Taiwan detects 11 Chinese aircraft, 6 naval vessels around its territory
Taiwan reported increased Chinese military activity around its territory, including aircraft and naval vessels crossing the median line. Former US Indo-Pacific Command Chief Admiral Harry Harris urged the United States to abandon strategic ambiguity and explicitly commit to defending Taiwan against China's aggressive intentions. Harris emphasized China's clear aim to seize Taiwan, necessitating a firm US stance.
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Indian Express
12 minutes ago
- Indian Express
Delhi must talk tough with Beijing over China's construction of a dam on Brahmaputra
On July 19, Chinese Premier Li Qiang travelled to Nyingchi in Tibet to launch the construction of a 1.2 trillion yuan ($167.8 billion) mega hydropower project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. This massive project is being constructed without prior consultation with lower riparian India, though its likely location in Medog County is barely 30 km from the place the river enters India and becomes the Siang, the main channel of the Brahmaputra River system. The project has several ominous implications for India, but the Government of India has not commented publicly on its construction. While the project details have not been made public by China, except its cost and that it will involve five cascade hydropower plants, Chinese media reports suggest that it will generate nearly 300 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually, more than thrice the designed capacity (88.2 billion kWh) of the Three Gorges Dam in China, currently the largest in the world. It would involve drilling four to six 20-km tunnels and diversion of half of the river's flow. India ought to be deeply concerned about the downstream impact, which will manifest in many ways. First, a project of this magnitude will inevitably interfere with the flow of waters in the Brahmaputra. The contribution of glacier melt, snow melt and precipitation in Tibet to the waters in the Siang could range from 25 per cent to 35 per cent. There will be significant impact downstream of any diversion or pounding of water in Tibet, particularly in the lean season. The construction of five massive hydropower plants in cascade is likely to involve reservoir-like structures, even though it is claimed to be a run-of-the-river project. Altering natural river flows will harm aquatic ecosystems, fisheries, sedimentation, and biodiversity hotspots. Second, even more worrying is the risk of flooding. While reservoirs can regulate floods, unannounced or sudden releases of water during heavy rainfall, or in a natural disaster like an earthquake, to protect the structure, can exacerbate downstream flooding, causing immense damage to life and property. Third, this massive project involving tunnelling through fragile and young mountains is being undertaken in an area classified as Seismic Zone V (very high risk), which has seen major deep and shallow earthquakes in the past. Medog County lies within the Eastern Himalayan Syntaxis, a highly seismic region influenced by the Himalayan Frontal Thrust and local faults like the Medog Fault. Challenges such as reservoir-induced seismicity, tunnelling, geological miscalculations, and previous Chinese lapses in construction quality (for instance, in the Neelum-Jhelum project in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir) leave zero margin for engineering error — post-construction, there will be an ever-present danger of disasters. Fourth, China has leveraged its advantage as a predominantly upper riparian vis-à-vis its neighbours and has mostly withheld meaningful cooperation with downstream countries. For instance, China's development of a cascade of 12 smaller hydropower projects on the Mekong (called Lancang in China) has led to irregular fluctuations, drying out of areas, and depletion of fish catches and fertile sedimentation in the Lower Mekong Basin, affecting Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. This pattern of behaviour presages foreseen and unforeseen consequences of the proposed dam for India and Bangladesh. Fifth, China's track record of cooperation under three MoUs with India over the past two decades has been unsatisfactory. China has suspended the supply of wet-season hydrographic data for the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej from time to time. It has not agreed to provide lean-season data, let alone discuss broader cooperation like the sharing of waters of trans-border rivers. Not one collaborative project has been undertaken under the umbrella MOU for cooperation signed in 2013. Finally, neither China nor India is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997). However, two key principles of the Convention, 'equitable and reasonable utilisation' of shared waters and the 'obligation not to cause significant harm' to downstream states, are a part of customary international law. India has been a responsible co-riparian state, including with Pakistan, even after the Indus Waters Treaty was put in abeyance after the Pahalgam terrorist outrage. The same cannot be said of China. The present strategy of quiet diplomacy with China is not working. Strangely, none of our readouts on recent high-level conversations with China have even mentioned the Medog project. Looking ahead, there must be strong signalling of our deep concerns about this project to China, both through diplomatic channels and in public comments. If the roles were reversed, there is absolutely no possibility of China being similarly circumspect. It is also worthwhile recalling how forceful Pakistan has been in dealings with India as a lower riparian, even though we had given generous terms under the Indus Waters Treaty. The scope of the dialogue with China must be expanded beyond the issue of hydrographic data. As an affected party, we have every right to insist on full visibility on the technical specifications of the project, its environmental impact studies and how China proposes to tackle the seismic challenge. We must push for transparent and broader transboundary cooperation, similar to China's engagements with Kazakhstan on rivers like the Ili and Irtysh, to protect our existing and proposed user rights and other interests as a co-riparian. Indeed, we should seek suspension of work on the project until the relevant issues have been addressed. There should be a clear message that China undertaking a massive project like this without taking on board our legitimate concerns will have consequences for bilateral relations. We must undertake a series of activities on our own. Considering the danger of floods and reduction in lean-season flows, India has no alternative but to create storage structures to moderate the risks in the immediate downstream. India should reassess the quantum of water contributed by major tributaries and local hydrological systems using its remote sensing datasets, geospatial modelling tools and legacy hydrological data to reduce dependency on upstream data from China. We have the means and expertise to monitor the project and make the findings of those studies public. Finally, it is important to build a sustained narrative about China's unilateral actions in the upstream and escalate the issue bilaterally as also in our broader messaging on India-China relations. Our NGOs should raise this matter in relevant international platforms. We must appreciate that India's circumspection could be seen by China as a sign of weakness. This wouldn't help in pursuing our larger agenda of rebuilding bilateral relations with our northern neighbour. The writer is former ambassador to China
Mint
12 minutes ago
- Mint
Apple isn't leaving China. Its footprint is getting harder to see.
Apple's plans to make iPhones in India, components in Vietnam, and build new hubs across Southeast Asia reflect a meaningful effort to diversify away from China. But they tell only part of the story. In March, Apple CEO Tim Cook announced a new $99 million clean energy fund during a visit to Beijing. He didn't disclose project locations or recipients—only that Apple's commitment to China was 'expanding." The announcement came just two months before Chinese regulators delayed Apple's rollout of generative artificial intelligence features, the Financial Times reported. Those developments show how even one of China's most entrenched U.S. companies may face political and commercial friction as it tries to do business in both countries. As geopolitical pressure intensifies and investors look for clarity on decoupling, Apple's recent maneuvers offer a lesson for global businesses: A company need not leave China entirely so long as it can more effectively hide itself within it. Apple's behavior over the past several years shows it recalibrating its exposure to the actors and regions in China that carry reputational or regulatory risk. But it isn't ceasing to do business in China. Rather, Apple has stepped back from some of its direct affiliations and reduced its visibility without severing its ties to the business ecosystem in China, which remains dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. This model is instructive for other multinationals operating in China and other complex authoritarian environments. Confrontation and divestment are costly. Structural opacity, by contrast, offers flexibility—and protection. Apple needs to remain in good standing with regulators on both sides of the Pacific. That has led to unusual arrangements in China's western Xinjiang region. The Chinese Communist Party's policies of mass surveillance and forced labor there have deservedly drawn international condemnation. Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in 2021, banning imports tied to forced labor in Xinjiang. Many Western businesses have withdrawn entirely from doing business in Xinjiang. In 2016, Apple announced that it had taken minority stakes in four wind power projects in China as part of a strategy to decarbonize its supply chain. The projects were developed in collaboration with Goldwind, one of China's largest wind turbine makers. Goldwind has strong ties to state-led infrastructure planning and to Xinjiang. The company was formerly called Xinjiang Goldwind but dropped the word from its name in 2023. Though not sanctioned by the U.S., Goldwind has faced criticism for its ties to Xinjiang from European and U.S. politicians for its suspected ties to forced labor. An investigation by the Tech Transparency Project, a nonprofit organization, and The Information, a tech and business publication, linked Goldwind to state-run labor transfer programs and construction projects involving the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, a U.S.-sanctioned paramilitary entity. U.S. pressure over forced labor in Xinjiang intensified in 2020. Companies such as H&M and Nike, which issued statements addressing forced labor allegations, faced backlash on social media in China. By 2021, Apple's affiliated entities no longer appeared as shareholders in the Goldwind wind projects in Xinjiang. Corporate filings, reviewed in a Chinese business registration database, indicate that the equity stakes were transferred to subsidiaries controlled by Goldwind. Apple didn't publicly disclose the move, and no mention appeared in its environmental or investor reporting: Apple's investment shift is being revealed here for the first time. Apple didn't respond to requests for comment. The company has addressed allegations of forced labor involving Xinjiang in at least one other case, saying it regularly audits its supply chain to avoid the practice. It cut ties with a Chinese supplier that had been accused of forced labor in 2021, Bloomberg reported. Apple may have found other investing strategies that allow it to maintain relationships with Chinese entities in less visible ways. In 2018, Apple had announced it and 10 Chinese suppliers would invest $300 million in China Clean Energy Fund. That fund allows Apple's capital to reach state-linked firms and potentially sensitive regions without appearing in public filings. Among the beneficiaries of the fund, disclosed in a Chinese business registration database, is China General Nuclear Power Group, a state-owned firm added to the U.S. Entity List in 2019 for military ties. U.S. companies face sharp restrictions on doing business with companies on the list. The initial clean energy fund, designed to last just four years, ended in 2022. This year, Apple announced a successor fund worth approximately $99 million during Cook's visit to Beijing—but this time disclosed neither project locations nor recipient companies, continuing its reliance on indirect investment vehicles. This isn't a retreat from China but a careful reconfiguration—one that allows Apple to meet its clean-energy goals while addressing government sensitivities in both the U.S. and China. In 2024, Apple ranked third for China exposure of large U.S. companies in Strategy Risks SR 250 rankings; it has since dropped to 27th. Apple continues to operate at scale within China's commercial and political systems, while relying on structures that make its presence less legible to outside observers. The company meets regulatory expectations in both Washington and Beijing, while it avoids direct exposure that could invite retaliation from either. U.S. sanctions law covers physical imports from Xinjiang, but it doesn't restrict capital flows. Financial contributions routed through investment vehicles, such as the CCEF, are legally safe—even if reputational risk persists. Apple isn't exiting China. It has re-engineered its presence there to be less visible and harder for outsiders to trace. Its energy partnerships, once direct and disclosed, are now filtered through funds. In Xi Jinping's China, the companies that endure aren't the ones that speak out. The ones that endure are the ones that adapt—and recede from transparency. Guest commentaries like this one are written by authors outside the Barron's newsroom. They reflect the perspective and opinions of the authors. Submit feedback and commentary pitches to ideas@
Time of India
42 minutes ago
- Time of India
'LoP decided to get briefing from Chinese Ambassador during Doklam crisis': Jaishankar slams Rahul Gandhi in LS debate
External Affairs Minister Jaishankar responded to Congress's claims regarding China. He mentioned Rahul Gandhi's meeting with the Chinese envoy during the Doklam issue. Jaishankar highlighted Congress's past dealings with China, including trade agreements and technology imports. He spoke about the government's efforts to improve border infrastructure and relations with neighboring countries like Maldives and Sri Lanka. Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads Tired of too many ads? Remove Ads External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar on Monday hit back at Congress over its allegations against the government in relation to China and took potshots at Rahul Gandhi over his meeting with Chinese envoy during Doklam standoff in minister, who was participating in the debate on Operation Sindoor in Lok Sabha, referred to some comments made by Congress member Gaurav Gogoi about government not mentioning China in the context of its support to Pakistan."Some mention was made about visits, including my visit. Yes, I went to China. I went to China to make our position very clear about de-escalation, about trade restrictions and about terrorism. I did not go to China for the Olympics, I did not go to China for secret agreements. The House should know that people were watching Olympics when China was issuing stapled visas to people from Arunachal and Jammu and Kashmir. This is the reality of China. Let me really tell you how is the relation with China. We heard about warning about China, caution about China and you know China is planning this and China is planning that. Sir, I want to remind this House," he over two-month Doklam crisis eruputed in 2017 following actions of Chinese Army. Rahul Gandhi is now the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha."Doklam crisis was on. The Leader of Opposition decided to get a briefing from whom? Not from the Government, not from the MEA, but from the Chinese Ambassador. He took his briefing from the Chinese Ambassador when our military was confronting the Chinese military in Doklam. This is the political thing. I spoke about the political fact, I spoke about the border fact, let me give you an economic fact. What is the economic thinking of the Congress Party about China? In 2006, the Congress Party agreed to do a regional trading arrangement with China. It was finalised during the visit of President Hu Jintao. A task force was appointed. The task force gave a positive recommendation. Through the efforts of various people, this did not happen. Let me give you the technology side. The very people today who are cautioning us on China are the people who allowed 3G and 4G to come from China. It was this Government which made sure that there was a Made in India 5G," the minister spoke of government's efforts to ramp up border infrastructure."We keep speaking about the border. The border today, whether it is border with Pakistan or border with China or any other border. If our military is today able to stand its ground, the kind of massive deployment that we saw on the China border after 2020, it is because our border infrastructure budget has gone up four times, our tunnelling, our road building, our bridge building has doubled or tripled. And this is a far cry from the period the thinking was let us not develop the border because then the Chinese cannot come in. We had 60 years of the neglect of the border. Today in last 10 years, that neglect has been reversed. There is still a lot of work to be done. So I think people need to understand, and its not just in India," he also talked of improving ties with several neighbouring countries."We have just come back from Maldives. When I hear comments about foreign policy, day before yesterday, the PM was the Guest of Honour at the Independence Day of Maldives. This is the country which during their time forced an Indian company to leave an airport. That country has today invited India to build two new airports. Look at Sri Lanka. If the Hambantota port was built between 2005 and 2008 and at that time it was actually justified that it has no impact on India's interest. I want the House to appreciate that the people who are claiming today to be the custodians of national security thinking, who say that they are giving warnings, let us look at their record, let us see what they did when they were in office," he added.
