Top Trump Aide Accuses India of Financing Russia's War in Ukraine
'What he (Trump) said very clearly is that it is not acceptable for India to continue financing this war by purchasing the oil from Russia,' said Stephen Miller, deputy chief of staff at the White House and one of Trump's most influential aides.
Miller's criticism was some of the strongest yet by the Trump administration about one of the United States' major partners in the Indo-Pacific.
'People will be shocked to learn that India is basically tied with China in purchasing Russian oil. That's an astonishing fact,' Miller said on Fox News' 'Sunday Morning Futures.'
The Indian Embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Indian government sources told Reuters on Saturday that New Delhi will keep purchasing oil from Moscow despite U.S. threats.
A 25% tariff on Indian products went into effect on Friday as a result of its purchase of military equipment and energy from Russia. Trump has also threatened 100% tariffs on U.S. imports from countries that buy Russian oil unless Moscow reaches a major peace deal with Ukraine.
Miller tempered his criticism by noting Trump's relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which he described as 'tremendous.'
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Energy from the North? Japan Eyes the Promise and Perils of Alaskan Gas Investment
Among the barrage of executive orders that US President Donald Trump issued upon taking office in January 2025 is one titled Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential, which proclaims the need to tap the state's natural resources, including liquefied natural gas, to rein in inflation, create jobs, correct trade imbalances, boost America's global clout, and counter moves by foreign powers to weaponize energy supplies. In conjunction with this policy, the Trump administration is urging Japan—under pressure from tough tariff negotiations—to invest in the Alaska LNG project, a costly plan to pipe gas across the state, liquefy it, and ship it to East Asian countries. Liquefied natural gas has a long history in Alaska. Japan's very first imports of LNG, back in 1969, were shipped from the state. But apart from the name, the Alaska LNG project being pushed by the White House has very little in common with its predecessor. Under the earlier plan, natural gas was extracted from reserves on the Kenai Peninsula on the south coast of Alaska, where it was processed into LNG and loaded onto ships for export. Total capacity was only about 1.5 million tons a year. Beginning in 2015, global LNG prices dropped as supplies increased and demand weakened, and it became increasingly difficult for Alaska to compete with other suppliers. In 2017, Alaska LNG's operations were shut down. The new Alaska LNG development project proposes to tap the North Slope gas fields on the Arctic Ocean coast in northern Alaska. A 1,300-kilometer trans-Alaska pipeline would transport the gas all the way down to the Kenai Peninsula, where chilling facilities would produce up to 20 million tons of LNG annually. Alaska Gasline Development Corp. (AGDC), the independent public corporation heading up the project (including construction of a natural-gas pipeline and liquefaction plant) hopes to begin shipping LNG around 2030. Alaska depends heavily on locally extracted natural gas for its own heating and industrial purposes, and the Kenai Peninsula's gas reserves have been dwindling, with supplies expected to run out sometime in the mid-2030s. For the state, therefore, development of the North Slope fields promises a new source of affordable energy for Alaskans, as well as significant revenue from exports. LNG Demand in East Asia In February 2025, the Japanese government released its Seventh Strategic Energy Plan, which calculates the outlook for energy supply and demand in 2040. Alongside its basic energy outlook, the plan incorporates an alternative scenario in which the official targets for adoption of nonfossil fuels (such as renewable energy and hydrogen) are not met. If the goals are achieved, demand for LNG in fiscal 2040 is expected to drop from the current level of 66 million tons (fiscal 2022) to somewhere between 54 million and 60 million tons. If the country falls short of the targets, though, it will need an estimated 74 million tons of LNG. In short, a certain level of demand for LNG is expected to persist through 2040. In the interim, the long-term contracts under which Japanese utilities and trading companies purchase LNG are coming up for renewal. New contracts will have to be signed to ensure a stable energy supply farther down the road, and Alaska LNG is one potential supplier. South Korea and Taiwan are in a similar position. Much like Japan, South Korea can only guess at the amount of energy renewables will be able to supply over the next 10 or 20 years. Taiwan, which shut down its last operating nuclear power plant in May this year, has adopted an energy strategy that calls for converting coal-fired plants to natural gas. All three countries have a clear need for LNG going forward, presenting a business opportunity for Alaska LNG. Geographical Merits Clearly, Alaska LNG enjoys the Trump administration's enthusiastic backing, but what are the relative benefits for Japan and its neighbors? The biggest advantage is probably geographical proximity. Japan already imports LNG from the United States, but those shipments originate in the Gulf of Mexico. The shortest route, through the Panama Canal, is about 17,000 kilometers. Moreover, because congestion has made it difficult for LNG tankers to transit the canal, the preferred route nowadays is around the Cape of Good Hope, a 29,000-kilometer trip. The southern coast of Alaska, by contrast, is only about 6,000 kilometers from Japan. The shorter distance and shipping time would mean lower transportation costs and more flexible delivery schedules. Shipping from Alaska is also attractive from the standpoint of safety of navigation. LNG from Qatar typically passes through the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca before traveling north through the South China Sea. The Strait of Hormuz poses safety risks whenever the situation in the Middle East is unstable, and piracy continues to be an issue in the Strait of Malacca. China's increasingly assertive activity in the South China Sea, most of which it claims as its own territory, makes navigation problematic there. Shipping LNG from Alaska is a way of avoiding these safety risks. Cost Questions Remain But the Alaska LNG plan raises some serious questions centered on costs and lead time. Gas from the North Slope is inexpensive in and of itself, but the construction of a new gas treatment plant on the North Slope, a trans-Alaska pipeline, and a liquefaction plant on the Kenai Peninsula would incur enormous costs. An early estimate by the developer put the total expense at about $44 billion, but inflation has pushed up construction costs since then, and the challenges of laying pipeline through permafrost areas could add significantly to the expense. Any final decision must await a detailed, independent analysis, which will doubtless yield a higher price tag. For purposes of comparison, one might note that total investment in the Rio Grande LNG project, now under construction in Brownsville, Texas, is estimated at roughly $20 billion. To be sure, the two projects differ significantly in terms of the scale of construction and the kinds of expenses involved, but the comparison helps put the cost of the Alaska LNG project in perspective. The high initial investment required augments the challenges of financing the project and could also push up the selling price of the LNG thus produced. Bad Timing? The long lead time required for Alaska LNG to launch commercial operations is problematic on several counts. First, it could affect Alaska LNG's ability to compete with other LNG projects targeting Asian markets, including various US ventures, a Canadian project that began shipping LNG from the Pacific Coast in May 2025, and plans to expand production in Qatar. In short, Asian customers have multiple options for investing in and importing natural gas, and they will only choose Alaska LNG if it suits their needs with respect to timing and terms of sale. This is especially true in Japan, where most of the importers are private companies. In South Korea and Taiwan, where public corporations handle the importation of LNG, political considerations may play some role in purchasing decisions, but even so, buyers will have to decide whether the political benefits are worth the additional costs. Second, under the current timeline, Alaska LNG will not begin exporting until after the end of Trump's second term of office in January 2029. We have witnessed firsthand the policy U-turns that can result when a new president from a different party takes control in Washington. The next administration might well resurrect the environmental protections and climate-change policies that Trump has discarded, a shift that could spell trouble for Alaska LNG. Long-term business decisions require a measure of policy predictability, and in this key respect, the United States has become a high-risk country. The third issue with Alaska LNG's long lead time pertains to the target year for achieving net zero carbon emissions. Demand for LNG from Japanese and other East Asian importers is bound to decline sharply as the 2050 target year approaches. A 20-year LNG contract concluded in 2030 will last through 2049. If long-term contracts are needed to secure funding for the future, then it makes sense to begin export operations as soon as possible. Alaska LNG has very little time to spare. A Narrow Window of Opportunity Plans for tapping the North Slope's natural gas resources have been around for decades, but they have stalled repeatedly in the face of financial and political obstacles. Trump's executive order Unleashing Alaska's Extraordinary Resource Potential presents an unprecedented opportunity for the Alaska LNG project. But given Trump's term of office and the looming net-zero deadline, the window of opportunity is narrow. Ultimately, speed and cost will determine whether Alaska LNG can tap into the East Asian market. In terms of speed, the project needs to make concrete progress—meaning a final investment decision and initial construction—soon, while the political winds are still favorable. Otherwise, the project will lose momentum, and the market will be snapped up by competing LNG projects. The importance of cost considerations goes without saying. It would be foolish to overrate the value of Alaska LNG solely on the basis of geography. That said, if Alaska LNG can offer its product at a price comparable to that of competitors, then its geographical location becomes a powerful inducement, vastly increasing its chances of claiming a share of the East Asian market. (Originally published in Japanese on July 25, 2025. Banner photo: A liquefied natural gas tanker arrives at Futtsu Power Station in Futtsu, Chiba Prefecture, in February 2023. © Kyodo.)
The Diplomat
2 hours ago
- The Diplomat
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NHK
3 hours ago
- NHK
Fired U.S. federal workers may be prey of China
Thousands of US federal workers laid off by President Trump's government may be at risk for recruitment by fake Chinese firms.
