Official Campaigning for Upper House Election Starts: How Will Japan Overcome an Era with Many Challenges? / Critical Occasion as New Govt Could be Chosen
How will Japan deal with these internal and external challenges and open up new prospects? The ruling and opposition parties must clearly present the course the country should take.
Campaigning for the 27th House of Councillors election officially kicks off today. A total of 125 seats will be up for grabs — 124 of which are held by members whose terms are set to end and one seat to fill a vacancy in the Tokyo constituency.
Rethink strategy for tariff talks
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party suffered a crushing defeat in the June Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, which was positioned as a prelude to the upper house election. The support ratings for the LDP are also at extremely low levels.
Upper house elections are essentially considered a midterm assessment of the current administration and cannot be said to be elections in which a new administration is chosen. However, if the LDP and Komeito, which are the minority ruling parties in the House of Representatives, were to lose their majority in the upper house as well, the political situation might become fluid, leading to such changes as a reshuffling of the coalition government.
In this upper house election, a major point of contention is the Japan-U.S. relationship. Regarding tariff negotiations, U.S. President Donald Trump has indicated that he will impose tariffs of 30%-35% on imports from Japan. He also said Japan would have to pay 'whatever the number is that we determine.'
It is now possible that the 24% 'reciprocal tariffs' the United States had previously intended to impose on Japan could be raised. Trump appears to be dissatisfied with the negotiations between Japan and the United States.
At a debate organized by the Japan National Press Club between the leaders of eight parties, Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan President Yoshihiko Noda said, 'The distance between Japan and the United States is growing.' He asked Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba how he plans to break the deadlock in the negotiations.
Ishiba replied: 'Japan is the largest investor in the United States and has created the most jobs in the country. Japan is very different from other countries in that sense.' He said if Japan persistently continues negotiations, it will open up a path forward.
Economic revitalization minister Ryosei Akazawa has already visited the United States seven times for ministerial-level talks, but there have been no visible results.
The idea that Japan will be able to avoid high tariffs in the end because it is an ally of the United States is a naive way of thinking. It will not work in negotiations with Trump. It has become necessary to rethink Japan's negotiation strategy.
One way to press Washington to rethink its position would be to cooperate with European and other friendly countries and Southeast Asian nations. It is advisable that the ruling and opposition parties will rack their brains and compete with each other to find a solution.
Steps too meager against high prices
Regarding the biggest point of contention, the ruling and opposition parties have proposed measures to deal with high prices.
Both the LDP and Komeito have pledged to provide ¥20,000 in cash to each member of the public. An additional ¥20,000 would be given to every child and adults in households that are exempt from residential tax.
The opposition parties have proposed cutting or abolishing the consumption tax. On making the tax rate on groceries 0%, the CDPJ advocates for doing so for one to two years, while the Japan Innovation Party advocates for two years.
During the debate, many of the opposition party leaders criticized the proposed provision of cash as a lavish handout. Ishiba countered by saying, 'A plan that does not have a focal point is a lavish handout.'
On the reason for his party touting the tax cuts, Noda stated that it is 'an effective measure to halt a rash of price increases of food and other products.'
Price increases have outpaced wage increases, and real wage growth has stagnated. In light of this situation, there are no objections to taking measures to deal with high prices. But their mainstay measures of cash handouts and consumption tax cuts seem to be too simplistic.
The LDP-Komeito coalition has provided a variety of cash handouts in the past, but it is unclear whether they have been effective.
If the consumption tax is abolished or reduced, there will be a hole in the funding of social security programs, such as pensions and medical and nursing care. A decline in the quality of services will be inevitable. It cannot be said that measures that will pass the burden on to future generations are appropriate.
Simply competing over short-sighted measures will not create fundamental solutions. It is essential to discuss reforms to increase economic productivity, leading to sustainable wage increases.
Voters' judgments being tested
In elections in recent years, many voters have referred to information on social media when deciding who or which party to vote for.
However, some users post extreme claims or false information on social media in an attempt to increase the number of views and make a profit. In last year's Hyogo Prefecture gubernatorial election, the internet was flooded with information of unknown veracity, and it is believed to have influenced the election results.
The Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry has asked major social media operators to take steps against false information, through such means as setting up a section that will receive requests to delete posts. However, whether to actually delete the posts on the grounds that the information is false is largely left to the judgment of the operators.
It is vital for voters to access various information and discern the political views of candidates and parties. This is an era in which the judgment of voters is also being tested.
(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, July 3, 2025)
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The Diplomat
12 minutes ago
- The Diplomat
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South Korea's new Lee Jae-myung administration made establishing the country as a global AI leader one of its top priorities and took immediate action upon assuming office in June. Lee appointed Ha Jung-woo, the former AI chief of Korean tech giant NAVER and the nation's most vocal advocate for the so-called 'sovereign AI' discourse, as South Korea's first-ever presidential chief AI adviser. Days later, Bae Kyung-hoon, who led another massive AI foundation model development project at LG, was nominated as the new minister of science and ICT. The appointments were unconventional in several respects. Instead of the politicians or senior academics who typically rise to high administrative posts, two 40-something industry experts – considered young blood in South Korea's political scene – were brought to the forefront. More importantly, they were the very executives who had led South Korea's two largest large language model (LLM) projects. Their appointments are backed by a 100 trillion won (approximately $75 billion) national investment plan that Lee had pledged since his campaign. This was a clear message: Seoul has bet its future on building sovereign AI and is prioritizing practical execution over mere symbolism. In South Korea, sovereign AI is defined as more than just developing a single proprietary language model. It refers to a country securing capabilities and initiative across the entire AI industry value chain and ecosystem – from semiconductors, power, and computing infrastructure to data centers, cloud, and AI deployment services. So why is South Korea, a key U.S. ally and a tech powerhouse in its own right, now taking this risky and expensive path toward AI autonomy? The answer lies in a high-stakes experiment to carve out a 'Third Way' in an age of China-U.S. AI rivalry. The Geopolitical Imperative: The Two Waves The entrenchment of this shift was preceded by a pair of immense shockwaves. The first wave began in late 2022, when OpenAI's ChatGPT swept the globe. South Korea's tech giants at the time responded swiftly, with NAVER unveiling 'HyperCLOVA X' and LG launching 'EXAONE' to jump into the race to develop their own LLMs. It was at this point that pioneers like Ha began to champion the concept of 'sovereign AI.' Ha, in particular, stressed that to protect national sovereignty, critical infrastructure for diplomacy or defense could not be entrusted to foreign firms. He also argued that it is essential to preserve the nation's cultural and historical context – highlighting cases where early U.S. models referred to the 'East Sea' as the 'Sea of Japan,' a highly sensitive issue in South Korea. However, this initial push for sovereignty faced three major obstacles. First, the dominant global AI discourse at the time – from the 2023 AI Safety Summit at Bletchley Park in the U.K. to the 2024 AI Seoul Summit – was framed around cooperation over competition. Second, the Korean public's skepticism toward nationalism meant such arguments were often met with domestic derision as 'guk-ppong (국뽕),' a slang term for jingoistic fervor. Critically, there was widespread skepticism that the concept of sovereign AI itself represented specific corporate interests. As Ha was the AI chief of NAVER at the time, critics dismissed the argument as 'marketing jargon' aligned with the company's commercial interests. This perception was reinforced when global business leaders like Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang also endorsed sovereign AI, due to the pragmatic calculation that chipmakers stood to gain the most as nations rushed to purchase GPUs for their sovereign projects. What shattered this stalemate and elevated the sovereign AI discourse to the forefront of the nation agenda was the second shockwave: the 'DeepSeek Moment.' The V3 model from the Chinese startup DeepSeek, which gained attention around the Lunar New Year in February 2025, shocked the world with its claim of having lowered training costs to $6 million through algorithmic optimization (though experts point out this claim is debatable). The key takeaway was that a geopolitical rival, China, could create a frontier AI in a 'very cost-effective' manner. This signaled to South Korean decision-makers that sovereign AI was no longer a game only for the capital-rich United States, but had now become a viable and essential mission for South Korea as well. The Chief AI Officer's Doctrine: A Vision of 'Full-Stack' Sovereignty To understand Seoul's strategy, one must first understand the blueprint of its new architect, Chief AI Officer (CAIO) Ha Jung-woo. His argument for sovereign AI goes beyond simple technological nationalism; it is a comprehensive vision rooted in South Korea's significant tech capabilities and the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. At the core of Ha's argument is the belief that South Korea is one of the few nations with the capacity to even attempt such a feat. He has frequently emphasized that the country possesses nearly all the components of the AI 'full-stack': world-leading memory semiconductors and burgeoning AI chip (NPU) development, established cloud infrastructure, vast high-quality datasets from a hyper-digitalized society, and a significant pool of AI talent. For South Korea, therefore, sovereign AI is not just a vague dream but a viable national strategy. Ha defines sovereign AI as liberation from technological dependency. According to him, this is not a call for isolationism, but for securing AI systems that deeply understand and align with the nation's own language, culture, laws, and social values. The argument is that no matter how advanced a foreign model may be, it cannot, by definition, internalize this nuanced context. Ultimately, his vision is geopolitical. He warns that AI is poised to become the primary tool of 21st-century 'neo-imperialism.' Just as past empires used guns and ships to colonize territories, he argues, future powers will use AI to dominate the digital territories and data of other nations, subordinating their industrial ecosystems. From this perspective, sovereign AI is a defensive shield against this tide. Moreover, this defensive logic leads to a proactive global strategy: the Third Way. 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Their primary concern is the fear of a new tech chaebol. With former top executives from the nation's two largest tech companies now at the helm of national AI policy, many startup founders worry the strategy will inevitably favor the two giants they hail from. A prominent Korean AI startup CEO wrote on social media, that 'it will create a very strange structure where foreign AI giants, domestic MSPs, and countless B2B software partners will have to band together to compete against the government's AI.' His sentiment was echoed by others who fear a tilted playing field where national resources are funneled to large corporations. This fear is rooted in a fundamentally different business reality. For most startups, the race to build the biggest foundation models is already a lost cause – a money pit that they believe South Korea cannot afford. The real market, they argue, is in 'vertical AI': creating specialized applications for industries like medicine, law, and finance. For them, U.S.-based Application Programming Interface (APIs) from OpenAI or Anthropic 'are not a threat,' but a vital, cost-effective tool for innovation and survival. From this perspective, the government's focus on creating a national LLM is a misguided use of taxpayer money. It diverts resources away from South Korea's most vibrant and profitable AI sector – the application layer – to chase a goal that is both commercially unviable and potentially harmful to the broader ecosystem. While the government counters that a national LLM is a public good – an 'AI highway' for all startups to use – this explanation has done little to assuage the market's skepticism so far. Conclusion: A Grand Experiment of Opportunity and Risk South Korea's sovereign AI strategy has become a fascinating experiment of a nation navigating the turbulent waters of the 21st century tech race. 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Ultimately, the success of this grand experiment hinges on whether South Korea can solve a dual challenge: winning the support of the domestic tech ecosystem internally, while proving its technological credibility externally. Can Seoul bridge this gap? Can the state-backed national champions create a platform for coexistence instead of competing with domestic innovators, and persuade their own ecosystem to endure short-term pain and perceptions of unfairness for long-term strategic gain? The world's middle powers, seeking a path between the U.S. and Chinese spheres of influence, are watching this process closely. Whatever the outcome of Seoul's high-stakes gambit, the journey will offer important lessons on the price of and challenges to pursuing autonomy in the age of AI.
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Why South Korea Needs a Trade Deal With the United States
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Without a new deal or an extension to the talks, South Korea will face a series of new tariffs from the United States that will significantly impact its economy. As one of the world's leading trading nations, South Korea is both directly and indirectly impacted by the new tariffs being implemented by the Trump administration. In the aftermath of the Korean War, the country rebuilt its economy and became one of the world's economic development success stories in part because of international trade. Even today, trade is a key component of the Korean economy. In 2024, exports and imports accounted for 77.6 percent of South Korea's GDP. Exports alone were equivalent to 39.1 percent of GDP. While China remains South Korea's largest trading partner, the margin has been decreasing in recent years. The United States is South Korea's second-largest trading partner and a critical partner for technological cooperation and economic growth. Last year, South Korea exported $128.4 billion in goods to the United States, according to United Nations trade data, only about $4 billion less than it exported to China. Because of the global nature of supply chains, even tariffs that do not directly target South Korea can impact the supply chains of Korean companies either through parts that are produced in third countries for final assembly in the United States or finished goods that are built in third countries for export to the U.S. market. In this context, Korean firms face the impact of the full array of the Trump administration's tariffs including the reciprocal tariffs, sectoral tariffs on steel, automobiles, semiconductors, and other products, as well as tariffs on China and potentially Canada and Mexico. How the Reciprocal Tariffs Impact South Korea In the April 2 executive order announcing the so-called reciprocal tariffs, the White House argued that 'Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships.' In the case of South Korea, the United States has maintained a persistent trade deficit that reached $55.9 billion in 2024. The trade deficit has grown significantly since the implementation of the KORUS FTA and was a point of contention during the first Trump administration. In announcing the reciprocal tariffs, the Trump administration placed a tariff of 25 percent on imports from South Korea. Automobiles, steel, and other products are subject to subject to separate Section 232 national security tariffs; the reciprocal tariffs impact all other trade. They include two parts – a 10 percent universal tariff and a set of country-specific reciprocal tariffs (in South Korea's case, set at 25 percent). While the reciprocal tariff portion is theoretically open to negotiation, under a 90-day 'pause' that expires next week, the universal tariff may be a new baseline under the Trump administration. For the moment, many electronics products such as smartphones and computers will be exempted from the reciprocal tariffs, but those are expected to be covered to some extent by new tariffs once an ongoing Section 232 investigation into semiconductors is finished. According to a study by the Korea International Trade Association, around 50 percent of all Korean exports to the United States are intermediate goods used in production in the United States. These include semiconductors, auto parts, and steel. The high level of Korean exports of intermediate goods to the United States limits the impact of the reciprocal tariffs on South Korea to an extent but also means that the country is more exposed to the sectoral tariffs. When combined with automobile exports, this means that a significant portion of Korean exports will be hit by Section 232 tariffs. However, some significant exports will be subject to the reciprocal tariffs. These include $5.5 billion in exports of petrochemical products, $4.5 billion in plastics, $2.4 billion in optical and related equipment, and nearly $2 billion each in organic chemicals and cosmetics. To give one specific example, global exports of K-beauty products last year surpassed $10 billion for the first time. The United States is the second largest market for K-beauty products. If the full 25 percent tariff remains in place, exports of K-beauty products would likely see a decrease in demand in the United States and producers may need to grow alternative markets such as China and Japan, the number 1 and 3 export destinations for K-beauty. Tariffs on the Automobile Industry Automotive tariffs are the most significant challenge. Exports of automobiles and automotive parts accounted for a third of Korean exports to the United States in 2024. The U.S. is the most important market for the Hyundai Motor Group. Last year, the conglomerate sold 4.1 million vehicles globally; more than 1.6 million of those sales were in the United States, with Hyundai selling 836,802 vehicles and Kia an additional 796,488 vehicles. While the new Metaplant America facility in Georgia will help with U.S. production, slightly more than 50 percent of all vehicles sold by Hyundai Motor Group in the United States are imported. Hyundai Motor Group is not the only automotive producer impacted by the tariffs. GM Korea produces around 500,000 vehicles annually in plants in South Korea, with 90 percent of the production exported to the United States. GM estimates that the tariffs on its Korean production could reduce its overall profit by $2 billion. Without tariff relief, there are concerns in South Korea that the increased costs faced by GM Korea will further a reduction of GM Korea's operations that has been taking place over the last decade. The complete closure of GM Korea is not out of the question. Beyond the impact on Hyundai Motor Group and GM Korea's sales and profits, there will likely be an impact on employment in South Korea, where the automotive industry employs around 335,600 people. If GM Korea were to shutter its facilities completely, it would result in approximately 12,000 job losses. Without an agreement to reduce the Section 232 auto tariffs, imports of Korean autos and auto parts will continue to face a 25 percent tariff – separate from the reciprocal tariffs. The tariff on auto parts was adjusted to provide some relief for parts used to assemble vehicles in the United States, and the steel tariffs will also not apply for imports of steel used in automotive production. Other Section 232 Tariffs: Steel, Semiconductors, and Pharmaceuticals Ordinarily, being subjected to a 50 percent tariff would not be a positive outcome. However, the Trump administration's decision to initially place a 25 percent tariff on all steel imports, later raised to 50 percent, and cancel prior quota agreements on steel did have one silver lining – it eliminated the quota that had been limiting Korean exports to the United States since the first Trump administration. That may be the only positive for South Korea on the steel tariffs. The significant increase in the U.S. tariff on steel comes at an inopportune time for Korean producers. The United States is only the fourth largest export market for Korean steel, but South Korea's domestic steel producers are under pressure from a global glut of steel production, cheap Chinese products, and now the U.S. tariffs. This has forced Korean steel producers to suspend some production and close some facilities. Because the U.S. tariff will not just apply to exports of steel to the United States, but also steel used in large consumer goods such as refrigerators, washers, and dryers, the tariffs are also creating a pressure for exporters of large consumer goods to shift away from Korean steel in production. One estimate by Allianz Research suggests that the tariffs could result in a $600 million loss for Korean steel exports to the United States. Efforts to conclude a deal with the United States are further complicated by additional Section 232 national security cases that the administration is undertaking in areas such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. Last year, South Korea exported $10.7 billion worth of semiconductors to the United States. Samsung and SK Hynix account for around 70 percent of global production of DRAM memory chips and are the top two producers of NAND flash memory. The industry is critical to the Korean economy. The $10.7 billion in exports to the United States, however, understates the potential impact of a new semiconductor tariff on South Korea. Both Samsung and SK Hynix have significant production in China, from which they exported an additional $1 billion to the United States. Pharmaceuticals are another area that will be potentially impacted by a Section 232 investigation. South Korea had seen the industry as a potential area of growth and exported $1.4 billion worth of pharmaceuticals to the United States in 2024. Tariffs on Supply Chains in Vietnam, China, and Mexico Because of the nature of global supply chains Korean firms will also face tariffs on goods produced by suppliers or their own firms in other countries. Samsung, for example, produces 60 percent of its smartphones in Vietnam, many of which are then shipped to the United States. Trump announced that Vietnam has agreed to a 20 percent tariff rate; if that eventually includes consumer electronics, Samsung smartphones would face a 20 percent tariff when shipped from Vietnam rather than the current 0 percent tariff. If the White House maintains an exclusion for consumer electronics but places a tariff on the semiconductors inside the smartphone, the origin of the semiconductor will impact the tariff unless South Korea can gain an exemption for any semiconductor produced by a Korean firm regardless of the production facilities' location. The potential semiconductor tariff also could impact production in other ways. Both Samsung and SK Hynix have significant production in China that provides chips to U.S. and foreign firms that assemble consumer electronics in China for export to the United States. Both firms could face pressure to relocate that production as the partners they supply look for ways to avoid tariffs on their final goods. In the automotive sector, the long-term status of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) will also be significant. The Trump administration has for the moment suspended tariffs on goods from Canada and Mexico that are compliant with USMCA rules. If that exemption is changed, Korean firms could face tariffs on goods produced in Mexico or Canada for the U.S. market. Korean firms exported 271,000 vehicles from Mexico to the U.S. in 2024, such as the Kia Forte, which is exclusively made in Mexico for the U.S. market. Under normal circumstances, South Korea would be well placed to compete in the U.S. market with the KORUS FTA in place. However, with the Trump administration utilizing national security exemptions to override that agreement, South Korea will need to reach a new understanding on trade to minimize the damage to key sectors such as automobiles and semiconductors. Due to the global nature of supply chains, South Korea will be unable to completely avoid all the new U.S. tariffs, but a new deal that avoids tariffs to the extent possible on goods produced in South Korea is necessary.
Japan Times
an hour ago
- Japan Times
NATO's Donald Trump dilemma
NATO's just-completed summit in The Hague came at a time of extraordinary tension. Since returning to the White House, Donald Trump has repeatedly accused Europe of free riding on U.S. defense spending, raising serious concerns about the health of the Atlantic alliance. His decision to bomb Iran's nuclear facilities just three days before the summit — in coordination with Israel and without informing America's NATO allies — has only intensified those fears. Trump's strikes against Iran evoked memories of the post-9/11 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, when NATO expanded its role beyond addressing conventional military threats to include counter-terrorism operations. While the alliance supported the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq was far more divisive, owing to the lack of convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction and the absence of an explicit United Nations Security Council mandate. The resulting rift prompted then-U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to draw a controversial distinction between 'Old Europe' and 'New Europe.' But the current situation is even more alarming. Unlike in 2003, when the United States at least made an effort to consult its allies, Trump now keeps them in the dark. He provided no credible evidence to justify the attack on Iran and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi contradicted his claims of an imminent nuclear threat, stating just days earlier that there was no proof of a 'systematic' Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons. Strikingly, many NATO leaders were informed of the attack only after it had been carried out. By sidelining NATO, Trump has effectively reduced the alliance to a passive observer, undermining its core principles and signaling a dangerous shift in global diplomacy. Imagine if Iran had retaliated by targeting U.S. bases in Turkey, potentially dragging my country into war. And if a nuclear leak had occurred, endangering Turkish civilians, who would have borne responsibility? Although Israel and Iran accepted Trump's announcement of a ceasefire, NATO members had been thrust into a dangerous situation without warning. This was particularly worrisome for Turkey, which shares a border with Iran and is highly vulnerable to the consequences of regional escalation. Trump's behavior has jeopardized NATO's collective security. After all, there is no guarantee that Israel will not violate the ceasefire, as it did in Gaza in March. NATO members must now confront a fundamental question: Can the alliance survive if member states may launch unilateral military action that puts others at risk? The U.S. may have legitimate evidence that Iran violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty or was just about to do so. But if that were the case, the proper course would have been to present the evidence to the IAEA and pursue a coordinated response through the U.N. Security Council. Alternatively, the U.S. may have assumed that Iran would not retaliate and saw the attack as a way to force the Iranians back to the negotiating table. But talks between the two countries were already set to resume before Israel's intervention derailed them. A third explanation is more cynical but may be true: the attack was meant to divert attention from Israel's brutal war in Gaza. Whichever explanation proves true, Trump's actions could have far-reaching consequences for NATO and the alliance's future could depend on how its leaders respond. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for example, must clearly outline the risks that regional instability poses to NATO's collective defense posture — especially given Turkey's proximity to Iran. As leaders of countries with permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, French President Emmanuel Macron and U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer could play a vital role in strengthening coordination between NATO and the U.N. Likewise, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz will be instrumental in shaping NATO-EU relations, while Norwegian President Jonas Gahr Store and his Finnish counterpart, Alexander Stubb, could help reinvigorate diplomacy and restore the alliance's moral compass. Ultimately, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte's effectiveness will largely depend on leaders' commitment to pursuing rational, law-abiding security policies. Even beyond the immediate Iran crisis, NATO finds itself at a crossroads. The Hague summit may ultimately be seen as a defining moment — one that will determine whether the alliance can remain the world's most powerful defense organization, grounded in its members' shared concerns and contributions, or is destined to become a mere instrument of U.S.-Israeli strategic interests. If I were in office today, I would use the summit to highlight Israel's growing aggression and the security risks facing Turkey as the only NATO member in the region. I would ask Trump whether, in his 'America First' hierarchy, NATO allies now rank below nonmember Israel. Any leader willing to pose that question would take a principled stand against reckless military adventurism — and might just help save the alliance itself. Before the Iraq War, French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder were dismissed as representatives of 'Old Europe' for opposing U.S. intervention. Had their warnings been heeded, the catastrophic costs of the war might have been avoided and Iran's regional influence would likely not be as significant as it is now. History has shown that wars launched before exhausting every diplomatic avenue lead to ruin for all involved. Russia's miscalculations in Ukraine serve as a grim reminder that while starting a war is easy, ending one is far more difficult. Today, as Trump's actions threaten further erosion of hard-won international laws, European leaders must push back. If NATO fails to uphold the rule of law, it risks forfeiting its role as the cornerstone of global security. The alliance's fate — and the future of global stability — will hinge on whether its leaders insist on pursuing peace rather than confrontation. Ahmet Davutoglu is a former prime minister (2014-2016) and foreign minister (2009-2014) of Turkey. © Project Syndicate, 2025
