'Lack of religious directive': Why didn't Hezbollah join Iran in the war against Israel?

Yahoo

7 hours ago

Expert Tal Beeri discussed how it is unknown why the religious directive had not been given, but if it were, Hezbollah would have joined the war against Israel on Iran's side.
Hezbollah refrained from entering the war between Israel and Iran on Iran's side due to a lack of religious directive, expert Tal Beeri said.
Beeri is the head of the Research Department at the Alma Center for the Study of Security Challenges in the North. He has published a detailed analysis titled 'Why Didn't Hezbollah Join Iran in the War against Israel?' In it, the Middle East expert challenged prevailing explanations for Hezbollah's decision to refrain from entering the war on Iran's side and also discussed the perceived gap between Hezbollah's weakness and the actual reality.
Beeri noted: 'There is a significant gap between the existing portrayal of Hezbollah's supposed weakness and the actual reality.'
Beeri discussed the conflict that unfolded between June 13 and June 24, 2025 — 'Operation Rising Lion' — during which Israel engaged Iran directly. He argued that, contrary to common belief, Hezbollah did not join the fighting not due to deterrence or domestic pressures, but for a singular reason: 'It did not receive a religious directive.'
He emphasized, 'Throughout the war against Iran, from June 13 to June 24, 2025, Hezbollah refrained from joining the fighting alongside Iran against Israel. This was the case even as Israel continued its aggressive 'mowing the grass' strategy against Hezbollah's activities in Lebanon, targeting the group's infrastructure and eliminating operatives.'
Beeri outlines the two most common explanations for Hezbollah's restraint: Firstly, internal Lebanese pressure suggests that Hezbollah's influence is weakening due to social, political, and economic challenges in Lebanon.
Secondly, external deterrence by Israel - asserting that Hezbollah is held back by Israeli military pressure and the consequences of past confrontations.
However, Beeri found both arguments insufficient: 'The internal aspect certainly exists,' he conceded. 'But in our understanding, the argument that leans on this overestimates its influence on Hezbollah's status and decision-making. There is a wide gap between the current narrative of Hezbollah's alleged weakness and the actual situation.'
Hezbollah's civilian support structure — referred to as the Resistance Society — remains intact, Beeri explains. The group's Shi'ite base, described as a 'captive audience,' continues to benefit from a robust infrastructure operated by Hezbollah's Executive Council, functioning in parallel to the deteriorating Lebanese state.
Beeri acknowledged: 'There are quite a few financial difficulties in supporting civilian reconstruction,' but insisted the infrastructure still operates.
'Hezbollah can only be meaningfully affected by pressure from its Shi'ite base. Is that pressure currently significant? The answer is no, mainly because of the 'captive audience' principle.'
He warned against misreading the group's current stance: 'The claim that Hezbollah is deterred creates a dangerous illusion and takes us back to the days before October 7, 2023.'
To reinforce his argument, Beeri cited Ibrahim Al-Amin, editor-in-chief of Al-Akhbar, Hezbollah's main media outlet. A week before the ceasefire on November 27, 2024, Al-Amin wrote: 'The current round [Hezbollah's fighting against Israel that began on October 8, 2023] is just another phase in the war against Israel, which must be destroyed. Hezbollah will work to rebuild its capabilities and regain strength…'
Beeri explained: 'There is no peace. There are no compromises. There is only one ideology — endless armed resistance. Hezbollah's core — armed resistance — is not a means but an identity. Hezbollah is here to stay.'
He continued: 'The word 'deterred' doesn't exist in the vocabulary of an extremist ideological–religious organization like Hezbollah (or Hamas). Decisions about launching military or terrorist operations are based on religious directives. Any relevant interest (in this case, rehabilitation) is only a supporting factor in the decision-making process.'
According to Beeri, 'No religious directive was issued to Hezbollah to join Iran in the war against Israel. While there were reportedly Iranian pressures on Hezbollah at the operational–military level, the religious directive never came. It did not come from the Wilayat al-Faqih — that is, neither Iran's Supreme Leader nor Hezbollah's current leader issued such a command.'
He argued that Hezbollah's need to rebuild — especially militarily — reinforced its choice to avoid escalation:
'Hezbollah needs time. Hezbollah needs 'reconstruction quiet.' Therefore, its interest was to avoid a major escalation with Israel that could severely undermine its rebuilding efforts.'
Hezbollah, Beeri noted, has factored the Israeli strategy of 'mowing the grass' into its current risk calculus:
'The current state of Israeli 'mowing the grass' is one that Hezbollah can absorb while still managing reasonable reconstruction.'
'We don't know why the religious directive didn't come or whether it was even considered. But if it had come, Hezbollah would have joined the war alongside Iran. In that case, the popular claims of internal Lebanese pressure or deterrence would have collapsed.'
In conclusion, Beeri stressed that Israel has inflicted significant damage to Hezbollah's military capabilities — but not destroyed them. Despite mounting challenges, which could worsen in the post-Iran war period, Hezbollah's efforts to rebuild and rearm are well underway.
He suggested existing resources may now be directed more toward military restoration, even at the expense of civilian services to its base, which remains a 'captive audience.'
Beeri concluded, 'Hezbollah's various units are rebuilding and adjusting their operational plans, 'rerouting,' restoring capabilities and even preparing infrastructure for terrorist activity against Israel — both within Lebanon and beyond. In our assessment, Hezbollah's relevant units are capable of launching operations against Israel at any given moment.'
'Given the command — the religious directive — Hezbollah could have joined the war alongside Iran, both in terms of arsenal redundancy and operational–military capacity.'