About 7% of arrests were listed as 'Other Efforts' or didn't fit clearly into either category.
