Iran and Israel's decades-long shadow war
This marks the latest escalation between the two as fears of an all-out war rise. Iran and Israel have been sworn enemies for decades and have engaged in clandestine operations and cyber attacks. But, since the war in Gaza broke out in October, 2023, the two countries have also engaged in open warfare.
1979: Iran's pro-Western leader, Mohammad Reza Shah, who regarded Israel as an ally, is swept from power in a revolution that sees the establishment of the Islamic Republic.
1982: Israel invades Lebanon and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps work with fellow Shiite Muslims to set up Hezbollah. The group will become one of Israel's most dangerous adversaries.
1983: Iran-backed Hezbollah uses suicide bombings to expel Western and Israeli forces from Lebanon. In November, a car packed with explosives drives into the Lebanon headquarters of Israel's military. Israel later withdraws from much of Lebanon.
1992-94: Argentina and Israel accuse Iran and Hezbollah of orchestrating suicide bombings at Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and a Jewish centre in the city in 1994, each of which killed dozens of people.
2006: Israel invades Lebanon but is unable to crush Hezbollah.
2009: In a speech, Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei calls Israel 'a dangerous and fatal cancer'.
2010: Stuxnet, a malicious computer virus widely believed to have been developed by the US and Israel, is used to attack a uranium enrichment facility at Iran's Natanz nuclear site. It is the first publicly known cyber attack on industrial machinery.
2012: Iranian nuclear scientist Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan is killed by a bomb placed on his car by a motorcyclist in Tehran. A city official blames Israel for the attack.
2018: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hails President Donald Trump's withdrawal of the US from the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, after years of lobbying against the agreement.
2020: Israel welcomes the assassination of General Qassem Suleimani, commander of the Quds Force, the overseas arm of the IRGC, in an American drone strike in Baghdad.
2021: Iran blames Israel for the 2020 assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, viewed by Western intelligence services as the mastermind of a covert Iranian programme to develop nuclear weapons capability.
2022: US president Joe Biden and Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid sign a joint pledge to deny Iran nuclear arms, in a show of unity by allies long divided over diplomacy with Tehran.
April, 2024: A suspected Israeli air strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus kills seven IRGC officers, including two senior commanders. Iran responds with a barrage of drones and missiles in an unprecedented direct attack on Israeli territory on April 13. This prompts Israel to launch a strike on Iranian soil on April 19.
July, 2024: Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh killed in Tehran.
October, 2024: Iran fires more than 180 missiles at Israel in what it calls revenge for the killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on September 27, in an air strike on Beirut's southern suburbs, and the killing of Haniyeh.
Israel strikes military sites in Iran later in the month, saying it was retaliating against Tehran's attacks. Iran reports 'limited damage' to some locations.
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EVN Report
a day ago
- EVN Report
Armenia, the 12-Day War and Strategic Ambiguity
On June 13, a development that Armenia's political leadership, past and present, had feared as one that would place Armenia in an impossible position, materialized when Israel unleashed the 12-Day War against Iran to destroy Tehrans's burgeoning nuclear program. On June 22, the United States joined the onslaught by striking the Fordow, Isfahan and Natanz nuclear sites with B-52 bombers and Tomahawk missiles. In practical terms, the entirety of Iran's air defense capabilities were destroyed, allowing Israel and the U.S. complete aerial superiority, with Iran's ballistic missile sites, military bases, and military leadership becoming sitting ducks. In the broader theater of war, in what was to be a competition for regional hegemony, Iran was reduced to a paper tiger, having no deterrence capacity against the U.S.-Israel tandem. From the geostrategic perspective of Israel and America, not only did the Shia Crescent (also referred to as the Axis of Resistance) collapse, but more specifically, Iran's ability to be an effective regional actor was exponentially diminished. Iran's regional grand strategy, which for 40 years had been successfully developed through asymmetrical modeling, had relied on its expansive network of regional proxy militias and footholds in Iraq and Syria. Israel's decimation of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which was the most powerful and strategically important of proxies that Iran had developed since the 1980s, dismantled an important instrument in Iran's toolkit. The subsequent collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and Tehran's loss of what had become its quasi-client state, further severed the strategic tentacles defining Iran's power-projection capacity. In this context, the main instruments within Iran's asymmetrical model, which had served as the foundational framework of the Shia Crescent, had been neutralized. Collectively, the security architecture that Iran had meticulously built in the last 40 years eroded in a one-year time span. That is, whatever mechanisms of strategic depth and layers of deterrence that Iran had developed have now been dismantled. This, in turn, brings about an important question: how will Iran rebuild its deterrence capability, and considering the failure of the asymmetrical model, what other options remain open for Tehran? The answer is quite straightforward: if Iran operated off of the logic that it could preserve its security architecture while negotiating a nuclear deal with the U.S., this paradigm is now dead. This leads to one tenable alternative for Tehran, and that is to develop a nuclear weapon as soon as possible. In essence, having been painted into a corner, Iran is even more incentivized now to develop its nuclear program, lest it concedes that it is truly a paper tiger with almost no substantive deterrence capability. Herein lies the conundrum at hand, and for Armenia's regional foreign and security policy, an extraordinarily complex and structurally difficult position to be in. Unfortunately, it is a dilemma that cannot be resolved without another war. Iran, for reasons outlined above, and in pursuit of what it sees as advancing its national interest, will neither abandon nor dismantle its nuclear program, viewing it as the only tenable deterrent against its regional enemy. Israel, on the other hand, along with the U.S., will never tolerate the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear weapon. These positions are not open to compromise or interpretation, but rather, are very clear and concrete postures that place both sides on an inevitable collision course again. If Iran abandons its nuclear program, the regime will very likely collapse, since a regime that espouses strength and regional dominance will not be able to domestically bear the costs of assuming such a weakened and humiliated posture. Especially following Israel's unequivocal dominance in the 12-Day War, official Tehran will have no other options but to proceed, in whatever iteration, with the process of quickly developing nuclear deterrence. Israel and the United States, ever vigilant, will not hesitate, not for a second, especially after the precedent set with the 12-Day War, to immediately unleash another attack against Iran. In more simple terms, the 12-Day War was not a singular event, but rather, it is and will be the first of more to come, until the conundrum is resolved. And from the perspective of the Israeli-U.S. tandem, the resolution is quite clear: regime change. Not as a matter of some ideological precept, but rather, from their perspective, a solution to the conundrum: as long as the current regime is in power, Iran will never give up its nuclear program. Removing the regime, then, is being equated with ending the nuclear program. Whether this will be successful or not is besides the point, but what matters to Armenia is the growing contours of this conundrum and the implications of its attempted resolution. U.S.-Armenia relations are extraordinarily strong, as Washington has played a crucial role in the last two years of restraining Azerbaijan and utilizing acute diplomatic pressure to deter Baku from incursion or re-initiation of hostilities, while also taking the lead in advancing the peace process. Further, as strategic partners, U.S.-Armenia relations are growing quite rapidly, from security cooperation to deepening of diplomatic relations to economic and technological engagements to strengthening Armenia's energy independence. For official Yerevan, the relationship with the United States, at this point, is the most important bilateral relationship in its portfolio. For over three decades, Armenia and Iran have maintained healthy and stable relations. Tehran has consistently demonstrated diplomatic support for Armenia against Baku's aggression and has served as a vital logistical route south, particularly crucial given that Armenia has been surrounded and blockaded by its predatory neighbors. Similar to Georgia in the north, Iran has served as a lifeline for Armenia to the south. Stability in Iran is of utmost importance to Armenia, and any developments that can lead to fracture, destabilization, and thus threaten Armenia's access to its south poses immense dangers to Armenian strategic interests. In the confluence of Iran's conflict with the U.S.-Israeli tandem, Armenia's situation not only borders the impossible, but in the domain of risk analysis, produces a lose-lose framework. In essence, Armenia has nothing to gain from any future wars between the two sides, yet a lot to lose with respect to logistics, economy, and potential humanitarian crisis to its south. How can Armenia manage this exceedingly complex and volatile situation, while mitigating its own vulnerabilities and situating itself in the best position possible regardless of outcome? Armenia's policy, as it stands and going forward, will be defined by strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity is the tactical act of being deliberately ambiguous with respect to specific decision-making processes, operations, or policy positions. It is a mechanism of directly avoiding conflict, not being drawn into a quagmire, and allowing a state to manage a crisis situation without being forced to choose sides between warring powers. The scope of strategic ambiguity for large or middle powers is quite different than that of small states, for large or middle powers use strategic ambiguity to cultivate uncertainty, thus keeping their enemies or allies guessing, which offers the given power flexibility and an enhanced toolkit in advancing its policy interests. For small states, strategic ambiguity is more confined, as it is used primarily as a tool of risk-aversion, and it is mostly a tactical act, as opposed to a grand strategy. Within the doctrine of strategic ambiguity, Armenia's preferred policy position is more specifically known as 'situational ambiguity.' In this context, U.S.-Armenia relations or Armenia-Iran relations are not defined by strategic ambiguity, since there is clarity, structure, and functional engagement with each bilateral partner on a wide range of issues. Hence, the stipulation that strategic ambiguity, for Armenia, is not a grand strategy or foreign policy doctrine. But within the specific domain of conflict, such as the 12-Day War, and anticipated reinitiation of hostilities in the future, Armenia's tactical preference becomes strategic ambiguity, or more precisely, situational ambiguity. Thus, in the event of another war between Iran and the US-Israeli tandem, Armenia's policy position, as it pertains to this situation , will be defined by strategic ambiguity. For official Yerevan, strategic ambiguity will be operationalized through the following logic: ambiguity shall be strategically used to foster agreement on abstractions without stipulating specific interpretations. Thus, Armenia will rely on fostering such abstractions that are commensurate with its interests, while also finding agreements with those of the conflicting parties: Armenia will call for peace, mutual restraint, serve as a bridge in conflict-resolution, support post-conflict stabilization initiatives, promote resolutions to humanitarian concerns, and communicate Armenia's limited agency in the war with each side. What Armenia will not and cannot do is engage in specific interpretations, signal or indicate preferred outcomes, or much worse, choose a side. The objective of situational ambiguity is to manage the complex process of not being drawn into the narrative of the conflict, because if a state is drawn into the narrative of the conflict, they will then be forced to choose sides. For Armenia, not only would this represent a highly-dangerous trap, but more so, a high-risk lose-lose situation. The fundamental objective of Armenia's use of strategic ambiguity will be two-fold: first, to avoid entanglement, and second, to avoid defection from partner states. Thus, not to be drawn into the conflict or be pulled into having to choose sides remains the primary postulate in entanglement-avoidance. Second, to make certain that neither of the partners defects from the partnership, that is, making certain that relations are not harmed due to Armenia not meeting the presumed expectations of that partner. Strategic ambiguity allows for the management of such expectations with partners, as it relies on situational configurations, while not touching the wide range of factors that define the bilateral relationship. In this context, Armenia cannot and will not take sides in the next flare-up, and this is not a position that is defined by values or preferences, but rather, the hard core interests of Armenia. It does not matter whether Armenia wants Iran to be successful in the conflict, or for the U.S.-Israeli tandem to destroy Iran's nuclear program, or for there to be regime change, or for the regime to continue to survive, or for there to be a compromise that strengthens one side over the other. All of this is immaterial, because Armenia has no agency in shaping or defining such developments. Armenia cannot 'balance' the two sides that are at war; balancing is a broad, long-term geostrategic initiative, not a situational act. Thus, Armenia has no concrete policy preference with respect to such developments. What Armenia has, and will have, are 'agreements on abstractions,' such as achieving peace and stability between the warring sides: anything other than this, such as 'stipulating specific interpretations,' will be against the strategic interests of the Armenian Republic. What many pundits, pseudo-analysts, Diasporan social media warriors, and even well-intentioned idealogues fail to understand is that Armenia does not have the luxury to moralize, take sides, or even hedge a preferred outcome. In the domain of risk-propensity, such alternatives are so high-risk that they border on the irrational. It is for this reason that it is against the national interests of Armenia to entangle itself, in any iteration, whether rhetorically or substantively, in the ever-evolving conflict to its south. Indeed, lamentations on values, principled opposition to aggression, and emotive anger at perceptions of unjust war will always be a constant feature of the social media ecosystem that drives much of the public discourse in Armenia and the Diaspora. And in of itself, that is a good thing, for open discourse is vital to a healthy political culture. But geopolitical and geostrategic realities do not care for values, principled opposition, or emotive anger. What has and will define Armenia's approach is the empirical treatment of risk. Armenia cannot engage in 'risk-seeking' behavior when the 'gain-loss asymmetry' unequivocally stipulates that Armenia must be risk-averse with respect to this specific situation. To this end, Armenia does not operate in the domain of gains when it comes to the conflict between Iran and the U.S.-Israeli tandem, but rather, Armenia operates in the domain of mitigated losses. And when a state has to operate within this domain, strategic ambiguity and situational ambiguity are the most preferred policy positions.
Libyan Express
6 days ago
- Libyan Express
Power, dominance and the fractured Middle East
Ahmed Mayouf, Libyan analyst, warns of the region's slide from influence to existential threat In the years following the incomplete revolutions of the Arab Spring, a fundamental reality has come into sharper focus: nearly every state, whether powerful or peripheral, seeks to assert hegemony—be it political, economic, cultural or military. This pursuit of influence is not confined to global superpowers. It is a defining feature of international relations today, shaped by a fluid global order where national interests increasingly override shared principles. While some states have resisted such efforts—either through internal cohesion between the people and their rulers, or through the endurance of institutional structures—external attempts at domination have continued. The erosion of the post-war international system and the decline of multilateral norms have only emboldened expansionist actors. In this shifting landscape, two powers—Iran and Israel—stand out as key architects of new regional dynamics. Each pursues a distinct project of influence, shaped by history, ideology, and hard power. Yet, the implications of their ambitions differ in scope and consequence. Iran: Ideology and strategic depth Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has pursued a long-term vision to shape the Middle East through a combination of ideological influence, strategic alliances, and calculated geopolitical manoeuvres. Ayatollah Khomeini's call for 'exporting the revolution' and 'awakening the Islamic world' signalled Tehran's intent to become the vanguard of a transnational Islamic resurgence. While this rhetoric was not explicitly aimed at dismantling nation-states, it did promote political independence from Western powers and a reimagined regional order grounded in Islamic unity. Over the decades, Iran has operationalised this vision by forging alliances with non-state actors and governments that share its opposition to Western dominance. From Hezbollah in Lebanon, to the Houthis in Yemen, to the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, and its enduring alliance with the Assad regime in Syria, Iran has developed a regional network of influence that has proven highly resilient. Iran's perception of threat has been equally influential in shaping its strategy. The presence of American military bases across the Gulf, alongside Israel's regional footprint, is viewed in Tehran as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and national security. In response, Iran has pursued 'strategic depth' by projecting power beyond its borders, establishing influence over neighbouring states, and controlling chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery through which 20% of the world's oil and gas flows. This geographical leverage has enhanced its bargaining power not only with regional actors but with global powers reliant on energy security. Yet Iran's ambitions are not pursued through outright occupation. Instead, it relies on ideological appeal, asymmetrical warfare, and proxy networks. Through this approach, it has carved a sphere of influence that extends from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean—a formation often referred to as the 'Shia Crescent.' Despite some setbacks, particularly in Syria following shifts in the Assad regime's fortunes, Iran has succeeded in embedding itself within the region's political and security landscape. Israel: From survival to supremacy If Iran's project is ideological and defensive in origin, Israel's project is fundamentally existential and expansionist in trajectory. Since its creation in 1948, Israel has operated within a regional environment that questions its legitimacy. In response, it has adopted a posture grounded in security imperatives and strategic superiority. Over time, however, this has evolved into a more assertive quest for political normalisation, territorial consolidation, and demographic engineering. Israel's security doctrine, once centred on deterrence and survival, has expanded to include a range of political and ideological objectives. At the heart of these lies the ambition to be recognised not merely as a state, but as the nation-state of the Jewish people—a status formalised in the 2018 Jewish Nation-State Law. This law, passed by the Knesset, declared Israel as the exclusive national home of the Jewish people and downgraded the status of Arabic from an official language to one of 'special standing.' Though symbolic, it carries profound implications, entrenching legal inequalities and signalling a vision of the state that excludes its Arab citizens and Palestinians under occupation. This internal legislative shift is mirrored by an external diplomatic campaign. Over recent decades, Israel has succeeded in breaking Arab consensus on Palestine by normalising ties with key Arab states. From the Camp David Accords with Egypt, to the Wadi Araba Treaty with Jordan, and more recently the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Israel has progressively dismantled the historical Arab front against normalisation. The strategic result is twofold: the marginalisation of the Palestinian cause and the legitimisation of Israeli regional leadership. Were it not for the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, more Arab states might have joined this path. Instead, the war on Gaza has crystallised a new phase in Israel's trajectory—one that moves beyond occupation to what many observers now describe as systematic ethnic cleansing, enabled by overwhelming Western support and in open defiance of international humanitarian law. A regional reckoning The current reality in Gaza, marked by mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and the collapse of humanitarian systems, represents more than a military campaign. It signals an Israeli strategy to permanently alter the demographics of Palestine, thereby resolving its so-called 'demographic dilemma' through force rather than negotiation. In this sense, Israel's hegemonic ambitions are not merely political—they are existential in their impact on others. The goal is not just influence, but erasure. In comparison, Iran's project—however destabilising—is rooted in strategic depth and deterrence. It seeks influence without necessarily dismantling states. Israel, on the other hand, is now engaged in reshaping borders, narratives, and entire populations. Its expansionist logic, some fear, aligns with earlier Zionist visions of a Greater Israel stretching 'from the Nile to the Euphrates.' This comparison is not meant to justify Iranian interference or downplay its impact. Iran's role in fuelling regional polarisation is real. But it does underscore the disparity in scope and intent. Where Iran seeks regional leverage, Israel appears to seek regional supremacy. Conclusion: The anatomy of hegemony Hegemony is not a static concept. It evolves with power, narrative, and opportunity. Many states, including Libya under Gaddafi, have sought regional influence, often projecting ideology or capital to assert leadership. Saudi Arabia exported Wahhabism; Qatar used the Muslim Brotherhood as a tool of soft power; the UAE has leveraged its economic might to counter revolutionary movements and reshape post-Arab Spring transitions. Yet none of these actors pose the same existential threat to the region as Israel currently does. Israel's project, bolstered by diplomatic cover, military superiority, and ideological conviction, aims not just at dominance—but at the displacement and elimination of a people. The forced demographic restructuring of Palestine, should it continue unchecked, could serve as a blueprint for similar campaigns elsewhere. If today Iran is the primary target of containment, tomorrow others may face the expansionist appetite of a state emboldened by impunity. The lessons of the Arab world's silence and complicity in the face of unfolding tragedy will not be forgotten. In the end, the region must ask: is it hegemony we fear—or annihilation we are failing to prevent?
LBCI
13-06-2025
- LBCI
New blast heard at key uranium enrichment site in Iran center: State TV
A new explosion was heard Friday morning at a key uranium enrichment site in central Iran, state television reported, after Israel launched air strikes against the Islamic Republic. "New explosion heard at Natanz uranium enrichment facility" in Isfahan province, the broadcaster reported, showing thick black smoke rising from the facility.
