Why South Africa needs an urgent ICT policy reform to leapfrog into global digital leadership
Having recently participated in the Global Internet Governance Forum (IGF), I left with one burning realisation: South Africa's digital future depends on how quickly and boldly we reform our ICT policy landscape. The IGF discussions revealed a sobering geopolitical reality: ICT infrastructure is no longer just about connectivity or convenience; it has become a strategic asset, a tool of control, and, in many ways, a modern currency in the global power play.
Subsea cables, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite networks, radio frequency spectrum, and hyperscale data centres are now at the heart of geopolitical influence. The Global North is rapidly consolidating control over these digital arteries, ensuring that data traffic, internet governance decisions, and emerging technologies remain within their sphere of influence. Sub-Saharan Africa, including South Africa, is heavily dependent on foreign-owned undersea cables and satellite services. Over 80% of South Africa's internet traffic is still routed internationally. Global content companies and Big Tech are increasingly dominating African digital spaces, often without contributing adequately to local economies. Without intentional ICT policy reform, South Africa risks remaining a digital consumer in a world where ownership equals power.
South Africa's ICT history is complex. Under apartheid, ICT infrastructure was an exclusive domain, designed to serve a minority and reinforce state surveillance.
Post-1994, South Africa made significant strides:
• The Electronic Communications Act,
• The Broadband Policy (SA Connect),
• The establishment of regulatory bodies like Icasa and ZADNA.
These were critical steps towards inclusivity and access. However, ICT policy in South Africa has not evolved at the pace required by technological advancements. Globally, ICT policy cycles average five years or less. In contrast, several key South African ICT laws remain over 15 years old. To illustrate this: South Africa has had more than 11 different ICT ministers since 1994, each introducing policy directions with limited continuity. This leadership churn, coupled with slow regulatory updates, has undermined investor confidence and delayed critical infrastructure investments.
Technology is moving at a speed that no static policy can match.
Consider developments like:
• 6G spectrum planning (IMT-2030),
• Artificial Intelligence governance models,
• Quantum computing frameworks,
• Satellite mega-constellations.
These emerging areas require dynamic, agile and future-proof legislation. The longer we delay, the wider the gap becomes between South Africa and global digital leaders. Investor confidence is built on policy certainty. Currently, South Africa's unpredictable policy environment is a deterrent for both local entrepreneurs and global technology investors. For South Africa to attract data centre investment, subsea cable landing stations, and satellite gateways, we need a clear, stable, and forward-looking ICT policy framework.
Equally critical is data sovereignty. With most government data currently stored in foreign-owned infrastructure, South Africa must prioritise the development of local, black-owned data centres, especially those hosting sensitive public sector data. This is not just a cybersecurity concern; it's a sovereignty issue.
South Africa's ICT policy reform must focus on several strategic areas:
• Artificial Intelligence (AI): Ethical use, innovation governance, and positioning South Africa for AI competitiveness.
• AI Data Centres: Ownership models that ensure local control over high-density computing infrastructure and government datasets.
• Next-Generation Connectivity (6G/IMT-2030): Preparing for spectrum allocation and next-generation mobile broadband services.
• Optical and Non-Terrestrial Networks: Expanding fibre infrastructure and integrating satellite systems (LEO, MEO, GEO) for national coverage.
• Subsea Infrastructure: Strengthening and diversifying ownership of subsea cable landing stations and promoting local investment.
• Data Sovereignty: Developing legislation that mandates local data storage for public and sensitive private sector data.
• Cybersecurity: Establishing robust national frameworks to address both global and domestic cyber threats.• Child Protection and Online Safety: Addressing emerging online harms and developing national frameworks for digital child protection.
• Digital Diplomacy and Geopolitics: Preparing South Africa's position on space governance, suborbital policies, and international digital negotiations.• Content Platforms and Broadcasting: Addressing the impact of new media platforms on local content industries and ensuring protection of South African content.
The South African Internet Governance Forum (ZAIGF), in partnership with the Department of Communications and ZADNA, has already demonstrated the capacity to convene multistakeholder dialogues that reflect the voices of government, business, academia, and civil society. However, South Africa must now institutionalise the IGF outcomes into formal policy processes.
Annual ZAIGF recommendations should feed directly into national policy development frameworks, especially given the fast-changing global internet governance landscape. Furthermore, South Africa must closely monitor, implement and align with International Telecommunication Union (ITU) resolutions and World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) outcomes to remain globally competitive and future-ready.
We stand at a pivotal moment. The global digital divide is widening. With bold, inclusive, and visionary policy reform, South Africa can not only catch up but leapfrog into a position of global digital leadership. This is not just a policy exercise; it is a national development imperative.
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