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Philippines set for ‘more robust' Balikatan joint drills, but no mention of Typhon

Philippines set for ‘more robust' Balikatan joint drills, but no mention of Typhon

The Philippines is gearing up for its biggest joint military exercise this year, aimed at enhancing its defence capabilities, with observers suggesting Manila should still showcase a controversial US-made missile system that Beijing is firmly against.
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Without giving detailed information on the dates and number of soldiers slated to join the drills, Brigadier General Michael Logico, Balikatan's executive agent, said last week that the 40th Balikatan exercises would be a full battle test.
'There will be participation coming from the Australian Defence Force and the Japanese Self Defence Force,' Logico told reporters at a briefing after a live fire exercise last week in Capas, Tarlac, adding he was waiting for 'newer developments from other countries' before giving further details on this year's Balikatan.
Like last year, the drills will feature sinking exercises 12 nautical miles outside the Philippines' territorial waters.
The Typhon missile system was deployed in the Philippines during the first phase of the Salaknib exercise in April of last year and used in the Balikatan joint exercises the following month.
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Muhammad Faizal Bin Abdul Rahman, a research fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, told This Week in Asia the coming Balikatan drills would continue to serve as a deterrent against China along the first island chain, where Philippine interests in the South China Sea and the security of the Taiwan Strait were implicitly linked.

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