Iran hangs man convicted of killing seven at 2022 protest
Abbas Kurkuri was sentenced to death over a shooting in the city of Izeh during a protest sparked by the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurd detained for an alleged breach of Iran's strict dress code for women.
The judgement handed down by the Revolutionary Court in Ahvaz, capital of the southwestern province of Khuzestan, was upheld by the Supreme Court and the sentence was carried out by hanging, the judiciary's Mizan Online news website said.
The court convicted Kurkuri of the capital offences of 'corruption on earth' and 'moharebeh' -- waging war against God.
It found him guilty of 'brandishing a weapon with intent to kill and terrorize the public,' and 'committing crimes by firing a military weapon and forming and joining a rebel group.'
He was accused of opening fire with a military weapon in Izeh in an attack that left seven people dead, including 10-year-old Kian Pirfalak. Officials described the shooting as a 'terrorist attack.'
At trial, Kurkuri confessed to the charges and said he had been 'under the influence of social media,' Mizan said.
The report described him as a 'notorious offender' with a record of 'disrupting public order through shootings, armed assault, destruction of property, and trafficking in drugs and alcohol.'
Hundreds of people were killed during the 2022 protests, including members of the security forces. Thousands more were arrested.
Iran has since tried and executed several people detained during the protests.
Kurkuri's execution comes a day after Iran hanged nine men convicted of plotting to carry out attacks in 2018 on behalf of ISIS.
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