For India-South Africa maritime partnership to work, it needs to go beyond symbolism

Indian Express

4 days ago

Written by Graham Sherbut and Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy
Late last month, India and South Africa signed two agreements on submarine cooperation during the 9th Joint Defence Committee meeting in Johannesburg. While the specifics of these deals have yet to be fully detailed, their symbolic weight is clear: They signal a potential deepening of maritime ties between influential Indian Ocean powers.
Yet beneath the surface, the agreements also highlight striking asymmetries – in economic strength, strategic coherence, and political stability – that may shape, and potentially constrain, this budding 'Southern maritime partnership'.
India and South Africa have long shared warm relations, rooted in anti-Apartheid solidarity and broader Global South cooperation. New Delhi and Pretoria have stood side-by-side in multilateral platforms like BRICS and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), calling for more equitable global governance and a greater role for the Global South in shaping international priorities. However, translating this solidarity into concrete security partnerships has remained elusive.
The submarine cooperation agreements mark a bold shift, at least on paper, from rhetorical alignment to operational cooperation. Yet the underlying power dynamics between the two countries have become more pronounced over the past decade. India's economic and strategic ascent under Narendra Modi's BJP government contrasts sharply with South Africa's stagnation under the often cautious and fragmented leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa's African National Congress (ANC). Given these disparities, India is far better positioned to lead and shape this emerging bilateral partnership.
India has emerged as a confident regional power with growing economic clout, a robust defence manufacturing sector, and a clear maritime strategy articulated through its 'MAHASAGAR' (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) vision. Its investments in indigenous naval production – including the locally-built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and advanced destroyers like the Visakhapatnam class – and its expanding naval footprint across Africa's Indian Ocean rim reflect an ambition to become the principal security provider in the region.
By contrast, South Africa has struggled to convert its diplomatic prestige into strategic muscle. Years of economic stagnation, underinvestment in defence, and a declining shipbuilding sector have weakened its maritime capabilities. While South Africa's geostrategic location — straddling the Indian and Atlantic Oceans — offers natural advantages, particularly as security concerns in the Suez Canal again elevate the importance of the Cape of Good Hope as a global shipping hub, its ability to act decisively on maritime security has been undermined by chronic budget constraints and domestic political distractions.
For any ambitious defence partnership to succeed, sustained political will is essential. In India, PM Modi's administration has consistently prioritised defence modernisation and strategic partnerships as pillars of its rise as a global power. This has allowed India to allocate resources and maintain focus even amid electoral cycles.
South Africa, however, faces a far more fragile political landscape. The ANC, long the dominant party, is now navigating an uncomfortable coalition with its long-time opponent, the Democratic Alliance, forcing leaders to focus inward on domestic stability rather than outward on strategic initiatives. At the same time, South Africa's foreign policy has often prioritised ideological solidarity and support for liberation movements over concrete security interests.
Maintaining consistent attention and investment in submarine cooperation, or broader maritime security initiatives with India, will thus be an uphill battle. The temptation to retreat to symbolic gestures rather than substantive commitments may prove hard to resist in Pretoria. Domestic priorities such as economic recovery, addressing inequality, and stabilising coalition politics are likely to overshadow external security partnerships. In this environment, defence cooperation risks becoming a lower priority, easily sidelined in favour of more immediate social and political concerns. Unless Pretoria can reconcile its ideological commitments with practical security needs and sustain a long-term vision for its navy, it may find itself unable to match India's ambition, relegating South Africa to the role of a junior, more passive partner in this emerging maritime relationship.
Beyond domestic constraints, India and South Africa fundamentally differ in how they perceive their maritime roles. India views the Indian Ocean as central to its economic and strategic future, an arena where it aspires to offer more equitable partnership choices and is increasingly seen as both a net security provider and a development partner to regional states.
For South Africa, maritime security is important but not existential. While it recognises the need to secure the southern sea lanes and combat threats like illegal fishing and trafficking, its primary foreign policy energy remains focused on continental African issues and domestic socio-economic challenges. This divergence means that while India is likely to push for operational depth in this partnership, including joint exercises, coordinated patrols, and technology transfers, South Africa may struggle to match the ambition, both politically and materially.
There is no doubt that the submarine agreements represent a promising new chapter in India–South Africa relations. Submarine cooperation is among the most sensitive areas of military engagement, demanding high levels of trust and interoperability. On paper, these deals hold the promise of jointly strengthening Indian Ocean security, boosting anti-piracy capabilities, and providing a partial counterweight to China's expanding naval reach.
Yet for this potential to materialise, both countries must move beyond symbolic gestures. South Africa, in particular, will need to address its economic constraints and overcome internal political distractions to sustain meaningful participation. For India, the challenge lies in ensuring that its growing network of African partnerships translates into tangible outcomes rather than stalling at the level of declarations and high-profile visits. Without careful follow-through, this 'Southern maritime partnership' risks becoming more of an aspirational slogan rather than a true strategic reality.
Sherbut is founder, Tantara Development Insights, and Chaturvedy is associate professor and head School of International Relations and Peace Studies, and founding coordinator of the Centre for Bay of Bengal Studies, Nalanda University