Clear failures, no fixes: The Government's asylum blind spot
WHILE THE BACKLOG of asylum seekers at the Administrative Review Tribunal (A.R.T.) boomed from around 2016, it has now both stabilised (mainly due to additional funding for the AAT/A.R.T. allocated in 2023) at around 43,000 and its composition has changed markedly.
From 2016, asylum seekers appealing their refusal decisions boomed (see Chart 1).
A figure caption for your reading pleasure
That boom was driven by a massive labour trafficking scam out of Malaysia and China, appealing their Department of Home Affairs (DHA) refusals to the A.R.T. (see Chart 2).
A figure caption for your reading pleasure
In 2017-18, around 67% of primary asylum applications were from Malaysian and Chinese nationals. With international borders re-opening in early 2022, the labour trafficking scam appears not to have resumed. Primary asylum applications from Malaysian and Chinese nationals fell to around 14% in 2022-23 and are likely to have fallen to just over 10% in 2023-24 (for some reason, DHA has not published the full year data for 2023-24).
That has enabled the A.R.T. to gradually reduce the backlog of asylum cases from these two nationalities. Asylum applications on hand at the A.R.T. from Malaysian nationals have fallen from around 15,000 in mid-2022 to less than 6,000 in May 2025. Those from Chinese nationals have fallen from over 9,000 in September 2023 to just over 8,000 in May 2025.
New primary and appeal asylum applications from Chinese nationals remain strong but are not at the levels pre-pandemic.
Asylum applications on hand at the A.R.T. from Thai, Bangladeshi and Pakistani nationals have remained relatively stable.
The number of asylum seekers refused at both the primary and appeal stages and still not departed exceeded 50,000 at end March 2025.
The big increases have come from:
India rising from 658 in June 2020 to 5,711 in May 2025;
Vietnam rising from 1,510 in June 2020 to 4,982 in May 2025;
Indonesia rising from 436 in June 2020 to 2,805 in May 2025; and
the Philippines rising from 317 in June 2021 to 2,144 in May 2025.
Nationals from all four of these nations have very low primary approval rates and very low set-aside rates at the A.R.T.
But it is asylum applications on hand at the A.R.T. from Pacific nationals and in particular nations providing labour under the Pacific Australia Labour Mobility (P.A.L.M.) scheme that have grown most dramatically (see Chart 3).
A figure caption for your reading pleasure
Asylum seekers from these nations also have very low primary approval rates and very low set aside rates at the AAT/A.R.T. They are largely running away from exploitative employers in Australia and seeking to extend their stay by abusing the asylum system. They really have no choice as their chances of securing a permanent visa through the lottery-based Pacific Engagement Visa (PEV) are negligible.
They are also facingvery high death and injury rateswhile in Australia due to accidents both in the workplace and away from the workplace.
Both the P.A.L.M. visa and the PEV desperately need a serious redesign. But there appears to be little inclination in the Government to pursue this.
The agriculture visa for Pacific Island nationals has been a dismal failure from the beginning, resulting in exploitation bordering on slavery and even fatalities, writes Dr Abul Rizvi.
DrAbulRizviisan Independent Australia columnistanda former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Immigration. You can follow Abul@RizviAbul.
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Malaysia Sun
an hour ago
- Malaysia Sun
NATO circles China in more ways than one
The alliances latest summit avoided confronting Beijing but could not cover up the efforts to contain the Asian great power The June NATO summit, held in The Hague, ended with a significant headline: a collective pledge to increase annual defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035. This bold target, far exceeding the current 2% benchmark, signals a new era of militarization in the West, reflecting anxieties about a rapidly changing world order. While China was notably absent from the summit's final declaration, the specter of the Asian giant loomed large over the event. The omission appears tactical rather than strategic - a thinly veiled attempt to avoid escalating tensions, even as NATO members ramp up rhetoric and military preparations clearly aimed at containing Beijing. Though the summit declaration remained silent on China, the alliance's leadership left little doubt about their true concerns. NATO's secretary general, Mark Rutte, used the summit sidelines to sound alarm bells over China's "massive military build-up". Echoing the now-familiar Western narrative, Rutte linked China - alongside Iran and North Korea - to Russia's military operations in Ukraine, accusing Beijing of supporting Moscow's war efforts. These remarks followed Rutte's June address at London's Chatham House, where he described China's military expansion as happening "at breakneck speed" and labeled Beijing, Tehran, Pyongyang, and Moscow as an "awful foursome." This framing makes clear that the NATO establishment and US leadership regard China not as a partner or even a rival, but a threat. The perception of China as an imminent danger was also echoed at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, where US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned of a potential Chinese military move against Taiwan and reiterated Washington's commitment to regional allies - albeit while pressing them to increase their own defense budgets. His remarks left no doubt: the US strategic focus is firmly on the Indo-Pacific, even at the expense of its traditional European commitments. In a notable diplomatic snub, the leaders of Australia, Japan, and South Korea - the so-called "Indo-Pacific partners" of NATO - cancelled their plans to attend the summit in The Hague. This decision, viewed by observers as a pointed message, undermined NATO's aspiration to consolidate its influence in the region. Since the 2022 Madrid summit, when NATO adopted its "Strategic Compass" and for the first time classified China as a "systemic challenge," the alliance has moved steadily to incorporate the Asia-Pacific into its strategic thinking. It now considers developments in East Asia as directly relevant to Euro-Atlantic security. As such, NATO seeks deeper cooperation with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand to uphold what it calls the "rules-based order" - a euphemism for Western hegemony. However, the absence of these Indo-Pacific leaders suggests a growing discomfort with NATO's expanding footprint. For many regional actors, NATO's presence in Asia represents not stability, but the risk of being drawn into geopolitical conflicts under the guise of shared security. Further adding to regional unease, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a controversial message at the Shangri-La Dialogue, warning Beijing that NATO could be involved in Southeast Asia unless China convinces North Korea to withdraw its troops from Russia. This statement not only mischaracterized Beijing's independent foreign policy and its complex relations with Pyongyang but also marked a sharp departure from France's previous resistance to NATO's involvement in Asia-Pacific matters. Such remarks, however, are increasingly aligned with the alliance's real trajectory: NATO is no longer content with transatlantic defense. Its strategic horizon is now global, and its compass points East. NATO-China relations, once limited and mostly symbolic, are now strained to the point of near-hostility. The first Chinese representative visited NATO headquarters in 2002, and both sides cooperated on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden after 2008. Since then, however, the relationship has eroded amid intensifying geopolitical competition and diverging security philosophies. Beijing has become increasingly vocal in its criticism. Chinese authorities responded sharply to Rutte's remarks at The Hague, accusing NATO of spreading disinformation about China's stance on Ukraine and conflating the Taiwan question - which Beijing insists is a purely domestic matter - with a war between states. Chinese officials emphasized that NATO's role in the Asia-Pacific is unwelcome and destabilizing, viewing the alliance as a Cold War relic now repurposed to uphold US dominance and contain China's rise. For China, NATO is not just a military alliance, but a political tool used by Washington to limit Europe's engagement with Beijing. From this perspective, NATO's eastward ambitions threaten to derail the potential for constructive China-Europe cooperation, replacing it with division and distrust. China's concerns are not limited to NATO. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the emergence of the "Squad," and the 2021 formation of AUKUS - a trilateral pact between the US, UK, and Australia - have only deepened Beijing's fears of encirclement. The AUKUS agreement, under which Australia is to receive nuclear-powered submarines from the US worth $240 billion, has introduced a new and dangerous element into regional security dynamics. Canberra will gain long-range strike capability for the first time and become only the second nation - after the UK - to receive access to US nuclear propulsion technology. Though the Trump administration has initiated a formal review of AUKUS, few expect significant changes. On the contrary, the pact is likely to reinforce the militarization of the region and increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. In contrast to NATO's bloc-based approach, China promotes a regional security framework rooted in multilateralism, inclusiveness, and dialogue. Beijing advocates for an ASEAN-centered architecture and supports institutions like the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the East Asia Summit. It also backs the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) and has launched the Global Security Initiative to advance regional stability. Most significantly, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has emerged as a key platform for Eurasian states to coordinate on security, with the June meeting of defense ministers in Qingdao underscoring its role in promoting collective peace without resorting to confrontation or hegemonism. The NATO summit may have avoided naming China, but it failed to conceal the reality of growing confrontation. While the alliance doubles down on military spending and expands its strategic reach into Asia, the Global South and a number of key Asia-Pacific states appear increasingly wary of NATO's global ambitions. As the world stands at a strategic crossroads, two competing visions of international security are on display. On one side, NATO and its partners advocate a "rules-based order" backed by military alliances and deterrence. On the other, China offers a model grounded in multipolarity, multilateral cooperation, consensus-building, and mutual respect. The choice, increasingly, is not between East vs. West - but between confrontation and coexistence. (
New Straits Times
4 hours ago
- New Straits Times
Shinawatra clan faces crisis again
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Malaysiakini
4 hours ago
- Malaysiakini
Native land and soul: When will justice take root in S'wak?
LETTER | For too long, the soil of Sarawak has been rich with contradiction. It is a land of rivers and rainforests, of ancestral memory and spiritual depth - but also a land of encroachment, exploitation, and bureaucratic cruelty. Nowhere is this contradiction more painfully felt than in the long and unresolved battle over native customary rights (NCR) land. Recently, PKR deputy president Nurul Izzah Anwar added her voice to what Sarawak's indigenous communities have been crying out for, not for years, but for generations. In calling for an immediate halt to new licences issued over disputed lands and the expedition of surveys and legal ownership titles, she speaks not merely as a politician, but as a Malaysian with a conscience. Her words cut to the heart of the matter: 'Land is more than just a place to live. It is part of their soul and identity.' That soul, however, has been eroded, piece by piece, hectare by hectare - while court victories ring hollow, and elderly men and women die waiting for land titles that never come. A decade on the bureaucratic treadmill Take the case of Mary anak Nakai (not her real name), someone personally known to me. For the past 10 years, this middle-aged Bidayuh woman has made the long trek from her kampung to various Land and Survey Department offices - from Kota Samarahan to the towering Menara Pelita in Petra Jaya. She carries a neatly bound folder of letters, old maps, and hope - hoping that 'this visit' will be the one where someone finally tells her, 'Yes, puan, your land grant is approved.' But each visit ends with the same bureaucratic riddle. One officer tells her the file is 'under review.' Another says it's 'with the legal unit.' The next time, the officer in charge is 'at a meeting.' If not in a meeting, then 'on duty outside.' Sometimes, there's the cryptic 'we cannot locate your file'. And the cycle goes on. Nakai now refers to the actual decision-maker as 'the ghost officer' or 'pegawai hantu' - ever-present in theory, but never seen in reality. Only when Nakai arrives, the 'hantu officer' (ghost officer) has a meeting and cannot be disturbed. Her story, as she told me, is tragically familiar. Across Sarawak, countless NCR land applicants like Nakai have spent decades navigating red tape, only to die landless on land their families have lived on for generations. Forgotten rights, forgotten lives Names like Harrison Ngau and the late Bill Kayong are now etched into the legacy of resistance. Kayong, shot dead in broad daylight in 2016, remains a martyr for the cause of NCR land. His killers may have faced justice, but the system that emboldens land grabs has yet to be dismantled. Their struggle was not merely about court documents; it was about honouring the covenant between a people and their land. It was about saying: 'We were here, we are here, and we have the right to stay.' Numbers mask a deeper injustice Deputy Premier Awang Tengah Ali Hasan recently reported that over 1.2 million hectares have been surveyed under the New NCR Land Survey Initiative since 2010, with nearly 936,000ha gazetted as Bumiputera Communal Reserves under Section 6 of the Sarawak Land Code. On paper, these numbers seem promising. But statistics don't show the heartbreak. They don't reflect the speed at which bulldozers have cleared sacred forests while villagers wait years just to have their land claims recognised. They don't show the faces of the elderly being told - yet again - to 'come back next week.' And communal reserves are not the same as individual titles. Section 6 gives temporary security. Section 18 gives rightful ownership. That distinction means the world to the people living on that land. When law lags behind morality NCR is not merely a matter of administrative delay - it is a moral emergency. While state officials and companies profit from the spoils, communities are left navigating a legal labyrinth that too often leads nowhere. And though courts have recognised the legitimacy of native land based on 'adat' (customary law), enforcement remains inconsistent, and victories too often remain confined to courtroom transcripts, not real-life outcomes. It is one of the cruellest ironies of our modern federation: the Iban, Bidayuh, Orang Ulu, and Penan are treated as if they are squatters on their own ancestral land. Generations have been born and buried on these lands. Sacred grounds, burial sites, fruit groves, rivers, and hunting trails - all mapped in memory and tradition - have long constituted a living system of land tenure that predates any Sarawak Land Code. Yet, despite decades of promises and court affirmations, the land continues to be leased out to palm oil giants and timber tycoons with impunity. Often, this happens without consultation, without consent, and without even the courtesy of compensation. The result is not just legal ambiguity; it is cultural violence. A politician who knows That's what makes Nurul Izzah's intervention especially significant. Here is a politician from Putrajaya - far from the hills and rivers of Sarawak - who not only understands the law, but 'feels' the issue. Her call to action reflects rare empathy and clarity – as if she's telling Sarawakians, 'I hear you'. She cited heroes like Ngau and Kayong and reminded the nation that 'land is not just for living, but for worship, culture, and the soul.' To many Sarawakians, that sounds like the first time someone from Peninsular Malaysia truly gets it. Let the land be theirs again If the Sarawak government is sincere in its intentions, it must treat land rights not as a political concession but as a fundamental right. Expedite the surveys. Issue the titles. Halt all new licences on disputed land. Recognise the sacred and sovereign connection between a people and their land. To delay is to dispossess. To ignore is to erase. And to exploit is to colonise. Until then, people like Mary anak Nakai will keep catching buses, making appointments, and circling the same bureaucratic merry-go-round, no music, no horses, no joy - just hope, prayer, and the aching wait for someone to finally say: 'This land is your land.' The views expressed here are those of the author/contributor and do not necessarily represent the views of Malaysiakini.
