Canada resumes trade talks with US after rescinding tax on tech firms
Canada announced the resumption of trade negotiations with the United States and the cancellation of its tax targeting US tech firms, a move that had previously led President Donald Trump to abruptly suspend talks.
Ottawa introduced the digital services tax last year, projected to generate 5.9 billion Canadian dollars over five years. Though not a new measure, the US Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA) recently warned that the tax would have imposed billions of dollars in costs on American service providers operating in Canada by June 30.
Washington had requested negotiations to resolve the dispute. However, Trump announced Friday the immediate termination of trade talks with Canada in response to the tax, stating that Ottawa would learn of the tariff rate imposed on it 'within the week.'
In a statement, Canadian Finance Minister François-Philippe Champagne said Trump and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney had agreed to resume negotiations with the goal of reaching a deal by July 21, 2025.
'Canada will rescind the digital services tax in anticipation of a mutually beneficial comprehensive trade arrangement with the United States,' Champagne added.
The White House and President Trump have not yet issued any official comment.
Earlier Friday, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC that Washington hoped Canada would suspend the tax as a gesture of 'goodwill.'
Trump's move to terminate trade talks came amid rising tensions over the 3% digital services tax, which targets large multinational firms such as Alphabet, Amazon, and Meta that provide digital services to Canadian users.
'Stabilizing Relations'
While Canada had been exempt from some of the broader tariffs imposed by Trump on other countries, it remains subject to a separate set of trade duties.
Since returning to the White House in January, Trump has imposed steep tariffs on steel, aluminum, and automobile imports. Canada is one of the largest exporters of steel and aluminum to the United States.
On June 19, Carney said Canada would 'adjust' its 25% retaliatory tariffs on US steel and aluminum if no agreement is reached within 30 days.
On Friday, the Canadian prime minister reaffirmed the government's commitment to 'continue to conduct these complex negotiations in the best interest of Canadians.'
Carney previously said a successful outcome would mean to 'stabilize the trading relationship with the United States,' ensuring 'ready access to US markets for Canadian companies,' while also 'not having our hands tied in terms of our dealings with the rest of the world.'
Trump and Carney met earlier in June on the sidelines of the G7 Summit hosted by Canada, where G7 leaders urged the US president to de-escalate trade tensions with key partners.
Dozens of countries are watching the July 9 deadline, when Trump's newly approved additional tariffs are set to take effect, on top of the current 10% duty, unless new deals are reached beforehand.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Roya News
2 hours ago
- Roya News
Syria-'Israel' talks hint at limited security deal, not peace: Sources
Senior 'Israeli' cabinet officials believe that normalization between 'Israel' and Saudi Arabia is currently unlikely. According to a report by Ynet on Monday, while Saudi normalization is off the table, talks with Syria are quietly progressing, not toward a peace deal, but rather a limited security arrangement. The report noted that Saudi Arabia remains uninterested in joining the Abraham Accords or offering support for a Palestinian state as long as the war in Gaza continues. Moreover, 'Israel's' standing in the eyes of Riyadh has diminished significantly, and the 'Israelis' no longer see Saudis as essential to advancing their interests. Despite this, in a Fox News interview, US President Donald Trump claimed that 'additional countries have recently applied' to join the Abraham Accords, stating: 'We have great countries in the Abraham Accords, and I think we'll start adding more.' When asked whether Syria could join, Trump replied: 'I don't know. I lifted the sanctions on them—that's significant.' At a joint press conference with Austrian Foreign Minister Beata Meinl-Reisinger, 'Israeli' Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar also addressed expanding the Accords. He stated that 'Israel is interested in expanding the circle' and mentioned Syria and Lebanon as neighbors with whom Israel has long-term security interests. He added: 'Israel applied its laws to the Golan Heights over 40 years ago, and in any peace agreement, the Golan will remain an inseparable part of the State of Israel.' Syria: Not a peace agreement, maybe a security arrangement Unlike Saudi Arabia, Syria is emerging as a potential candidate for a limited arrangement with 'Israel'. Sources say this would not be a peace agreement or diplomatic normalization but rather a quiet security deal. According to the sources, there's an alignment of interests between Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, who is seeking foreign investment and sanction relief, and 'Israel', which wants stability on its northern front. 'Anyone imagining they'll be eating hummus in Damascus anytime soon is dreaming,' one source said. The proposed deal may include mutual security guarantees, anti-terror cooperation, and measures to prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria, particularly near the Golan Heights. No sovereignty changes in the Golan would be on the table. The talks appear to be grounded in the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, which has mostly held since the Yom Kippur War and may be updated to reflect today's challenges. When asked about new candidates for normalization, 'Israeli' officials listed Indonesia as a top prospect, but only if the Gaza war ends. In Africa, developments may emerge with Niger, Mali, or Djibouti. Azerbaijan is also deepening its already strong strategic ties with 'Israel'.
Ammon
3 hours ago
- Ammon
From missiles to deals
Whatever the definition of victory or defeat in the recent Iranian-Israeli war may be, the fact remains that Iranian influence has significantly faded over the past two years in Syria, Lebanon, and even Iraq. The latest developments are expected to deepen internal debate in these countries, with growing division over Tehran's role. More significantly, the regime of "Wilayat al-Faqih" will face fundamental questions about political legitimacy, and internal political and social fragmentation is likely to become more entrenched. In sum, Iran will likely cease to be a key regional actor in the coming phase, as it once was over the past two decades. On the other side, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will attempt to translate these wars and military operations into "political gains," both regionally and domestically. However, his agenda clashes with U.S. President Donald Trump for the next phase. According to credible and realistic leaks reported in Israeli media, active backchannel negotiations are underway to end the war in Gaza, resolve remaining issues, and reach a permanent ceasefire, including the release of prisoners in exchange for a temporary administrative commission to govern Gaza with the presence of Arab forces to ensure security and stability. Regionally, the political "cash-out" that both Trump and Netanyahu seek is to link the end of the Gaza war with the broader Saudi-Israeli normalization project. This would pave the way for wider Arab-Islamic normalization with Israel and its full integration into the region. Yet that grand prize is contingent, from the Saudi perspective, on the establishment of a Palestinian state—something Netanyahu vehemently opposes. For him, such a step would fracture his right-wing coalition. Should he agree, the alliance would likely collapse. Trump's reported insistence on shielding Netanyahu from prosecution could be a lifeline for the Israeli PM, enabling him to recalculate his political alliances and find new partners more aligned with advancing normalization, while softening Israeli resistance to the Palestinian state and even the Palestinian Authority itself. Israel's current political setup is not ideal for advancing regional normalization, true. But what would a Palestinian state even look like? Where would its borders be? What about the fate of Jerusalem? These are unresolved, difficult, and complex questions. No Palestinian leader dares to concede on these issues—particularly the demand for East Jerusalem as the capital. Meanwhile, would Saudi Arabia be willing to proceed with normalization without clear, specific, and time-bound commitments to establishing a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders? That scenario is not a viable option for the Israeli leadership—not Netanyahu, nor Yair Lapid, Naftali Bennett, or others. So what is the "magic formula" that would make the Saudi demand acceptable or achievable? Will the term 'state' be rebranded or watered down? Or will it be mentioned only with delayed implementation? Leaks suggest Trump may grant Israel control over portions of the West Bank in exchange for agreement on a Palestinian state—conditional on reforming the Palestinian Authority (with "reform" being a loaded and ambiguous concept). Trump is pushing hard for a new Middle Eastern order, one in which Israel is fully embedded, along with Saudi Arabia and other regional states. Even Syria could potentially be part of this, despite its unresolved dispute with Israel over the Golan Heights. What price would be acceptable for normalization in that case? Can historical impasses be temporarily bypassed to push this new vision forward? Will Trump succeed in imposing his terms and vision on all parties after the Iranian-Israeli war? Many questions remain unanswered—but what is certain is that the coming phase will be crucial in reshaping the Middle East and redefining regional politics.
Ammon
3 hours ago
- Ammon
Post-War pressure: Iran faces a new phase of internal confrontation
The 12-day war between Israel and Iran came to a halt without any written agreements or clear outlines for ending hostilities. While there were objective circumstances that forced both sides to stop the fighting—most notably the intervention of U.S. President Donald Trump—the manner in which the war ended clearly suggests that Israel has now added the Iranian front to its list of open arenas in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, where it reserves the right to strike whenever it deems necessary. This is reflected in the statements made by Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz, who outlined a permanent plan to counter Iranian threats. This means that Israel has no intention of abandoning its strategy of dominating Iranian airspace or conducting ground operations, especially after the exposure of the extent of Israeli intelligence penetration into Iran. In practice, the war has ushered in a broader Iranian withdrawal from the areas surrounding Israel. Israel has managed to isolate the bordering fronts, dismantle the capabilities of affiliated groups, and contain the immediate threat posed by Iran. However, with the battlefield shifting into Iranian territory itself, it is fair to say that the corridor between Beirut and Tehran has effectively been severed. This also explains the immediate resumption of Israeli strikes against Hezbollah on the Lebanese front as soon as the fighting with Iran paused—a consistent Israeli approach throughout this conflict: reverting to other active fronts whenever one front is de-escalated. Now that direct hostilities with Iran have stopped, Tehran faces an uncomfortable reality: internal confrontation. Israel's apparent goal is to redirect Iran's focus inward, pushing it to grapple with its domestic crises, thereby accelerating its strategic withdrawal. Iran, which long sought to transfer the crisis into Israel, now finds itself confronting a multifaceted internal battle that spans political, security, economic, and social fronts. Politically, the crisis is becoming more evident with the absence of a clear strategy around the current impasse or return to the negotiating table. The scale of concessions Iran might need to make highlights a deep internal dilemma that may not be resolved without sweeping reforms to the structure of political representation. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's recent speech underscored the severity of this crisis. Directed only at one domestic faction 'the hardliners', it sought to boost morale and frame the outcome as a 'victory,' yet it also revealed just how detached this faction has become from reality—evident in inflated claims such as the destruction of Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar, among others. Such statements triggered a harsh and humiliating response from President Trump, who reminded Khamenei that he was the one who prevented his assassination. Trump also reaffirmed that sanctions on Iran would remain in place, effectively shutting the door to any immediate diplomatic resolution and deepening the country's internal crisis. Even the European position—once supportive of reviving the nuclear deal or a similar framework—has become far more cautious. The stance of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) toward Iran's nuclear program could lay the groundwork for a more forceful international consensus, making Iran's exit from the current crisis much more complicated and contingent on fundamental internal changes. With no prospect for lifting sanctions or resuming negotiations, pressure on Iran's regime is reaching unprecedented levels. Exiting a war of this magnitude—one that targeted the regime's core institutions—requires broad internal consensus and a clear economic breakthrough, neither of which seems likely at this point. This raises the possibility of large-scale domestic unrest, potentially of a nature and scale that the regime has not previously faced and may struggle to contain. It is now evident that the crisis has shifted firmly into Iranian territory. The war that erupted on Iranian soil is just one facet of this transformation. Yet the bigger challenge that remains is Iran's ability to navigate its internal landscape and move toward viable international understandings that ease tensions. Failing that, the current crisis could quickly evolve into a complex political breakdown—one that the regime may find increasingly difficult to contain.
