Video: Trump calls Biden 'son of a b***h' while touring newly opened migrant camp
Trump has faced four criminal cases tied to classified documents and the 2020 election aftermath, charges he claims were politically motivated by the Biden administration. Biden, who ended his re-election bid in July 2024 amid growing concern over his cognitive health, has denied any involvement in the prosecutions.Meanwhile, during the tour of immigration detention center deep in Florida's Everglades, surrounded by alligator-infested swamps and nicknamed 'Alligator Alcatraz,' Trump joked that any escapees from the facility would have to outrun the alligators.advertisementCalling the site 'very appropriate' and 'escape-proof,' Trump said he wants similar centers in 'many states' and even floated the idea of deporting some US citizens. He also suggested the Florida National Guard could help speed up deportations by serving as immigration judges.'This place will soon house some of the most menacing migrants on the planet,' Trump declared. 'The only way out, really, is deportation,' he added.Outside the remote airstrip facility, lined with tents and trailers, hundreds of protesters gathered, demanding humane treatment for migrants and raising environmental concerns about the Everglades, which are home to endangered species and Native American tribes.- EndsTune InMust Watch
IN THIS STORY#Donald Trump#Joe Biden#United States of America
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Time of India
3 minutes ago
- Time of India
US, China and Russia: Navigating the superpower trilemma
Today, Indian foreign policy discourse is mired in an important debate. Two key assumptions govern this debate: that New Delhi's ties with the US arguably constitute its most important relationship in the 21st century, and that any negotiations with Beijing are a signal of weakness. India-US relations are undergoing a tense phase. The tensions have primarily been instigated by US President Donald Trump's decision to impose a 25% tariff on India, and an additional, 'unspecified penalty' for continuing to buy energy resources from Russia. His social media comments have gone so far as to refer to both India and Russia as 'dead economies.' Naturally, this has called into question the time-tested nature of the partnership in the face of the 'China challenge'. With the US-China equation changing, India has to balance ties with both as well as work towards its own national interests Speaking of China, after a long period of severed dialogue, postures on both sides have slightly relaxed, though the road to stability vis-à-vis the border issue, or even China's backing of Pakistan, is long and winding. Nonetheless, communication and negotiation between the two neighbours is underway, and is perhaps a welcome break from the silent-but-violent treatment. Besides the volatility in New Delhi's ties with the two superpowers, there exists a bilateral dynamic between the US and China, which vitally impacts India. An intense back-and-forth of escalating tariffs ensued between the two economic giants earlier this year. Yet, Trump's recent statements seem to suggest that a trade deal with Beijing is in the works. So how does that affect India? So far, India has believed that Trump's continued dissatisfaction with Beijing will be a core aspect of mutual convergence between itself and the US. This definitely was the case under the Joe Biden administration. But if anything is certain about Trump, it is that nothing, indeed, is certain. So, the US and China may not be entering a friendly phase, but they sure are inching toward some semblance of stability. The dynamics of this fateful triangle require that India think in its national interests— sustained economic growth and security of its territory from both external and internal threats. And as PM Modi himself remarked in an interview in 2023, '[The] foremost guiding principle in foreign affairs is our country's national interest.' This begs the question: How should New Delhi balance the nuances of its ties with the US and China and the repercussions of their own thaw, while working to achieve its national interests? One way is not to believe that negotiations with China signal weakness. This anxiety is likely to play up as New Delhi and Beijing negotiate. Most recently, India has eased tourism rules, while China has opened up access for Indians to undertake the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. To a great degree, India's geographical, economic and military constraints require that communication with Beijing continue for sustainable security to be achieved. This is not to say that India should give up its confident posture, or discontinue investments in de-risking or border security. It is also not a call for it to shed its affinity for the US. But the steps toward a thaw with Beijing — high-level political conversations, ministerial-level dialogues, and working mechanism consultations on the border — are necessary. And at a time when Trump seems to be prepared to meet the 'China challenge' alone, India must figure its own way out to do the same. Second, is to evaluate costs when it comes to fulfilling its energy requirements through purchases from Russia. The affordability of such purchases, and the historic nature of ties with Moscow (especially in defence), make it a vital partner to New Delhi. However, Trump is prioritising reciprocal access to the Indian market over having a vital partner in the Indo-Pacific. And in a world where the US is vastly more powerful than India — or in most aspects, even China — much of what Trump says, goes. So the question is, where is the common ground between India not shedding its friendship with Russia, not risking insurmountable tariffs from the US, and not enabling China's unchecked regional power? The intertwined interests of economic growth and stable security seem orthogonal in this situation. But it is important to face facts. If it wasn't buying oil from Russia, India would still get the tariff slap. If there was great openness in the Indian dairy and agricultural markets, which Trump consistently demands, there would still be an 'unspecified penalty' for trading with Russia. So, the acknowledgement that there is no absolute win-win, is essential. It boils down to assessing what is more harmful — not making any adjustments to the trade numbers with Russia, or the US. It is also important to acknowledge the trade-offs — if there is a significant reduction in the imports of oil and/or defence equipment from Russia, and the US becomes the preferred alternative source of imports, Moscow may become unabashed in its support for China in its disputes with India. If trade with Russia continues as is, India shall face agonistic tariffs under Donald Trump and an overall lack of support in regional geopolitics. It is indeed true that India's tariffs continue to remain high, market openness is low, and domestic innovation and production capability face challenges. Hence, is the first step to addressing the above mentioned dilemma to take difficult steps towards phased openness? Most likely. It may assuage Trump's concerns about the US's trade deficit, without creating many troubles in India-Russia relations. Finally, the worrisome trend of self-reliance across the globe is leaving fewer alternatives for India to replace its dependencies on the US, China, or Russia. Where it gets affordable imports, it faces controversial dilemmas. Where it sees a strong partner, it faces chiding and deriding. So, moving forward, even as the willingness to negotiate diplomatically must continue, India must invest in its own trajectory toward economic and military modernisation. Illustration credit: Illustration by Chad Crowe (USA) Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Indian Express
an hour ago
- Indian Express
To secure US trade deal, key ministries told to list what they can bring to talks table
FOLLOWING US President Donald Trump's tariff sledgehammer, the government has kicked off an exercise to thrash out concessions across sectors that can be offered in the tariff negotiations later this month. Key economic ministries have been asked to see what they can still afford to offer to sweeten New Delhi's deal when the US team is here on August 25. To reach an agreement, the Trump administration has been demanding much more than what the government has offered in its market access commitments, including lowering of tariffs across the board and removal of non-tariff trade barriers. As policymakers grapple with Trump's announcement of a 25 per cent tariff on goods from August 7, alongside an additional but unspecified 'penalty' for its defence and energy imports from Russia, economic ministries have started sending in sectoral tariff concessions in their jurisdictions. There are indications oil refiners have started reducing Russian oil purchases. Some of these concessions, if calibrated well, could ensure an opening up of the domestic economy, sources aware of discussions at the highest levels told The Indian Express. In fact, it was an external crisis that had forced the reforms of 1991. Most importantly, the sources said, an unnecessary show of bravado in countering some of Trump's assertions, however ridiculous they may be, should be avoided. India was one of the first countries the Trump administration had expected to sign a deal with, but slow progress has been a source of frustration for Washington DC. Like countries around the world scrambling to deal with Trump's tariff threats, India had largely adopted a principled, but non-confrontational, stance in an attempt to balance selective concessions with caution to safeguard its economic growth, and circumvent a backlash from domestic producers. Sources closely tracking the US talks with others said a majority of the countries that rushed to sign deals with the world's biggest economy ended up with lopsided agreements that effectively extracted more than what it gave. This includes the UK and Australia that have a trade deficit with the US. On talks with New Delhi, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC Thursday: 'Well, I don't know what's going to happen; it will be up to India. India came to the table early. They have been slow-rolling things, so I think that the President, the whole trade team is frustrated with them. And also, India has been a large buyer of sanctioned Russian oil, that they then resell as refined products. So, they have not been a great global actor'. The assumption in New Delhi has always been that Washington DC will maintain a differential of 10-20 per cent in tariffs between China and India; and that the Americans would be cognizant of India's traditional redlines that have endured for decades, including concerns over GM food crops and the need to safeguard the interest of the vast subsistence-level manufacturing base that has an oversized contribution to labour-intensive exports. The government is also keen to stay away from offering duty concessions on imports of agri items such as soybean, corn and dairy, in the interim deal. While the government has offered to cut tariffs on 55 per cent of US imports, this could be pushed up in the upcoming talks, given that in FTAs with Japan, Korea, and ASEAN, over 80 per cent of tariff lines were down to zero. Sources said the outer limit for a deal with the US, currently pegged at around October, could be brought forward, if fresh negotiations are positive. What complicates the equation for India is that the Chinese are at an advanced stage of negotiations towards a deal, which could have a favourable tariff rate and potential waivers on secondary tariffs, including possibly the tariff on account of Russian oil imports and the proposed 10 per cent BRICS tariff. China is currently faced with a 30 per cent tariff. From New Delhi's perspective, a deal needs to be clinched precisely for ensuring the gap in tariffs between India and China is maintained, even with a limited early-harvest type of deal. There is, however, greater receptiveness now within the policy circles to cut tariffs on some industrial goods, especially intermediate goods where there is the twin problem of high duties and an inverted duty structure (duty being higher on inputs than on final products). Alongside, there is a willingness to grant concessions in sectors such as public procurement and agri provided these are matched by the other side, like in the case of the UK deal. Also, India is willing to import more from the US, especially in three big-ticket sectors – defence equipment, fossil fuels and nuclear – to manage Trump's constant references to the trade gap, the sources said. Tariff rebalancing, if done right, could potentially offer an impetus to the economy, given that the biggest beneficiaries of tariff protection, especially the non-tariff barriers such as an increasing array of QCOs (quality control orders), are the big players. MSME units have been calling for these QCOs to be removed, especially in areas such as steel and textiles. Since 1991, New Delhi has gradually reduced its average tariff from nearly 79 per cent in 1990 to around 12 per cent in 2013, following which it has gone back up to 16-17 per cent by 2023. Sectors such as agriculture, dairy and automobiles, continue to be protected, even as the Ministry of Commerce and industry maintains that its trade measures are WTO compliant. Unlike its response during Trump's first term, where retaliatory tariffs were imposed, New Delhi has desisted from retaliating and is working on strategic concessions in sectors that the US is keen to target, while adhering to its own broad red lines. This involves areas symbolic of trade openness, including nuclear energy, fossil fuels and defence procurement. Think tanks such as Delhi-based Global Trade Research Initiative have said that by refusing to cross its red lines, particularly on agriculture, India has helped avoid 'the trap of a one-sided deal'. Once the official level discussions wrap up, there is a sense that a final call on the deal could come down to a conversation between the two leaders, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump. This is especially so since it is Trump who is the trade negotiator-in-chief. For India, the best-case scenario would be to get a deal of some sort now, and then build on that in the future negotiations that could run into 2026, experts said. With Trump announcing the tariffs and penalties on India, that phone call could come in sooner, they said. Anil Sasi is National Business Editor with the Indian Express and writes on business and finance issues. He has worked with The Hindu Business Line and Business Standard and is an alumnus of Delhi University. ... Read More
Indian Express
an hour ago
- Indian Express
What Trump is actually doing — and why India needs to press reform & reset
FOR all the disquiet in Delhi over US President Donald Trump's sugar-uncoated remarks, his rough and ready tactics on trade, there needs to be a sobering acknowledgment of two realities: one, like it or not, tough tactics often win on the street in a world that's never stopped being an unfair place; and, two, Trump has prevailed. Most mainstream economists dismissed his approach, warning that his aggressive tariff regime would spell disaster for the US economy. Yet, four months after unveiling his first tariff chart on April 2—dubbed 'Liberation Day'— and his second on Friday, Trump has gained enough ground to claim a significant victory. Like a gambler, who believes he is on a winning streak, Trump is set to roll the dice for far more sweeping changes in the post-war global financial and technological orders. The US President's bilateral negotiations are being described as the 'Trump Round' of trade talks, echoing the major rounds of GATT and WTO negotiations that shaped global commercial order. With the exception of Canada and China, most countries refrained from retaliatory tariffs. Instead, they lined up outside the White House, eager to strike deals before the extended August 1 deadline. India was among the early partners to start trade talks but failed to close a deal. While many major economies and middle powers signed agreements on Trump's terms, India now finds itself in the company of Brazil, Burma, and Switzerland facing steep US tariffs. To its credit, Delhi did recognise trade as central to Trump's second-term agenda. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's February 13 meeting with Trump produced a joint statement affirming the goal of expanding bilateral trade to $500 billion and launching time-bound trade negotiations. India negotiated in good faith and continuously. But the gap between India's negotiating brief and Trump's maximalist agenda proved too wide to bridge. Trump's growing impatience was evident in a barrage of tweets targeting India, while senior administration figures—Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Senator Marco Rubio—spoke publicly about the President's 'frustration' with Delhi's posture. Frustration had also defined Trump's first-term trade engagement with India. Robert Lighthizer, Trump's former US Trade Representative, recounts in his book, No Trade is Free, how difficult it was to conclude even a modest trade agreement with Delhi. He placed the blame not on India's bureaucracy, but on the entrenched interests of the Indian capitalists that fiercely guard the barriers protecting them from external competition. Lighthizer revealed he kept files on top Indian tycoons—whom he labeled 'oligarchs'—to better understand Delhi's negotiating strategy. Trump's complaint about India's 'obnoxious' non-tariff barriers rings familiar. India's neighbours have long voiced similar grievances, although a lot more politely. Yet, the deeper issue may be Delhi's underestimation of the scale and ambition of the Trump Round. Trump's goal was not merely a new bilateral deal here or there, but a systemic overhaul of the global trading order constructed after the Second World War and revamped at the turn of the millennium. On the campaign trail and in office, Trump has argued that the international trade regime has failed the American people—and must be overturned. The strategy, often dismissed as irrational, had a logic of its own. Stephen Miran, Trump's economic adviser, argued in a paper written before the presidential election that Washington could exploit the global export dependence on the US market—and allies' reliance on US security guarantees—to rewrite the rules. Miran describes the post-war free-trade order as a political construct, in which US policy sacrificed domestic industry for Cold War geopolitical goals. He proposed replacing blanket multilateralism with 'strategic pluralism,' forging separate deals with different nations based on US leverage. Before taking over at the Treasury, Bessent, too, hinted at the broader potential of tariffs—not just to reshape trade, but to pressure states on energy, currency, and strategic alignment. For Bessent, Trump's strategy was about a grand rebalancing of the global economy in America's favour. Trump has not held back. He has used tariffs for a variety of objectives. He imposed a 50% tariff on Brazil to weaken President Lula and help his rival Jair Bolsonaro. He is threatening tariffs on Indian and Chinese oil imports from Russia and using economic leverage to push BRICS countries away from their loose talk on de-dollarisation. In the last four months, three core pillars of Trump's strategy have become visible: using tariffs to narrow trade and fiscal deficits; mobilising investment to reindustrialise the US; and compelling trade partners to buy American energy and goods. Even countries with minimal trade ties to the US have had to offer something of interest to the White House. Pakistan's offering was its allegedly 'rich' oilfields. The EU, Japan, and South Korea have made sweeping pledges, including tariff concessions, major investments, and hefty American purchases. Whether these commitments are realised is another question. But they have delivered the optics of victory that Trump craves. What India offered remains unclear—but evidently, it was not enough. If Delhi was unprepared for Trump's counter-revolution in trade, it now faces an even more profound challenge: coping with a broader transformation of the global financial and technological order. Trump is targeting the foundations of the old monetary system. His administration's embrace of cryptocurrencies and stablecoins promises to reinforce the dollar's dominance over the global system and the US ability to leverage it. At the same time, Trump is aggressively deregulating artificial intelligence. At a recent AI summit in Pittsburgh, he announced a sweeping new policy to promote American AI dominance—especially over China—and pledged to invest a significant share of the revenues secured through trade negotiations into AI-driven industrial renewal. Trump's vision of American resurgence hinges less on outsourcing work and insourcing labour and more on technological innovation to restore US industrial might. In short, Trump is not just renegotiating trade. He is leading a radical overhaul of American capitalism by reshoring key elements of the supply chains, promoting a national industrial policy, and investing in tech-centric manufacturing in the United States. As India resumes trade talks with the US later this month, it must recognise this historic moment in the evolution of the global economy. Any negotiating strategy premised on maintaining the status quo at home at a time of radical change abroad will leave India more vulnerable—not just to US pressure, but to the accumulating costs of missing a long-overdue internal economic transformation. This is a moment that demands India to focus on reforming its own economy to make it globally competitive and technologically agile. India owes this to itself – and to its future. (C. Raja Mohan is a contributing editor on international affairs for The Indian Express)
