EDITORIAL: Established political parties must reconnect with the public
It goes without saying that this is an extremely harsh evaluation by voters of the administration of Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Meanwhile, the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan only managed to maintain the number of seats it held before the election, while new parties, such as the Democratic Party for the People and Sanseito, made significant gains.
The election outcome can be seen as a defeat for the established political parties.
Voters appear to believe that they have not adequately addressed the public dissatisfaction and distrust that have been growing under more than 30 years of economic stagnation.
At a news conference on July 21, Ishiba reiterated his intention to remain in office, saying, 'Political stagnation cannot be allowed even for a moment.'
The prime minister may have judged that it would be inadvisable to announce an immediate resignation given the imminent deadline of the Japan-U.S. tariff negotiations on Aug. 1.
Still, staying in power cannot be said to be in line with the will of voters.
Ishiba clearly said he is not considering expanding the coalition framework at this point. He said he would discuss individual policy issues with opposition parties, as he has done so far.
However, as he failed to gain public trust in both the Lower House and Upper House elections, it remains to be seen how much cooperation opposition parties will extend.
It is nothing short of a 'thorny path,' as Ishiba himself put it.
Komeito, which shares responsibility for the administration as a member of the ruling coalition, won a record-low eight seats, losing three seats each in electoral districts and the proportional representation portion.
Among the opposition bloc, only the Japanese Communist Party lost seats. The party won only three seats, down from its seven seats up for re-election.
Despite their long histories and established organizations, both parties have been in decline in recent years due to the aging of supporters, among other factors.
They will continue to be challenged to develop new support bases using methods that adapt to the changing times.
In contrast to the established parties, the DPP and Sanseito, both founded five years ago, have risen.
The DPP, which appeals to the working generations with its slogan of increasing take-home pay, garnered 17 seats, up from its four seats up for re-election.
Sanseito, which advocates 'Japanese First' policies, gained 14 seats, although it had only one seat up for grabs.
The two parties share a common strategy of expanding their support base by taking advantage of social media to criticize the established parties.
Sanseito's antiforeign rhetoric has often sparked intense debates on social media and become a source of conflict and division.
Still, simply frowning upon the public discontent that sometimes erupts violently will not resolve the problem.
It is the role of political parties to explore the background of such 'public sentiment,' bring it to the table for discussion and present effective solutions.
If that channel has been blocked, it must be urgently reconnected.
The established parties must start by confronting the reality of being shunned, reflecting on what is lacking and determining what needs to be done to regain the public's trust.
--The Asahi Shimbun, July 22
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