Famed pilot's plane ‘porpoised,' rolled before fatal crash at Langley Air Force Base
As Holland's custom built, single-seat MX Aircraft MXS approached, it leveled off about 50 feet above the runway, then flew straight down the runway for several hundred feet, the report said. The airplane then 'porpoised,' pitched straight up, and rolled 90 degrees to the left before crashing into a grassy ditch about 100 feet from the runway.
A porpoise landing is a bounced landing that, if not recovered by the pilot, results in a plane touching down nose first. If not corrected, the plane will go into a series of nose ups and nose downs, like a real porpoise leaping in and out of the water. The 5-page report said Holland's plane porpoised twice.
The 50-year-old national aerobatic champion was flying to Joint-Base Langley-Eustis on April 24 to prepare for his performance in the base's Air Power Over Hampton Roads air show in a couple of days. Holland flew to the base from Smyrna Airport in Smyrna, Tennessee, according to the NTSB. The crash at Langley occurred about 11:35 a.m.
NTSB preliminary accident investigation reports focus on factual information gathered at the scene, and are issued about one to two weeks after the accident. Preliminary reports don't provide a determination of probable cause of an accident. That information is included in the final report, which can take a year or more to complete.
The preliminary report in Holland's case said he worked with the manufacturer of his aircraft to modify it to his specifications. All the plane's major components were accounted for at the site, the report said, and its most recent condition inspection was completed March 3.
Jane Harper, jane.harper@pilotonline.com
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
New York Times
16 hours ago
- New York Times
Tensions Flare Between Two Federal Agencies Charged With Aviation Safety
The relationship between the National Transportation Safety Board, the government entity that investigates civilian airplane accidents, and the Federal Aviation Administration, the agency responsible for aviation safety, can frequently be contentious, especially after a major national tragedy. Last week, a rift between those two main regulators of aviation safety spilled out into public view. Frustrations — and sometimes tempers — flared in uncommonly raw fashion during the board's marathon of investigative hearings into the deadly midair crash between a military helicopter and a commercial jet near Ronald Reagan National Airport in January. Board members grilled witnesses, including air traffic controllers and F.A.A. managers, over three days and 30 hours of public testimony. Jennifer Homendy, the N.T.S.B. chair, led other board members in accusing the F.A.A. of knowingly stymieing efforts to improve safety at Reagan National Airport and stonewalling parts of the board's investigation into the crash. And Ms. Homendy directly accused the agency of fostering a culture among the air traffic control operation that discouraged employees from raising legitimate safety concerns, including by wielding the threat of retaliation. 'There is and always has been a healthy tension between the two agencies,' said Jeff Guzzetti, a former accident investigator for the F.A.A. and the N.T.S.B. And while the level of public outrage on display during board hearings depends largely on the proclivities of its members, he added, 'in this particular case, it's a shift.' Ms. Homendy and the other board members were careful not to direct their ire toward Sean Duffy, the transportation secretary, or Bryan Bedford, the F.A.A. administrator. Still, the very public airing of grievances raised questions about the working relationship between the two agencies at a critical juncture. The N.T.S.B. makes safety recommendations, but it is up to the F.A.A. to put them into place. The crash at Reagan National Airport, and a series of near misses and tower outages at major airports in the months since, have dampened public confidence in the safety of flying, intensifying the need for cooperation. 'Warning signs were ignored, or just not known or identified or sought, which is quite tragic,' Ms. Homendy told reporters late Wednesday, after the first day of testimony. In a statement, the F.A.A. said officials 'have and will continue to fully support the N.T.S.B.'s investigation,' stressing that the agency had been proactive about addressing concerns and adopting the board's early recommendations. The statement added that 'if there has been any stonewalling, withholding of information or intimidation — those actions will be identified and remedied without hesitation.' The gloves had already begun to come off in the final hours of the hearing on Wednesday. Ms. Homendy lost her patience with F.A.A. managers who claimed they never knew that air traffic officials from Reagan National Airport had urged higher-ups to address the potential risks posed by a helicopter route, known as Route 4, that crossed under the descent path for airplanes landing on a supplementary runway, No. 33. The Army Black Hawk that crashed into the commercial jet on Jan. 29 was flying along Route 4, and at the time of impact, was 78 feet higher than the F.A.A.-mandated ceiling of 200 feet. A number of witnesses testified that the devices pilots relied upon to measure their altitude frequently were off by about 100 feet of helicopters' actual flying height. Air traffic controllers, knowing the risks, sought to make changes as part of a helicopter-focused working group at the airport — but were told by district managers that doing so would be seen as 'too political,' according to the transcript of an interview included in an N.T.S.B. report. 'Every sign was there that there was a safety risk, and the tower was telling you that,' Ms. Homendy told F.A.A. officials. She accused agency managers of routinely dismissing safety concerns raised by employees in the airport's air traffic control tower and of reassigning people who had previously voiced concerns after the accident. She also said they used F.A.A. bureaucracy as an excuse to avoid making needed changes. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead,' she said, denouncing the F.A.A.'s process for reviewing safety recommendations. 'Fix it. Do better,' she added. By the last day of the hearings, Ms. Homendy was accusing F.A.A. officials outright of trying to stymie the N.T.S.B.'s investigation by withholding documents and data the board had been requesting for months. 'I think you're interfering in the investigation,' she charged, 'because you're basically telling us 'no' every way you can.' Aviation safety experts said it was understandable for tensions to run unusually high after the collision because of the magnitude and rarity of the tragedy — it was the first fatal crash involving a major American airline in over 15 years. But part of the N.T.S.B.'s visible agitation in the hearings could also be strategic, those experts said. The fact that the crash happened just outside the nation's capital — along with the fact that power brokers from the Trump administration and Congress are eager to respond — has created a unique opportunity for the board to influence sweeping changes. 'The intensity has increased partly because of the visibility of this particular catastrophe and the proximity to Washington,' said Alan Diehl, a former aviation safety official with the N.T.S.B. and the F.A.A. 'By doing that, the N.T.S.B. hopes to convince both the F.A.A. and Congress that we need a revolution,' he added, 'in both personnel policies within the F.A.A. as well as the funding policies.' Ms. Homendy, who spent more than 14 years on Capitol Hill before President Trump nominated her to fill one of the Democratic slots on the board, has a keen understanding of Washington dynamics, according to board watchers. She is known for being more public-facing and, at times, being more comfortable adopting an adversarial posture than some of her predecessors. But she was not alone last week in being pointedly critical of the F.A.A. J. Todd Inman, a Republican member of the N.T.S.B, also accused the agency of stonewalling the investigation. The F.A.A. withheld documents about staffing at the control tower for months, he charged, dumping thousands of pages on the board on the Friday before the hearing, only after Ms. Homendy appealed to agency and Transportation Department leaders for help. At another point, Mr. Inman lost his patience with officials' promises to do better. 'We'd like to be treated privately the same way we are publicly,' he said. Mr. Inman also accused the F.A.A. of refusing to share critical data about real-time flight tracking technology, forcing the safety board to spend $50,000 annually to evaluate it 'because the F.A.A. does not consider N.T.S.B. a trusted government partner.' F.A.A. officials in the hot seat frequently defended their agency. Nick Fuller, the F.A.A.'s acting deputy chief operations officer, responded to allegations that the agency had withheld documents and data by arguing that some of the board's requests had been unclear, and that 'in fact, we just gave you the latest and greatest' information. Mr. Fuller also pushed back on accusations from all three presiding board members that after the Jan. 29 accident, the F.A.A. had removed managers at Reagan National's control tower who had previously raised concerns about traffic, staffing or other safety pitfalls. He argued that staffing changes had not been retaliatory, but rather executed in the interest of solving the problem quickly. 'I was given a task to fix the facility risk between helicopters and fixed wing,' Mr. Fuller said, referring to airplanes, 'and it wasn't to work through a collaborative process and allow a few months — it was to get the job done immediately.' On several occasions during the hearings, Ms. Homendy sought assurances that F.A.A. employees who were called as witnesses in the investigation would not be retaliated against for their testimony — a step prompted by reports that some who had critical things to say were being harassed, she told reporters on Thursday after that day's testimony. 'Nobody can take what is clearly a safety issue and get it up through the offices that should be making the decision to ensure safety in the airspace — or somebody's ignoring them,' she told reporters. 'You raise a red flag, and two things happen: You don't get it, you don't get the safety change that you have asked for, or you're transferred out after an accident occurs.' But experts warned against assuming that the acrimony of the hearing would disrupt the two agencies' expert staff members from being able to work together. 'Overall, the process is healthy,' said John Cox, a former airline pilot who runs a safety consulting firm. 'Is there friction? Yes. Is it normal? Yes. Was last week a little more so than normal? Yes,' he added. 'Will that encourage F.A.A. to move more quickly? I hope.'
3 days ago
Broken altimeter, ignored warnings: Hearings reveal what went wrong in DC crash that killed 67
Over three days of sometimes contentious hearings this week, the National Transportation Safety Board interrogated Federal Aviation Administration and Army officials about a list of things that went wrong and contributed to a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet colliding over Washington, D.C., killing 67 people. The biggest revelations: The helicopter's altimeter gauge was broken, and controllers warned the FAA years earlier about the dangers that helicopters presented. At one point NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy scolded the FAA for not addressing safety concerns. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?' she said. 'Fix it. Do better.' Victims of the January crash included a group of elite young figure skaters, their parents and coaches and four union steamfitters from the Washington area. Here is a look at the major takeaways from the hearings about the collision, which alarmed travelers before a string of other crashes and close calls this year added to their worries about flying: The helicopter was flying at 278 feet (85 meters) — well above the 200-foot (61-meter) ceiling on that route — when it collided with the airliner. But investigators said the pilots might not have realized that because the barometric altimeter they were relying on was reading 80 to 100 feet (24 to 30 meters) lower than the altitude registered by the flight data recorder. The NTSB subsequently found similar discrepancies in the altimeters of three other helicopters from the same unit. An expert with Sikorsky, which makes the Black Hawks, said the one that crashed was an older model that lacked the air data computers that make for more accurate altitude readings in newer versions. Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the board that an 80- to 100-foot (24- to 30-meter) discrepancy between the different altimeters on a helicopter would not be alarming, because at lower altitudes she would be relying more on the radar altimeter than the barometric altimeter. Plus Army pilots strive to stay within 100 feet (30 meters) of target altitude on flights, so they could still do that even with their altimeters that far off. But Rick Dressler of medevac operator Metro Aviation told the NTSB that imprecision would not fly with his helicopters. When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. The NTSB's final report will be done next year, but there likely will not be one single cause identified for the crash. 'I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident,' aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti said. Army officials said the greater concern is that the FAA approved routes around Ronald Reagan International Airport with separation distances as small as 75 feet (23 meters) between helicopters and planes when planes are landing on a certain runway at Reagan. 'The fact that we have less than 500-foot separation is a concern for me,' said Scott Rosengren, chief engineer in the office that manages the Army's utility helicopters. Army Chief Warrant Officer David Van Vechten said he was surprised the air traffic controller let the helicopter proceed while the airliner was circling to land at Reagan's secondary runway, which is used when traffic for the main runway stacks up and accounts for about 5% of flights. Van Vechten said he was never allowed to fly under a landing plane as the Black Hawk did, but only a handful of the hundreds of times he flew that route involved planes landing on that runway. Other pilots in the unit told crash investigators it was routine to be directed to fly under landing planes, and they believed that was safe if they stuck to the approved route. Frank McIntosh, the head of the FAA's air traffic control organization, said he thinks controllers at Reagan 'were really dependent upon the use of visual separation' to keep traffic moving through the busy airspace. The NTSB said controllers repeatedly said they would just 'make it work.' They sometimes used 'squeeze plays' to land planes with minimal separation. On the night of the crash, a controller twice asked the helicopter pilots whether they had the jet in sight, and the pilots said they did and asked for visual separation approval so they could use their own eyes to maintain distance. Testimony at the hearing raised serious questions about how well the crew could spot the plane while wearing night vision goggles and whether the pilots were even looking in the right spot. The controller acknowledged in an interview that the plane's pilots were never warned when the helicopter was on a collision path, but controllers did not think telling the plane would have made a difference at that point. The plane was descending to land and tried to pull up at the last second after getting a warning in the cockpit, but it was too late. An FAA working group tried to get a warning added to helicopter charts back in 2022 urging pilots to use caution whenever the secondary runway was in use, but the agency refused. The working group said 'helicopter operations are occurring in a proximity that has triggered safety events. These events have been trending in the wrong direction and increasing year over year.' Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said 'every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.' But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. 'What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,' Homendy said. 'But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.''
Yahoo
3 days ago
- Yahoo
Broken altimeter, ignored warnings: Hearings reveal what went wrong in DC crash that killed 67
APTOPIX Aircraft Down Investigation Over three days of sometimes contentious hearings this week, the National Transportation Safety Board interrogated Federal Aviation Administration and Army officials about a list of things that went wrong and contributed to a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet colliding over Washington, D.C., killing 67 people. The biggest revelations: The helicopter's altimeter gauge was broken, and controllers warned the FAA years earlier about the dangers that helicopters presented. At one point NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy scolded the FAA for not addressing safety concerns. 'Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?' she said. 'Fix it. Do better.' Victims of the January crash included a group of elite young figure skaters, their parents and coaches and four union steamfitters from the Washington area. Here is a look at the major takeaways from the hearings about the collision, which alarmed travelers before a string of other crashes and close calls this year added to their worries about flying: The helicopter's altimeter was wrong The helicopter was flying at 278 feet (85 meters) — well above the 200-foot (61-meter) ceiling on that route — when it collided with the airliner. But investigators said the pilots might not have realized that because the barometric altimeter they were relying on was reading 80 to 100 feet (24 to 30 meters) lower than the altitude registered by the flight data recorder. The NTSB subsequently found similar discrepancies in the altimeters of three other helicopters from the same unit. An expert with Sikorsky, which makes the Black Hawks, said the one that crashed was an older model that lacked the air data computers that make for more accurate altitude readings in newer versions. Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis told the board that an 80- to 100-foot (24- to 30-meter) discrepancy between the different altimeters on a helicopter would not be alarming, because at lower altitudes she would be relying more on the radar altimeter than the barometric altimeter. Plus Army pilots strive to stay within 100 feet (30 meters) of target altitude on flights, so they could still do that even with their altimeters that far off. But Rick Dressler of medevac operator Metro Aviation told the NTSB that imprecision would not fly with his helicopters. When a helicopter route like the one the Black Hawk was flying that night includes an altitude limit, Dressler said, his pilots consider that a hard ceiling. FAA and Army defend actions, shift blame Both tried to deflect responsibility for the crash, but the testimony highlighted plenty of things that might have been done differently. The NTSB's final report will be done next year, but there likely will not be one single cause identified for the crash. 'I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident,' aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti said. Army officials said the greater concern is that the FAA approved routes around Ronald Reagan International Airport with separation distances as small as 75 feet (23 meters) between helicopters and planes when planes are landing on a certain runway at Reagan. 'The fact that we have less than 500-foot separation is a concern for me,' said Scott Rosengren, chief engineer in the office that manages the Army's utility helicopters. Army Chief Warrant Officer David Van Vechten said he was surprised the air traffic controller let the helicopter proceed while the airliner was circling to land at Reagan's secondary runway, which is used when traffic for the main runway stacks up and accounts for about 5% of flights. Van Vechten said he was never allowed to fly under a landing plane as the Black Hawk did, but only a handful of the hundreds of times he flew that route involved planes landing on that runway. Other pilots in the unit told crash investigators it was routine to be directed to fly under landing planes, and they believed that was safe if they stuck to the approved route. Frank McIntosh, the head of the FAA's air traffic control organization, said he thinks controllers at Reagan 'were really dependent upon the use of visual separation' to keep traffic moving through the busy airspace. The NTSB said controllers repeatedly said they would just 'make it work.' They sometimes used 'squeeze plays' to land planes with minimal separation. On the night of the crash, a controller twice asked the helicopter pilots whether they had the jet in sight, and the pilots said they did and asked for visual separation approval so they could use their own eyes to maintain distance. Testimony at the hearing raised serious questions about how well the crew could spot the plane while wearing night vision goggles and whether the pilots were even looking in the right spot. The controller acknowledged in an interview that the plane's pilots were never warned when the helicopter was on a collision path, but controllers did not think telling the plane would have made a difference at that point. The plane was descending to land and tried to pull up at the last second after getting a warning in the cockpit, but it was too late. FAA was warned about the dangers of helicopter traffic in D.C. An FAA working group tried to get a warning added to helicopter charts back in 2022 urging pilots to use caution whenever the secondary runway was in use, but the agency refused. The working group said 'helicopter operations are occurring in a proximity that has triggered safety events. These events have been trending in the wrong direction and increasing year over year.' Separately, a different group at the airport discussed moving the helicopter route, but those discussions did not go anywhere. And a manager at a regional radar facility in the area urged the FAA in writing to reduce the number of planes taking off and landing at Reagan because of safety concerns. The NTSB has also said the FAA failed to recognize a troubling history of 85 near misses around Reagan in the three years before the collision, NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said 'every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.' But after the accident, the FAA transferred managers out of the airport instead of acknowledging that they had been warned. 'What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,' Homendy said. 'But you guys are pointing out, 'Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'' ___ Associated Press writer Leah Askarinam contributed. Solve the daily Crossword
