
Taiwan's Recall Elections Failed – But That Doesn't Signal an Embrace of Beijing
Taiwanese voters delivered a decisive verdict on July 26: none of the 24 Kuomintang (KMT) lawmakers targeted in the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-backed recall campaigns were unseated. Seven more KMT legislators will face recall votes on August 23, but the failure of this first wave has already reshaped the political conversation.
The DPP explicitly framed the recall as a test of loyalty to Taiwan, promoting slogans such as '罷免投同意,反共更有利' ('vote yes to recall, oppose Communism more effectively') and portraying figures like Fu Kun-chi as symbols of 'pro-CCP' politics. Yet voters rejected the recalls decisively.
So does this result signal a Taiwanese embrace of Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or a clear shift toward endorsing some KMT politicians' approach to cross-strait relations? There is little evidence for either assumption.
The failure of the recalls does not reflect a re-evaluation of cross-strait policy preferences. Instead, it highlights voter fatigue with partisan manipulation, a desire for stability and competent governance, and growing skepticism toward political actors who treat national security as a tool for short-term electoral gain.
A Taiwan-Centered Identity, But Not a Blank Check
Taiwan's identity and civic nationalism have evolved over decades of de facto separation from the mainland. Across party lines, most Taiwanese now see their future as distinct from mainland China, and cross-strait debates increasingly revolve around how best to manage that reality, although many inputs from the mainland still outright reject its validity.
This Taiwan-first identity is not confined to one political camp. The KMT, knowingly or not, has adopted Taiwan-centric messaging as well. The KMT's public messaging increasingly places Taiwan, rather than party ideology or the Republic of China (ROC) framework, at the center of its political language. Its public branding now reflects this shift, including its official Instagram handle: kmt.tw. During the 2024 presidential campaign, when I served as foreign press secretary to Hou Yu-ih, the KMT's second-ever Hokkien, Taiwan-born presidential candidate, I observed a noticeable increase in the use of Hokkien in campaign communications. While the KMT continues to emphasize the ROC, its rhetoric and public symbols are often closely associated with Taiwan.
However, this identity convergence is not a partisan loyalty test. Ahead of the recalls, some argued that a newfound unity of voters supporting the ROC framework and Taiwan independence was forming in the face of the CCP threat. The assumption was that voters would punish any politician perceived as too close to Beijing, but the recall results suggest otherwise. If voters were motivated primarily by anti-CCP sentiment, the DPP's campaigns, which explicitly branded KMT lawmakers as 'pro-CCP,' would have succeeded.
Instead, voters demonstrated a more complicated, nuanced outlook. They can hold strong Taiwan-centric views while rejecting partisan efforts to weaponize the CCP threat. At the same time, their rejection of the recalls should not be misread as approval of every KMT figure's conduct. Many Taiwanese remain wary of gestures, such as Fu Kun-chi's high-profile trip to Beijing, that risk undermining Taiwan's deterrence or handing Beijing propaganda victories.
Taiwan's identity convergence is real, but voters are not willing to let it be exploited for domestic point-scoring.
The DPP's 'Boy Who Cried Wolf' Problem
The CCP threat is existential. Political warfare, disinformation, and gray-zone military pressure are daily realities for Taiwan. Yet by overusing the CCP threat as a partisan tool, the DPP risks undermining the very resilience it claims to protect.
My written testimony before the United States' Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) last week warned that 'over-politicizing the CCP threat, labeling domestic political rivals as 'pro-Communist,' plays directly into Beijing's hands. It risks exhausting and paralyzing concerned citizens, precisely the psychological effect Beijing intends to create.'
That warning feels prescient now. Voter fatigue is setting in. When every policy debate is cast as a loyalty test, public sensitivity to genuine CCP threats dulls over time. The DPP is beginning to look like the proverbial boy who cried wolf. The more it invokes the CCP threat for partisan gain, the less seriously voters may take real dangers.
This is not just a political misstep. It is a strategic liability. Taiwan's greatest defense against the CCP's cognitive warfare is public trust in democratic processes. If voters begin to tune out security messaging because they perceive it as partisan theater, Taiwan's whole-of-society resilience will suffer.
As Khedroob Thondup, a former member of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, noted, the DPP also made a tactical mistake: 'Recall elections are meant to be a safeguard against misconduct, not a shortcut to power. The DPP's strategy blurred that line, turning a constitutional tool into a partisan weapon.'
Their strategic and tactical mistakes, however, should not embolden the KMT to repeat its own.
The KMT Must Not Misread the Results
The recall failure does not mean Taiwan's voters approve of every cross-strait overture. It only means they disapprove of overt, politicized attempts to weaponize such overtures.
If KMT leaders interpret this result as a green light to double down on careless engagement, they risk squandering the very trust voters just extended to them. Reckless gestures, such as former President Ma Ying-jeou's remark urging Taiwanese to 'believe in Xi Jinping's goodwill,' have already handed Beijing propaganda victories and undermined Taiwan's deterrence posture.
My written testimony before the CECC also cautioned that 'responsible engagement requires careful messaging, timing, and coordination. Anything less risks feeding into Beijing's cognitive warfare and undermining our domestic unity, deterrence posture, and social cohesion.' That warning applies just as much now.
The KMT cannot afford to confuse rejection of partisan manipulation of a genuine concern with a mandate for complacency. This is not an invitation to return to old habits of poorly messaged cross-strait engagement. It is an opportunity to show that the KMT can act as a responsible governing party, not just an opposition force.
A Chance for Leadership, Not Complacency
If the KMT is serious about earning long-term public trust, it should seize this moment to lead on national security, not just block DPP initiatives.
First, it should take the lead on the defense special budget. The KMT has been vocal in demanding oversight of major defense appropriations, including the national defense special budget expected to be requested by the Ministry of National Defense in the next legislative session. Now is the time to move beyond criticism and explain, in detail, what changes it proposes, why they matter, and how they will strengthen deterrence and resilience.
The KMT should also outline a clear plan to meet its own previously stated goal of raising defense spending to 3 percent of GDP. Voters deserve to know whether the KMT is prepared to invest in Taiwan's defense rather than simply using defense funding as a political bargaining chip.
Second, the KMT should launch a transparent public campaign outlining its cross-strait priorities. That means clearly communicating what forms of dialogue with Beijing it considers acceptable, how it will ensure transparency and avoid being taken advantage of by the CCP's United Front work, and what red lines it will not cross, particularly in preserving Taiwan's democratic resilience.
By being transparent and disciplined, the KMT can demonstrate that cross-strait engagement is not a retreat but a risk-management tool that is consistent with Taiwan's security and democratic values.
If the KMT succeeds, it will position itself as a credible steward of Taiwan's national security, showing voters it is capable of balancing dialogue with deterrence.
The Quest for Unity
Facing the CCP threat, Taiwan does not have the luxury of remaining divided. However, it would be unrealistic to expect that, after the DPP just attempted to unseat KMT legislators en masse, the KMT legislative caucus will suddenly become 'cooperative,' especially after DPP caucus leader Ker Chien-ming's remark that those voting against the recalls were 'not Taiwanese.' Emotional remarks like Ker's only deepened partisan wounds, escalating political disagreements into questions of identity and loyalty. Such rhetoric makes legislative cooperation difficult at a time when unity is Taiwan's strongest defense.
Bonnie Glaser, managing director of the Indo-Pacific Program at the German Marshall Fund, was absolutely right to point out that 'the deep polarization in Taiwan's politics is harmful to national security… Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties need to strike compromises that strengthen governance and deliver better outcomes for the people.'
The failure of the recall elections does not signal an embrace of Beijing. Taiwanese voters are neither pro-Beijing nor reflexively anti-KMT. They are pro-stability, pro-democracy, and increasingly tired of being treated as pawns in partisan battles.
The message to both major parties is clear.
To the DPP: stop crying wolf. The CCP threat is real, but cheapening it as a constant partisan bludgeon risks dulling public vigilance when it matters most.
To the KMT: do not mistake voter fatigue for a blank check. You now have the public's cautious trust. Use it to lead responsibly, including showing that you are willing to invest in Taiwan's security and fulfill your own pledge to raise defense spending to 3 percent of GDP. Otherwise, that trust will quickly erode.
Taiwan's greatest strength against Beijing's coercion is a united and confident public that trusts its democratic institutions. That unity will not be won through fearmongering or careless gestures. It will be achieved through transparency, discipline, and serious governance. Both parties owe Taiwan nothing less.

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