Bad news for Israel, US as Iran plans to buy J-10C fighter jets from..., can challenge...
Israel has destroyed Iran's decades-old air force in a 12-day war and Iranian fighter jets have been selectively destroyed. Iran's air defense system and radar systems have been destroyed. Israel has completely destroyed Iran's very weak radar units.
After the devastating war with Israel, Iran is considering taking help from China. Iran's Su-35 deal with Russia has already failed, in such a situation Iran has no other option except China. In such a situation, Iran is moving rapidly towards buying J-10C fighter jets from China. Through this deal, Iran is not only trying to strengthen its air force, but if this deal happens then it will be a big geo-political signal and this will rapidly increase China's threat in the Persian Gulf.
On whom is Iran backing?
Iran has turned to China to modernise its dilapidated air force fleet in view of regional tensions, according to a report in Iran's Khorasan newspaper. The paper reported that the Iranian Air Force is desperate and in dire need of Chinese help. Iran's air force, officially known as the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF), does not have operational power. According to the Military Balance 2025 published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran's air force had about 150 fighter jets before the recent conflict, but most of them are relics of a bygone era.
Iran will modernise its air force
Iran's air force is still dependent on US-origin 1970s aircraft. 64 F-4 Phantom II, 35 F-5 Tiger II, and 41 F-14A Tomcats are its backbone. Many of these aircraft are not even in flying condition. Iran also has some Mi-29s that came in the 1980s, but these too have become useless due to acute shortage of spare parts and technical support. In the war that started on 13 June 2025, Iran admitted that 30% of its air force has become inactive. Apart from this, indigenous surface-to-air missile systems like Bavar-373 completely failed in front of Israel's electronic warfare and stealth capabilities.
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