Hong Kong activist Lui Yuk-lin stages solo protest on Handover anniversary
Arriving at Victoria Park at around 3.45pm, the activist wore a Chinese sign reading, 'Hong Kong people are very sad.'
She chanted slogans to protest the government's imported labour schemes, which have attracted workers – mostly from mainland China – to work in the city.
'Stop importing labour. Increase employment [opportunities] for [local] workers,' she chanted in Cantonese.
Lui – known as 'Female Long Hair' for having similar political ideals to ex-lawmaker Leung Kwok-hung, himself nicknamed 'Long Hair' – also held up a clay pot. She said it symbolised how imported labour schemes were affecting the livelihoods of Hong Kong people.
Plainclothes and uniformed police officers, including those from the force's media liaison department, followed and filmed the activist as she walked through the park.
She questioned why there were so many officers watching her, saying that she was not violent and would not attack anybody.
Victoria Park was the site of a Handover celebration on Tuesday, a public holiday commemorating the former British colony's return to China.
Parts of the park were booked out by the Hong Kong Celebrations Association, which set up installations – including giant egg tarts and mini panda sculptures – for people to take pictures with.
A small exhibition displayed photos of key landmarks in Hong Kong and the years they were built. Among those highlighted were Golden Bauhinia Square in 1997, the Avenue of Stars in 2004, West Kowloon Station, which connects Hong Kong to the mainland, in 2018, and Kai Tak Stadium this year.
Lui did not set foot in those parts of the park, which were cordoned off by security checks.
Speaking under a sheltered area opposite the clothing store H&M on Paterson Street, where Lui walked after it started raining, the activist told reporters that Hongkongers were struggling to get by in the poor economy.
Many businesses, like theatres and restaurants, had been forced to shut, she said.
Lui said the government should force landlords to lower their rents by 50 per cent so that people could hold on to their jobs. Authorities should also offer retirement benefits, she added.
Monday marked five years since Beijing imposed a national security law in Hong Kong following a year of protests and unrest sparked by a controversial extradition law.
Prior to 2020, the park was the starting point of pro-democracy marches on the Handover anniversary, during which civil society groups walked from Causeway Bay to Central to call for democracy.
Dozens of groups, however, have disbanded since June 2020. On Sunday, the League of Social Democrats (LSD), a political party co-founded by Leung, announced that it would dissolve due to 'tremendous political pressure.'
The demise of the LSD makes it the third major pro-democracy party to meet its end in recent years. The Civic Party folded in March 2024, and the Democratic Party, the city's largest opposition group with a history of three decades, announced in February that it would begin steps to disband.
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S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission. The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis. Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers. Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail. US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated 'integrated deterrence,' pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies. Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools. Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces. The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning. Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world's second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario. If Seoul is serious about being a 'Global Pivotal State,' it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific. South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments. It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners. Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI's analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line. Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid. South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace. Category Likely Request Policy Considerations Diplomatic Support Public statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or others Calibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risks Intelligence and Surveillance Cooperation Enhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisis Requires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocols Cyber and Space Operations Joint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperation Institutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops center Humanitarian and Non-Combat Support Disaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military supplies High public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creep Air and Maritime Protection Securing key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missions Emphasize a posture of protection and deterrence Base Access Forward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deployment Establish conditional use principles MRO Support MRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharing pre-negotiated civilian cooperation Logistics Support Ammunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance support Develop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/Australia Redeployment of USFK Assets Redeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forces Assess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraints Forward Deployment of Strike Assets Hosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radar Risk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetime Participation in Multinational Operations Naval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operation Reduces political risk; requires legal authorization Deployment of Combat Forces Overseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systems High political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements Washington's most plausible request will be access to South Korea's bases. 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Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity. South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple 'intervene or abstain' choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive. What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability. Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is. Hanbyeol Sohn PhD ( serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.
AllAfrica
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Marcos-Duterte clash upending Philippine economy, too
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Needless to say, these dramas and others aren't leaving the Marcos administration much bandwidth to stabilize an already unbalanced economy as the international scene goes haywire. Uncertainty over US President Trump's tariffs is damaging business and consumer sentiment everywhere. The specter of war in the Middle East and intensification of the US-China trade clash are making Manila's earlier 6% to 8% target unreachable. It's since been lowered to 5% to 6.5% for 2025. Looking at the state of global affairs, the Philippines' contention that it can grow between 6% and 7% in 2026 seems beyond fanciful. Not because of the inflationary fallout from tariffs and the Iran-Israel standoff, but because of extreme distraction at home. Three years in, the Marcos presidency has been steadier and more competent than many economists feared. The son of the dictator who ran the Philippine economy into the ground from 1965 to 1986 named a group of capable technocrats to key government posts. 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In just six years, Aquino transformed the 'sick man of Asia' into an economic growth and investment star. All major credit rating companies raised Manila to investment-grade status for the very first time. To be sure, Aquino left much undone. He didn't create enough good-paying jobs. But then, reversing decades of neglect dating back to the days of dictator Ferdinand Marcos isn't a six-year job. Enter Duterte, who was elected to turbocharge Aquino's Big Bang reforms. Duterte rose to national folk hero status after two decades of running the southern city of Davao. On his watch, the city developed a reputation for efficient governance with faster growth rates and better infrastructure than the national average. The hope was that Duterte would do the same nationally, taking the economy Aquino bequeathed him to new heights. Instead, Duterte largely rested on Aquino's economic laurels. When Duterte arrived in the presidential palace on June 30, 2016, the Philippines was enjoying its fastest growth since the 1970s. It helped that, at the time, the global economy was enjoying a rare, synchronized growth spurt, one that even saw Japan producing solid growth. Rather than take the Philippine economy to a higher level of innovation and productivity, Duterte benched Manila's reform program. Where he should have empowered technocrats to curb graft, reduce bureaucracy and ensure infrastructure projects were being done sustainably, Duterte deployed legions of trigger-happy gunmen – landing Manila in the global headlines for all the wrong reasons. Duterte pivoted away from Aquino's public-private partnership model that reduced large-scale graft in infrastructure projects. By the time Duterte left, Manila's Transparency International ranking had worsened to 116th. In 2010, the Philippines ranked 134th, trailing Nigeria. When Aquino left office, Manila was 95th. The Marcos-Duterte alliance was always a precarious one. Whereas the Dutertes were close to China, Team Marcos quickly pivoted back toward the US alliance. Yet, now as the Marcos and Duterte dynasties clash, there's little bandwidth left to ensure economic reform efforts get back on track. Or, at the very least, that economic backsliding is limited. As the second half of 2025 unfolds, says Fitch Ratings analyst Krisjanis Krustins, 'domestic political uncertainty could affect investment' at a moment when 'global trade tensions will likely drag on growth, in particular indirectly through weaker global demand.' The good news, Krustins says, is that We continue to view the central bank's inflation-targeting framework and flexible exchange-rate regime as credible. Monetary financing of the fiscal deficit during the pandemic was limited and reversed more quickly than in some peers. The government's response to the commodity-price shock was measured, for example, in resisting calls for widespread fuel subsidies. The bad news is what Krustins calls 'charged domestic politics.' One saving grace is that among Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN) members, the Philippines is less dependent on exports. As economist Priyanka Kishore at Asia Decoded points out, even if US tariffs remain unchanged, 'exports will likely slow as businesses and consumers fully absorb and adjust to the higher costs imposed by tariffs.' The impact on ASEAN economies, she adds, 'will be primarily felt through four main channels: a slowdown in goods and services exports, a lull in 'China plus' investments, knock-on impact of external slowdown on domestic demand and a pick-up in Chinese trade and investment inflows into ASEAN.' The resulting disinflationary impulse, Kishore notes, 'should create space for more monetary easing. Nevertheless, ASEAN's growth in 2025 is likely to be one percentage point lower than in 2024, with Singapore and Vietnam bearing the brunt of the slowdown and Indonesia and the Philippines least impacted.' Yet the fallout from the political brawl in Manila means elected officials are less focused on spreading the benefits of Philippine growth to reduce inequality. That's marring Marcos's economic legacy. 'From then until now, poverty and hunger have remained emblems of Marcos's brand of leadership,' says Danilo Ramos, chairperson of the Peasant Movement of the Philippines. The Social Weather Stations research group reports a significant increase in hunger among self-rated poor families. The number of households experiencing involuntary hunger rose to 20% in April. At the same time, a distracted Philippine government has consumers, businesses and investors alike worried about the economy's prospects. 'Uncertainty alone can prevent foreign direct investments,' says Aris Dacanay, ASEAN economist at HSBC. 'For the Philippines, foreign direct investment is important; around 10%of capital formation is FDI-funded. When investors hold back, that weighs on overall investment activities.' At present, Dacanay notes, many Philippine firms are delaying investments in capacity expansion. Also, demand from major trading partners like the US is weakening in real time. In a note to clients, economists at ANZ Research paint an even more cautious picture. 'Private investment and exports have been hindered by a lack of productivity growth, while real wage growth has been insufficient to drive a strong rebound in household spending,' ANZ argues. Looking forward, few economies are at greater risk from the artificial intelligence revolution to come than the Philippines. Citing the International Monetary Fund's numbers, Julius Cainglet, president of labor group Federation of Free Workers,warns that 14% of the country's workforce is at risk of being replaced by AI. This is largely due to the economy's reliance on the business process outsourcing industry. It would be grand if the Marcos administration were linearly focused on these challenges. The narrative needs to be more about economic upgrades and future prosperity and less about a 'Game of Thrones' sequel playing out in Manila.
AllAfrica
16 hours ago
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Chinese pressure stresses Taiwan's democracy
Internationally, Taiwan is mostly celebrated for its success in building a liberal political system despite the persistent threat of PRC military attack. 'Taiwan's democracy Is thriving in China's shadow,' we read; 'resilient,' 'robust' and 'vibrant,' 'a triumph.' But Taiwan's political system has been in crisis since the 2024 elections. The two major parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), accuse each other of threatening Taiwan's hard-won democracy. And that strife is intensified by external danger – a foreign 'black hand,' to borrow a phrase often used by the People's Republic of China (PRC) government. In the elections last year, the independence-leaning DPP maintained the presidency, but lost control of the legislature to a pan-Blue alliance of the KMT and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP, led by former presidential candidate Ko Wen-je, who is now in detention awaiting trial for corruption). Opposition legislators proposed cutting the government's budget. This included reducing funding for defense, despite the fact that the new Trump Administration was calling on Taipei to increase defense spending to justify continued US willingness to intervene in the event of a Chinese attack against Taiwan. KMT legislators also sought to shift the system of checks and balances against the DPP-controlled executive branch in favor of the legislature, including giving the legislature new powers to investigate and prosecute government officials. The KMT argued this was necessary to prevent corrupt behavior in the government, while critics feared the legislature would use these new powers to retaliate against criticism. The changes passed despite complaints by the DPP and tens of thousands of protestors that pan-Blue legislators were rushing the bills into law without adequate transparency. It took Taiwan's Constitutional Court to overrule the changes as in violation of the constitution. The KMT responded by attempting to sideline the Court. Seven of 15 justices finished their terms in October 2024. The KMT got a new law passed that requires a quorum of 10 justices for a valid ruling, then blocked the Lai government's new appointments to the Court. The DDP supported civil society groups in pursuing a campaign to oust KMT legislators through recall votes. The campaign is unprecedented in scope. Up to now, Taiwan has had recall votes for a total of only four legislators in its history, with only one legislator ousted. In July, however, a whopping 24 KMT legislators will face recall voting. Meanwhile, a counter-effort by the KMT to recall 15 DPP legislators appears to have failed. New President Lai Ching-te gets plenty of criticism for the political crisis from Taiwan's pan-Blue opposition, from China, from the US and even from former President Chen Shui-bian, a fellow DPP member. Chen gave a public speech in April, his first in 17 years, arguing that Taiwan's politics have become excessively partisan. Chen said that he disapproves of the recall campaign, that tolerance of contrary opinions is necessary in a democracy, that his party should not stigmatize political opponents as PRC collaborators and that the Lai administration should negotiate with the KMT to allow for effective governance. Chen even suggested that Lai is a dictator who has weaponized Taiwan's judiciary. Lai deserves a share of blame, but not all of it. The single most attention-grabbing anti-China gesture by Lai this year came during his announcement in March of '17 strategies' to counter PRC efforts to influence Taiwan's cross-Strait policy. Lai said the PRC qualifies as a 'hostile overseas force' under Taiwan's Anti-Infiltration Act. That law, passed in 2020 before Lai was president, defines 'hostile overseas forces' as 'countries, political entities or groups' that 'confront us with force' or 'advocate the use of non-peaceful means to endanger the sovereignty of our country.' Since confronting Taiwan with force and threatening to use military violence to prevent Taiwan from formally separating from China are long-standing PRC policies, Lai would seem to be simply stating a fact. Remember also, given the frequent charge that Lai's rhetoric is escalating cross-Strait tensions, that for over two decades the DPP has maintained the position that 'Taiwan is already an independent, sovereign country.' Lai's statements seem neither particularly radical nor ground-breaking. The most valid criticism, perhaps, is that he rejects the idea that accommodating Beijing's sensitivities is necessary to preserve cross-Strait peace. Lai and his advisors believe that the willingness of his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen to take a modestly conciliatory approach toward the PRC only resulted in additional Chinese pressure. Taiwan is a de facto multinational state. Chinese nationalism, which sees Taiwan as part of 'China' (but not necessarily the PRC), contends with Taiwanese nationalism, which sees Taiwan as a separate political entity despite the strong Chinese cultural influence. For the former, Taiwan 'separatism' is treason. To the latter, China is an existential threat. It makes no more sense for PRC officials to call Lai a 'historical criminal' or to castigate him for 'forgetting his roots' than it would make to criticize Americans for not having a monarchy. Democracy is difficult to achieve and difficult to maintain. According to Freedom House, there were no democracies in the world by today's standards as late as the year 1900. (The US and UK were 'electoral autocracies.') Moreover, successful democracies can backslide toward authoritarianism. The quality of democracy in democratic countries has steadily declined over the last two decades. An external military threat makes the task much harder. There is a natural and inescapable tension between upholding civil liberties and ensuring national security when a powerful enemy seeks ways to weaken a state's resilience from within. Taiwan took crucial steps toward democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but that was during the 'million-man swim' era – there was not a realistic prospect of the People's Liberation Army capturing Taiwan by force. The external danger was not strong enough to overwhelm internal demands for political reform. Lai's critics argue that he is using China as an excuse to give his government dictatorial powers. His supporters argue he is taking necessary steps to protect Taiwan from PRC subversion. The important point is that, regardless of the intentions of Lai's actions, they are occurring largely as a result of PRC actions. Even if Lai is acting out of cynical opportunism, China has enabled him. There is no question but that, in addition to exerting concrete military and economic coercion, Beijing is pulling various levers to subvert Taiwan's society toward weakening its resistance to a PRC takeover. Taiwan is an ideal target for United Front operations: a sizeable chunk of the population agrees with the CCP that Taiwan is part of China, and many Taiwanese are reliant on China for their livelihoods, which gives the CPP leverage over them. Some elites in China reportedly are looking to the 1936 Xian Incident as inspiration. In that case, a warlord general aligned with Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government, which was then at war with Mao's Chinese Communist Party forces, arrested Chiang and demanded that he agree to cooperate with the Communists to fight against the invading Japanese in a 'Second United Front' (the first being the Northern Expedition to unify China in 1926—27). The obvious modern parallel to the Xian Incident is China appealing to today's KMT leaders to take action against the DPP government in support of unification. Taiwan's National Security Bureau reports that suspected espionage cases are rising: from 10 in 2022, to 48 in 2023, to 64 in 2024. The Chinese government colludes with organized crime groups on Taiwan, which are traditionally pro-unification. The infamous convicted gang leader Chang An-lo founded the Chinese Unification Promotion Party, repeatedly accused of dispatching gangsters to intimidate opponents of its pro-China agenda. The owner of the China Times Media Group is a Taiwan billionaire who depends heavily on business in China and who says he wants to promote positive views of China. The Group allegedly consults with the PRC government in the shaping of its newspaper and television content presented in Taiwan. China warns other Taiwan businesspeople they must support Beijing's position on Taiwan if they want to keep making money on the Mainland. The PRC government pressures celebrities from Taiwan to make pro-China statements. Chinese sources promote disinformation fed to the Taiwanese public, such as the claim that Taiwan military exercises are actually rehearsals for Taiwan's president and other top officials to flee the island by aircraft in the event a war breaks out. Blue-aligned commentators in Taiwan and PRC propagandists are promoting similar anti-DPP messages. During Taiwan's 2024 election, both groups said a vote for the DPP was a vote for war. Both say Lai is imposing a dictatorship over Taiwan, and both repeat the specific insult of calling Lai's government 'green terror.' The phrase repurposes the term 'white terror,' a reference to the political repression in Taiwan under an authoritarian KMT government during the martial law period. The assassination of 'troublemakers' by the PRC is apparently not off the table. The Czech government recently reported that Chinese diplomats plotted to intentionally crash a vehicle into the car carrying Taiwan's Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during her visit to Prague last year. It's a valid criticism to charge Lai with imposing his Taiwanese nationalism over the objection of those of his fellow Taiwan citizens who are Chinese nationalists. There is also a risk that Lai's approach makes war more likely, as opposed to an approach that prioritizes peace at the cost of failing to fully satisfy Taiwanese nationalism. Lai may be getting ahead of public opinion, as most Taiwan residents want to retain the status quo of de facto independence but also avoid antagonizing China into taking military action. Beijing, however, deserves the stronger criticism. Its military pressure combined with aggressive efforts to cultivate defeatism effectually supply the rationale for Lai's DPP to pull farther away from Beijing's goal of voluntary unification. Of less concern to Beijing, the growing national security challenge is also straining Taiwan's democracy. Denny Roy is a senior f ellow at the East-West Center.
