Quad concludes logistics sharing exercise
The exercise took place from April 28 to May 2 at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii, it was revealed on Thursday.
The partner countries gathered 'for a Tabletop Exercise, a simulation to launch the Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network (IPLN). IPLN is an initiative that enables Quad partners to leverage shared logistics capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to support civilian response to natural disasters more rapidly and efficiently across the region,' the US state department said.
'Together with the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the IPLN reflects the Quad's commitment to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific and highlights the value of strengthening practical cooperation to address regional challenges,' it added.
The four countries have a broadening canvass of cooperation from medicines and climate to education and research, with complete buy-in from their governments, irrespective of the parties in power.
The group was founded in the aftermath of the 2004 Tsunami to pool resources and effort to provide humanitarian relief during such global disasters. It fell apart in 2008 after Australia exited under pressure from China.
The Quadrilateral Security Conference, as Quad was formally called, was resurrected in 2017 with the unstated purpose of countering China's aggressive rise in the Indo-Pacific region, marked by its pursuit of unilateral maritime and littoral claims.
'A free and open Indo-Pacific', as used by the State Department, is a phrase that underscores the Quad's goal of keeping the region free and open from China's influence without stating it so explicitly. The security aspect of the group's work has been played down, however, by the partner countries in recent years and their officials have forcefully pushed back against any attempt to call it a security grouping.
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