Nippon Steel aiming to prove value of Japan-U.S. cooperation, chairman says
"We want to improve the quality of U.S. Steel and prove that cooperation between Japanese and U.S. manufacturers is useful," Hashimoto said at the start of the meeting at the prime minister's office, in which other Nippon Steel executives also attended.
He reported to the prime minister that the takeover has been completed, and expressed gratitude for the Japanese government's support over the buyout effort.
Ishiba explained that Tokyo is continuing to urge the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump to review its high tariffs, saying that Japan is calling attention to investments rather than tariffs as it advances negotiations with the United States.
Nippon Steel's acquisition of U.S. Steel, made possible through a commitment for massive investments, "can be a model case for future Japan-U.S. relations," the prime minister said.
"The trend of the government strengthening its involvement in the economy and business will not change," Hashimoto told reporters after the meeting with Ishiba. "I think it will continue."
On Trump's dissatisfaction over automobile trade between the two countries, Hashimoto said that "there is too much focus on the competitiveness of Japanese cars in the U.S. market as (the U.S. government) places importance on the manufacturing industry."
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