China stocks climb on higher dividends, led by bank shares
TOSHIHIRO SATO
SHANGHAI -- Chinese stocks hit the highest level in three and a half years on Monday, lifted by anticipation of increased dividends and speculation about new measures to end a real estate downturn.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index rose for a third consecutive trading day to close at 3,519.65.
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The Diplomat
3 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China's Position on Russia and Ukraine Is a Warning to the West and the Pacific
Wang Yi's remarks confirm what many have long suspected: China's interests are best served not by stability, peace, or sovereignty, but by a prolonged conflict. The recent revelation that Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told EU leaders that Beijing does not want to see Russia lose its war in Ukraine is not just a diplomatic slip; it is a moment of clarity. Behind closed doors, China has dropped the mask of neutrality and revealed a sobering truth: it views a Russian defeat not as a moral failure or geopolitical catastrophe, but as a threat to its own strategic ambitions. This quiet admission, made to the EU's foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, cuts sharply against Beijing's carefully curated public stance. China claims it is a disinterested bystander in the Ukraine conflict. However, Wang's remarks confirm what many in global diplomatic circles have long suspected: China's interests are best served not by stability, peace, or sovereignty, but by a distracted, divided, and weakened West. To understand why, we must revisit the so-called 'no limits' partnership between China and Russia, announced just weeks before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Although not a formal military alliance, this strategic pact underscores a shared worldview. Both nations resent the dominance of liberal democracies and seek to reshape the global order in their own authoritarian image. Since the invasion, China has supported Russia's economy through trade, provided diplomatic cover in international forums, and participated in joint military exercises. At the same time, it continues to claim neutrality, masking its support for Russia behind the guise of plausible deniability. Wang's frank admission reveals the deeper logic behind this alignment. If Russia collapses in Ukraine, the United States and its allies will be free to pivot fully toward the Indo-Pacific and focus on deterring China's growing assertiveness, especially regarding Taiwan. In this strategic calculation, the prolongation of war, and the suffering it causes, is considered an acceptable cost if it keeps the West overextended. This is a profoundly cynical and destabilizing position. It confirms that, in the eyes of China's leadership, values such as territorial integrity, international law, and the protection of civilians are expendable. It also exposes a chilling willingness to allow or even encourage ongoing conflict if doing so creates space for China to advance its own interests. As an alumna of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), I have worked alongside legislators from democracies large and small who see this moment for what it truly is: a test. China is not simply observing how the West responds to Russia's invasion. It is studying our unity, our resilience, and our tolerance for risk. The outcome in Ukraine will directly influence Beijing's decisions regarding Taiwan and its broader conduct across the Indo-Pacific. In the Pacific, this challenge is no longer hypothetical. It is unfolding in real time. Through cyber influence operations and debt-leveraged infrastructure projects with potential military uses, Beijing is actively reshaping the region's strategic landscape. For small island developing states, whose survival depends on the integrity of international law and multilateral institutions, any erosion of those norms poses a direct threat to sovereignty and self-determination. This is why continued support for Ukraine is not solely about defending the right of a European nation to exist. It is about upholding a global order that protects all nations, especially those that are small and vulnerable. If Ukraine is forced into a territorial compromise, or if the West retreats under pressure, it will send a dangerous message to authoritarian powers everywhere: that aggression is effective, that might makes right, and that democracies lack the resolve for prolonged resistance. China's leaders are betting on that retreat. Wang Yi's comments were not an error in diplomacy. They were an intentional signal. It is now the responsibility of all of us, from Brussels to the Blue Pacific, to respond with unity, determination, and an unshakeable commitment to the values that have preserved peace for generations. If we fail to meet this moment, the next confrontation may arrive much closer to home.
Japan Today
3 hours ago
- Japan Today
Hokkaido town residents gird for battle against 'China Village'
The town of Kutchan, located about two hours southwest of Sapporo City, lies at the foot of 1,898 meter-high Mount Yotei. Known as the "Ezo Fuji" (Fuji of Hokkaido) because of its resemblance to Mount Fuji, the mountain is cherished for its scenic beauty. At the foothills of the mountain are cultivated fields and livestock farms. Also close by is a Japan Ground Self-Defense Force garrison. But as Shukan Bunshun (July 17) reports, this pastoral part of Japan's northern island appears to have been targeted by Chinese developers. "In early June, it was discovered that 3.9 hectares of trees had been cut down at the foot of Mount Yotei, in violation of the Forestry Act, without obtaining forest development permission," a local government official tells the magazine."Buildings have also begun to be constructed at the site. This has raised such commotion that it's been getting almost daily coverage on local TV. The prefectural and town governments have been moved to take action." Upon investigation, Shukan Bunshun has learned that a consortium of Chinese businesses has drawn up plans to erect a "China Village" over an expansive area at the foot of the mountain. Details of the plans are outlined in a presentation consisting of 16 slides, a copy of which the reporter obtained. Titled "Kutchan Town New Life Project," it proclaims that by "transforming the area into a village" by 2035, "a total lifestyle will be realized," which by then will include a hotel, condominiums, public open spaces, a supermarket and so on. A town official familiar with the situation told the magazine, "This development is aimed at Chinese people. They've already started running ads on Chinese websites to promote sales of vacation homes. The development is headed by company J, a real estate outfit based in Sapporo whose president is from China." Another town official also acknowledged that the company has been quietly buying up land in the area. Upon investigating the logging site and the land nearby, Shukan Bunshun found that between 2019 and 2025, the company had successively acquired at least 60 hectares of land, an area equivalent to 13 Tokyo Domes (the Yomiuri Giants' home stadium at Korakuen, Tokyo). Furthermore, some parcels of land have reportedly been resold to people with addresses in China or to Chinese companies. The developers are also believed to have an eye on the local water resources. "The water resources are located close to a distillation plant," says a source familiar with the project plans. "I can see them tapping into it and exporting bottled water to China and other countries." At the very least, Shukan Bunshun writes, the project may be in violation of seven laws or ordinances concerned with logging, building standards, urban planning, landscaping, soil pollution and protection of water resources. It is uncertain at this point what sort of action, if any, the Hokkaido prefectural government intends to take. Company J's Chinese president has been lying low, and the reporter's efforts to reach him for a comment, via his real estate offices or social media, were unsuccessful. Office staff advised the reporter to inquire through the company's attorney, who initially replied by sending a copy of the company's press release, but made no subsequent reply. "Although Mount Yotei is on privately owned land, no one has touched it," a local farmer was quoted as saying. "That's because, like Mount Fuji, it offered a view that many people could enjoy. I can understand developing it, say, to create a relaxing hot spring for use by the local townspeople. But it looks like it's going to be turned into a place for wealthy Chinese. What's more, construction work was done without obtaining permission, and is chock full of the most frightening thing of all is that it might raise the possibility of floods. "What is it that I want?" he asks rhetorically. "Just to be able to grow my vegetables in peace." © Japan Today
The Diplomat
4 hours ago
- The Diplomat
China's H1 Economic Data Was Encouraging, But It's Not Out of the Woods Yet
China's economic growth rate peaked in 2007 when it hit a jaw-dropped 14.1 percent; it has been declining since then. The decline was accelerated by Xi Jinping's crackdown on the real estate sector through his 'three red lines' policies, then by the COVID-19 pandemic. Now China's annual economic growth has stagnated at around 5 percent, according to official data, and many outside experts think the real total is even lower. China just published its economic data for the first half of 2025, indicating a better-than-expected growth rate. According to the latest data, China's GDP growth rate through the first six months of 2025 was 5.3 percent, better than the annual target of 5 percent. Despite this, the structural challenges remain solid. Internal factors – like the growing disparity between rural and urban areas and rising youth unemployment – are combining with the ongoing trade war with the United States and geopolitical crises in Ukraine and the Middle East to pose a serious geoeconomic challenge for the party-state. First, the good news for China: the trade war with the United States has not dampened either its exports or its manufacturing output (yet). On April 2, Donald Trump's administration in the United States imposed double-digit tariff rates on almost every country in the world, including China — though it quickly delayed the largest increases for a 90-day review period. The 'Liberation Day' announcement, as Trump called it, forced Beijing not just to retaliate, but to speed up the process of diversifying its economy from the United States. To that end, China's policymakers have two twin goals: expanding exports to other parts of the world while also focusing on boosting household consumption, which remains stuck at around 40 percent, far lower than the OECD average of 60 percent. Amid Trump's renewed trade war, Chinese policymakers doubled down on export diversification. Trade with ASEAN (15.9 percent of China's total trade) and key European economies (12.6 percent) expanded significantly. Amid those efforts, despite the U.S. tariffs, China notched a trade surplus of $586 billion in the first half of 2025, larger than the same period in 2024. That surplus is equivalent to more than 6 percent of China's GDP, the highest recorded rate since 2013. Despite the trade friction between the two superpowers, China's exports to the U.S. stabilized in the second quarter of 2025 due to temporary tariff reprieves and partial agreements brokered during high-level meetings in Geneva and London. These diplomatic efforts injected a degree of predictability into the trade environment. However, the broader strategic shift remains intact: Beijing is decoupling in economic relations and trying to reduce its structural dependency on the U.S. market in favor of a more geopolitically diverse portfolio. China remains the world's manufacturing powerhouse. Its industrial production rose by 6.8 percent in June, beating the forecast of 5.6 percent. Chinese factories have diversified supply chain opportunities in markets other than the United States, which is a significant factor in resiliency of industrial production. Despite these external opportunities, China still faces serious structural domestic economic challenges. Household consumption has remained stagnant for two decades at around 35-40 percent, coupled with exceptionally high saving rates. In addition, the youth and skilled unemployment rates have touched 15 percent, according to official data. While exports provide crucial support to the economy, China's leadership is aware of and indeed often acknowledges these domestic challenges. Beijing has implemented targeted fiscal measures to stimulate consumer spending and shift away from investment-heavy growth. National and provincial subsidy programs sought to expand domestic household consumption. Borrowed from the post-Global Financial Crisis 'cash-for-clunkers' program, China expanded this program to incentivize consumers to replace outdated products – including automobiles, electronics, home appliances, and more – with environmentally friendly alternatives. From January to May 2025, subsidies supported the purchase of over 77 million household appliances, 56 million electronic devices, and 6.5 million electric bikes. More than 57 million home decor items also received support. Consequently, retail data showed a 6.4 percent year-on-year rise in May, surpassing expectations. However, the impact was short-lived; growth slowed to 4.8 percent in June, falling short of the projected 5.3 percent. The factors behind this decline can be the earlier-than-usual online shopping promotions in May and administrative disruptions to the subsidy rollout in June. Still, despite the recent decline, Beijing's policies of combining fiscal stimulus with green development goals have led to a moderate upward trend in consumption. The real estate sector is more problematic. The property sector, which has long been the backbone of local economies in China, is facing more severe regulatory challenges. Many urban Chinese had invested their savings in real estate (more than 70 percent of household wealth), and with the regulatory crackdown and ensuing downturn, they lost their initial value. Meanwhile, according to the latest data, new-home prices in 70 major cities in June fell by 0.27 percent compared to May, marking the steepest decline in eight months. Second-hand home prices experienced an even more pronounced drop of 0.61 percent, their most significant monthly decline since September. The increasing number of cities reporting falling prices suggests that the weakness in China's real estate sector is not abating but spreading. The downturn is exacerbated by the declining real wages of urban middle classes and a rising gap between the rich and the poor. The poor and middle classes cannot afford real estate in China due to rising prices. The real estate sector presents two interconnected challenges. First, the downturn reduces consumer confidence, particularly among lower-middle and upper-middle class households, who rely on property as a significant source of wealth. Second, it undermines local government revenues, which are heavily dependent on land sales. This could reduce future fiscal policy options. China's economic performance in the first half of 2025 was encouraging, as expanded export growth and a domestic stimulus program helped tackle external shocks and internal deceleration. However, short-term resilience does not guarantee long-term transformation. Despite China's trade diversification ambitions, internal pressures like stagnant consumption, falling property prices, and a low consumption-to-GDP ratio persist. While the economy has remained stable in 2025, sustained momentum will require systemic reforms to boost household incomes, expand public services, and enhance labor mobility. Beijing's leadership recognizes the structural challenges, but policy solutions remain uneven. China's test lies in embracing a proactive, reform-driven approach to economic rebalancing. Its success will determine China's economic growth in the second half of 2020 and shape the global economy.
